


JPRS-NEA-90-017
21 MARCH 1990



**FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE**

JPRS Report

Near East & South Asia

Near East & South Asia

JPRS-NEA-90-017

CONTENTS

21 MARCH 1990

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

Activities of Religious Heads Reported	1
Cilician Catholicos in Iran [Paris GAMK 11 Jan]	1
Catholicos Vazken [Paris GAMK 11 Jan]	1
Communal Problems in Turkey Detailed [Paris GAMK 12 Jan]	1
Communique of Cultural Ties Committee [Paris GAMK 15-16 Jan]	2
Calls for Independence Scored [Paris GAMK 17-21 Jan]	4
Mobilization of 'Volunteer Army' Urged [Paris GAMK 18 Jan]	6
Exiled Nationalist on Relations With Turkey [Beirut ZARTONK 8 Dec]	6
APM Official on Independence, 'Pan-Turkism' [Paris HARATCH 31 Dec]	7
APM Congress, Program Deplored	8
Dashnak Party Expresses Wariness [Paris GAMK 4-8 Jan]	8
Ramgavar Writer Scores Disorganization [Paris ZARTONK 9 Dec]	9

NEAR EAST

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

AL-DUSTUR Criticizes Israeli-Ethiopian Plans for the Nile [London AL-DUSTUR 22 Jan]	11
Israeli Seeds Blamed for Low Tomato Harvest [AL-MUSAWWAR 2 Feb]	12
Peres' Visit Labeled 'Unwelcome,' Seen Unproductive [Cairo AL-SHA'B 30 Jan]	12

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Abu-Sharif on Peace Process [Lisbon EXPRESSO 3 Feb]	13
Role of Slogans in Intifadah Analyzed [London AL-MAJALLAH 6 Feb]	15
Impact of Hamas in Gaza Elections Described [Nicosia FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH 4 Feb]	16
DFLP Publication Views Soviet Role in Emigration [Nicosia AL-HURRIYAH 4 Feb]	18

EGYPT

Nafi' Responds to PLO Statement on Journalists [AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI 9 Mar]	20
Columnist Sees Interior Ministry as Threat to Musa [AL-SHA'B 6 Feb]	21
Contractor Discusses Apartment Costs, Market [London AL-MAJALLAH 6 Feb]	22
Plan To Increase Public Sector Productivity Discussed [AL-JUMHURIYAH 28 Jan]	23
Government Criticized for Failed Farming Policy [AL-WAFD 24 Jan]	23
Consultative Council Condemns Soviet Jewish Immigration [AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI 7 Mar] ..	24
Interviews Sample Students' Political Awareness [AL-AHALI 17 Jan]	25

ISRAEL

Water Supply Threatened [HADASHOT 14 Jan]	26
Minister Levy: No Talks With PLO [HA'ARETZ 12 Jan]	27
New Arab Communist MK Profiled [HA'ARETZ 12 Jan]	32
Kafr Qasim Leader Interviewed on Islamic, Local Affairs [AL-SINNARAH 2 Feb]	34
More Israelis Reportedly Indifferent to Democracy [YEDI'OT AHARONOT 25 Jan]	35
Kibbutzim, IDF To Help With New Immigrants [AL HAMISHMAR 25 Jan]	36
Sharon on Likud, Peace Prospects [YEDI'OT AHARONOT 19 Jan]	36
Civil Administration Budget Increasing Seven Percent [BAMAHANE 7 Feb]	40
Ansar-3 Detention Facility To Expand [BAMAHANE 7 Feb]	41
Technology Gap Between Israel, Arab States Viewed [BAMAHANE 7 Feb]	42
Effects of Arab Boycott Updated [HA'ARETZ 28 Jan]	46
Moshe Ma'oz Comments on PLO Confederalism, Peace Process [AL-USBU'AL-JADID 1 Feb]	46

JORDAN

- Abu-Zant Comments on Muslim Brotherhood, Parliament [*Paris AL-YAWM AL-SABI' 22 Jan*] .. 49

LEBANON

- Butrus Dib Suggests New Form of Government [*London AL-HAWADITH 5 Jan*] 51
Proposal for Privatization of Utilities [*London AL-HAWADITH 9 Feb*] 54

SUDAN

- Interviews Claim Lifestyles of New Leaders Austere [*AL-INQADH AL-WATANI 31 Dec*] 55
Official Discusses Merits of New Investment Law [*AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAHAH 24 Jan*] .. 58
Bank Official Comments on Draft Investment Law [*AL-INQADH AL-WATANI 17 Jan*] 60
Reviving Bank Investment, Unfreezing Assets Discussed [*AL-INQADH AL-WATANI 17 Jan*] 60
Investment Rollbacks Expected in Wake of East Europe Events
[*AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAHAH 25 Jan*] 61

SOUTH ASIA

IRAN

- Second Phase of Distribution of Potatoes Begins [*JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI 26 Feb*] 63
Gilan Facing Fuel Shortage [*London KEYHAN 22 Feb*] 63
IGAT-2 Pipeline To Be Extended to Soviet, Turkish Border [*London KEYHAN 22 Feb*] 64
Lead Free Gas To Go on Sale Next Year [*JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI 23 Jan*] 64

PAKISTAN

- Commentary: Center, Punjab Need To Mend Political Ways [*NAWA-I-WAQT 30 Dec*] 65
Government Said Not Sincere About Kalabagh Dam [*NAWA-I-WAQT 30 Dec*] 65
Commentary Views Prospects for Midterm Elections [*JANG 23 Jan*] 66
Concern Over Violent Crimes in Punjab [*NAWA-I-WAQT 20 Jan*] 67
Commentary Condemns Hyderabad Violence [*JASARAT 1 Feb*] 68
Sindh: Situation Sparks Serious Concern 69
 Proposal for All Parties' Conference [*AMN 20 Feb*] 69
 PPP Government Said Not at Fault [*AMN 20 Feb*] 70
Sindh: Ideological Rifts Discussed [*JASARAT 1 Feb*] 70
India Seen Winning Battle for the Minds of Sindhi Youth [*NAWA-I-WAQT 20 Jan*] 72

Activities of Religious Heads Reported

Cilician Catholicos in Iran

46050012A Paris GAMK in Armenian 11 Jan 90 p 1

[Text] The Catholicos of the Great See of Cilicia, Karekin II, arrived in Tehran on 3 January 1990 on a visit to the three Armenian dioceses of Iran at the invitation of the Armenians of Iran. Accompanying the Catholicos were two clergymen of the See, Supreme Archimandrites Yeghishe and Sebul.

Karekin II was welcomed at Tehran airport with full honors by representatives of the Armenian community, the two Armenian delegates in the Iranian parliament, diocesan officials and a representative of the Iranian Foreign Ministry. The Catholicos was given a full official reception in the special VIP lounge where Karekin II spoke about the centuries-old relationship between Armenians and Persians.

Escorted by police the Catholicos was driven to the Armenian prelacy church in Tehran where he was welcomed by the people.

As planned in advance, Karekin II visited the Armenians in various parts of Tehran, attended religious ceremonies and gave sermons. Everywhere he was given a warm and appropriate reception by the people.

On 9 January, the Catholicos left for New Jolfa where he will stay for 4 days. He will later visit the Armenian communities of Aذربaidjan.

According to the information obtained, Catholicos Karekin II will also have talks with the leader and president of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Catholicos Vazken

46050012B Paris GAMK in Armenian 11 Jan 90 p 1

[Text] On 8 January 1990, the Catholicos of All Armenians, Vazken I, sent a telegram to the president of the Soviet Council of Churches protesting the Azeris' anti-Armenian policy of destroying Armenian monuments inside Azerbaijan. The telegram says:

I consider it my duty to report to you that the destruction and desecration of Armenian historic monuments in Azerbaijan has recently been stepped up. I report with sadness that on 25 December 1989 Azeri fanatic nationalists set fire to the Armenian church in Baku. Valuable ecclesiastical books, icons and the church's entire store of religious artifacts perished as a result of that fire. We protest this desecration on behalf of the Armenian Church and believers and we ask you that you demand from the pertinent authorities to undertake immediate steps to apprehend the culprits.

Communal Problems in Turkey Detailed

46050012C Paris GAMK in Armenian 12 Jan 90 p 2

[Excerpts] Archbishop Shnork Kalustian, the Patriarch of the Armenians of Turkey, had meetings with Turkish President Turgut Ozal and Prime Minister Yildirim Akbulut on 20 December 1989.

For the first time in the last 10 to 15 years, the Patriarchate issued an official communique which details the issues discussed during those meetings. Until now the Patriarchate would only state that it had once again pleaded in writing to the Turkish Prime Minister with regard to "the Turkish-Armenian community's outstanding problems."

We report these meetings with quotations from the official communique that has been issued. [passage omitted]

During his meeting with the Prime Minister, Patriarch Shnork stated that "although the Armenian community of Turkey lives in peace, there remain numerous community problems which require resolution." Speaking on behalf of the Patriarch, [the Patriarch's personal adviser] Dr Garabed Arman enumerated the "outstanding problems related to our community's institutions and schools." During the half-hour meeting, the Prime Minister was given a memorandum regarding the issues that were raised.

For unknown and unexplained reasons, the meeting with President Ozal was also attended by Turkish Foreign Minister Mesut Yilmaz as well as "certain senior officials responsible for minority affairs."

During the meeting Ozal spoke about "the friendly relations between Armenians and Turks in the past and even today." "He pointed out the social and cultural similarities between the two nations particularly in the areas of cuisine, customs and traditions. He recalled that Armenian composers and singers have contributed significantly to Turkish music."

The Armenian delegation raised the problems of the Armenians remaining in Turkey during this meeting as well. At the request of the President "first the educational and then the communal issues" were discussed. The communique says: "The President, the Foreign Minister and the other officials expressed serious interest in these problems and exchanged views on resolving them."

Before turning to the problems enumerated in the official communique, we would like to point out that apparently the Patriarch and his companions had every reason to return to Istanbul the same night because, as the communique does not state anywhere, they were not given any promises that the problems which they raised and which have been left in abeyance for many years will be resolved. Moreover, the presence of the Turkish foreign minister at the said meeting and the hasty arrangement of the meeting suggest that the Armenian

representatives were pressured with regard to the "Armenian resolution" that is being discussed in the U. S. Congress. We hope that statements to be made public in the coming days will shed more light on our assumptions. Below are the problems that the Patriarchate has raised.

The difficulties that the Patriarchate has brought to the attention of the Turkish Prime Minister leave no doubt that they are deliberately imposed by the Turkish authorities in order to squeeze the last drop of blood out of the remnants of the Armenian Genocide in Turkey. Formally Turkey has no right to repress the rights of the Armenian minority in accordance with the infamous Treaty of Lausanne. Other European and international treaties also safeguard the rights of Turkey's minorities.

Now the difficulties:

A. Problems related to the communal institutions:

1. Since 1967, Armenian philanthropic organizations have been deprived of the right to buy or to receive as donations any immovable properties.

2. In the 1970's a decision was taken declaring that minority communities had no right to acquire immovable properties retroactively from 1936. No legal or plausible explanation has been given for this decision. Even so, all immovable property obtained by the community since 1936 has been returned to their former owners.

3. It is prohibited to erect new buildings on property owned by the Armenian community or to repair existing buildings on such properties.

4. Since 1972, an additional 5-percent tax has been levied on all properties owned by the Armenian community as a "book inspection fee."

5. The government has limited voting in elections of parish councils for churches to the inhabitants of the associated neighborhoods. The Patriarchate demands that the government not interfere in these church matters and that it allow the Church to set and to amend its rules.

6. The Patriarchate is barred from training clergymen.

7. Since 1986, an income tax has been levied on all property owned by the Armenian community.

B. Educational problems:

1. As in other minority schools, the students of Armenian schools are not registered in the relevant schools, but in a school decided by the government, under the supervision of special inspectors and over a period of only 2 or 3 days.

2. The identity cards of citizens states only their religion (i.e. Muslim, Christian etc), but not their sect (i.e. Armenian, Catholic, Assyrian etc). As a result the

national ancestry of Armenian children, especially those coming from the provinces, is questioned.

3. The right to attend an Armenian school is restricted by the place of residence.

4. There are difficulties between the principals and deputy principals of Armenian schools.

"Traditionally, the principals of Armenian schools have always been Armenian citizens who are born, raised and educated in Turkey and who must be approved by the Directorate of Education after being appointed to their posts. Naturally, they are subject to the rules of the Directorate of Education during their entire term of service and work as public servants under the supervision of the Directorate.

"However, as a result of problems that arise between the Armenian principals and the government-appointed Turkish deputy principals over areas of responsibility, sometimes a duality of authority is created contravening the principle of 'the principal runs the school.'

"Therefore, it is requested that the functions and duties of assistant principals in Armenian community schools be the same as those of the assistant principals in government schools, that is they genuinely assist the school principals and not try to become their equals or even superiors."

Communique of Cultural Ties Committee

46050012B Paris GAMK in Armenian 15-16 Jan 90 p 2

[Text] The communique below reached us late. We present it because of its interesting features.

The expanded meeting of the Presidium of the Committee for Cultural Ties with the Diaspora Armenians was held between 8 and 12 December 1989. The meeting was attended by authorized delegations from cultural associations in the Diaspora.

The [Diaspora] participants in the meeting were:

Aharon Shkhrdman, Vazken Dumdumian and Parsegh Tutunjian from the Nor Serunt Cultural Association [affiliated with Dashnak Party]; Hagop Yapujian, Garbis Harboyan, Armenak Yeghiayan and Kaghani Etyemzian from the Hamazkayin Cultural Association [affiliated with Dashnak Party]; Harutyun Yozghatian, Kevork Marashlian and Baruyr Aghbashian from the Tekeyan Cultural Association [affiliated with the Ramgavar Party]; Barkev Shamikian from the French-Armenian Cultural Association; Mardiros Kushakchian and Sarkis Der-Sahakian from the Lebanese-Armenian Literary Circle; Juan Dimijian from the Argentine-Armenian Cultural Association; and Hrach Khtikian from the Armenian-American Progressive Association.

Other participants in the meeting were Zaven Zadikian and Seveda Sevan from the Bulgarian-Armenian Cultural Association.

The participants in the meeting examined the issue of "the future development of Motherland-Diaspora relations."

The chairman of the Committee, Karlen Dallakyan, addressed the meeting.

The members of the Committee's Presidium, Silva Kaputikyan, Edvard Mirzoyan, Varazdat Arutyunyan, Grachia Ovhanisyan and Spartak Bakhtasaryan, as well as the administrators of the various departments of the Committee also participated in the exchange of views during the meeting.

1. The participants in the meeting acclaimed the role and significance of Motherland-Diaspora and Diaspora-Motherland ties in the preservation of the Diaspora, the strengthening of the Motherland, the pursuit of the Armenian Cause and the consolidation of the unity of the Armenian people.

2. It was noted that Motherland-Diaspora ties must be based on the principles of mutual equality and understanding, the future consolidation of Motherland-Diaspora ties, the strengthening of Armenian culture in the Motherland and the Diaspora and the pursuit of the unity of the people.

3. The participants in the meeting agreed that the representatives of the cultural, educational, charitable and other organizations of the Diaspora can be elected as members of the administration of the Committee for Cultural Ties with the Diaspora Armenians and can be invited to the full meetings and conferences of the Committee's administration.

4. The Committee must treat all cultural, philanthropic, educational and other organizations of the Diaspora on an equal basis in the administration of Motherland-Diaspora relations.

The participants believe that pannational interests must be the determining factor in Motherland-Diaspora relations.

5. The participants agree that it would be useful to create unified coordinating missions in various Diaspora communities with the purpose of qualitatively improving Motherland-Diaspora and Diaspora-Motherland ties, coordinating pannational gatherings and organizing productive mutual contacts.

6. The participants agreed that the Motherland and the Diaspora must urgently help the communities where the work of the preservation of Armenian identity is lagging.

7. The participants in the meeting spoke in favor of organizing pannational and general events as well as cultural, educational, youth, medical, athletic conferences and other similar gatherings. The participants believe that a scientific conference on the adoption of a unified spelling of the Armenian language must be convened.

8. An agreement was reached on preparing pan-Armenian calendar for each year in order to commemorate in both the Motherland and the Diaspora the important dates of our nation's history and culture and the birthdays and death anniversaries of important historic figures.

9. The participants spoke in favor of drafting a program of cooperation on the Armenian Cause issue, expanding historic document centers, establishing productive scholarly ties, convening appropriate conferences and organizing meetings.

The participants believe it is essential to supply Armenian and foreign specialists and institutions working on the Armenian question with the appropriate materials, to find the means of publishing work on the Armenian Cause in various foreign languages to reach the international community as well as the Diaspora and the Motherland.

10. The participants agreed to draft a coordinated program for the commemorative activities to be staged on the 75th anniversary of the Great Genocide.

11. The issue of opening representative offices of the Committee in several large communities was found to have matured, and it was decided to study the possibilities in those communities.

A number practical issues related to Motherland-Diaspora ties were also examined. These included:

The expansion and acceleration the flow of information between the Republic and the Diaspora in the areas of journalism, culture, medicine and economics; the creation of a major computer center for this purpose; the establishment and development of cultural ties between the internal [Soviet] and external Diaspora; the creation of a common editorial board and monetary fund for publications in foreign languages.

The participants also considered scientific and economic cooperation between the Motherland and the Diaspora to organize appropriate gatherings and to revitalize the Republic's economy and technology by making extensive use of Armenian and foreign information media for this purpose; to expand and to expedite the assistance provided to the quake-devastated areas; as well as other related issues.

The participants found it essential to hold similar meetings on a regular basis in both the Motherland and the Diaspora with the participation of representatives from cultural and philanthropic associations and societies.

The participants deplored strongly and unanimously the continuing economic blockade imposed on Armenia and Artsakh by the neighboring republic and approved the decisions of the 30 November 1989 sitting of the Armenian Supreme Soviet with regard to the reunification of Armenia and Artsakh and the decision of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the declaration of the USSR Foreign Ministry on the Artsakh issue.

The participants reaffirmed that despite the numerous difficulties of the past 70 years the people of the Motherland have managed not only to survive but also to preserve their national identity and to achieve notable cultural successes.

The participants of the meeting express their firm conviction that in the conditions of openness, restructuring and new thinking, the Armenian people will be able to realize its national aspirations in connection with the resolution of the Armenian Cause and will continue to work with a common will and on a common front for the preservation of the Armenian character, the future consolidation of Motherland-Diaspora ties and the reconstruction and strengthening of the Motherland.

Calls for Independence Scored

46050012C Paris GAMK in Armenian 17-21 Jan 90

[Article in four installments by Azat Yekhiazaryan originally published in the 5 January 1990 edition of Yerevan SOVETAKAN AYASTAN: "On Policy: Thoughts of a Nonpolitician"]

[17 Jan 90 p 3]

[Excerpts] [GAMK editor's note] Azat Yekhiazaryan is a bold Soviet Armenian intellectual who rose to prominence with the Artsakh movement. His article below constitutes a sharp response to the worrying experiments that have recently become evident in the Motherland.

Although Yekhiazaryan does not address his article directly at any person, it is obvious that he is responding to the well-known Soviet Armenian intellectual, Rafael Ishkhanyan, who has apparently become the chief theorist of the ideological direction of the Armenian Pan-national Movement [APM] and, in that capacity, has assumed the role of defense attorney for the national and political aberrations suggested by that ideology. [passage omitted]

We do not feel the need to respond to Ishkhanyan's absurd allegations and baseless accusations because since July 1989 our party has officially stated its position with regard to the "Ishkhanyan-style" sophistries enunciated by representatives of the Karabakh Committee or the APM party on the "myth" of pan-Turkism and the "principle" of having or not having "eternal enemies" or "eternal friends."

This is the context in which we must view Yekhiazaryan's article, which constitutes the response of an Armenian intellectual who has been ideologically shaped under Soviet rule. Naturally, we do not share Yekhiazaryan's faith in the Russian option. From a historical standpoint, that issue has been resolved for us, because we consider the Russian side as the lesser of all evils which block the full liberation of the Armenian people. We have faith in the reformation of the Soviet system because we hope that the Soviet wing of the Armenian political mind can contribute to the Armenian Cause by

consolidating the remnants of the national state they have inherited from the Armenian Republic, by fighting for the internal territorial problem and, especially, by forcing Soviet federal system to respect the just demands of the Armenian people.

[Begin article] [Passage omitted] The congress of the APM undoubtedly heightened the public's interest in issues of national policy. Perhaps, that was the greatest service the congress performed. It brought about a concept of national policy which differs from the official one. Today, it is impossible to ignore the APM congress and the documents it endorsed when thinking about national policy. But we will talk about the congress itself later. Now I would like to express some ideas about certain vital issues.

Some of our compatriots recently declared—undoubtedly out of feelings of national dignity—that "the mentality that a nation has eternal friends and eternal friends and not eternal national interests is a political folly." Let us set aside the fact that no one among us favors "eternal friends and enemies" over "eternal national interests" and that, on the contrary, the concept of "eternal friends and enemies" evolved out of concern for "eternal national interests." What is important is this: As is known, this concept originated in Britain. But there is at least one difference between Britain and Armenia. Britain, particularly in the period when this statement was made, was one of the world's great powers and remains so even today. It is understandable that the status of being a great power suggests certain principles of foreign policy, one of which is the said concept.

No nation should hitch its fortunes to the political wagon of another nation. But if its interests necessitate having friendly relations with any great power, then those relations must be established. Genuine national dignity exists only when the survival of the nation is assured. [passage omitted]

[18 Jan 90 p 2]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] Do we really think that if we and Azerbaijan abruptly secede from the Soviet Union Turkey would let us have Karabakh under UN or great power pressure, that it would help us prosper economically and that it would then hand over Mount Ararat and Lake Van? Do we think that it would not consider the Armenian Republic as an unnecessary obstacle between itself and the Turks of Azerbaijan? 1915 may not be repeated, but could Cyprus be repeated? I think that it could. It is also possible that it would not be repeated and that in the said hypothetical situation (about which many Armenians appear to be dreaming today) Turkey may, magnanimously, not interfere with our presence between itself and Azerbaijan. But here, the term "possible" has a great weight. We have no right to disregard it. As long the "possible" exists, in my opinion we have no right to speak about changing our orientation. It is even possible, for example, that the

United States and Europe may defend us against Turkey. I personally do not believe that. But even if I and people like me are wrong, we must not experiment with the fate of our small republic even theoretically on the basis of what is "possible." The borders of the federation at least assure the existence of our republic.

Thus, today our posture toward the Soviet federation is a matter of national policy. [passage omitted]

Recently our television broadcast an interview with [exiled nationalist leader] Baruyr Ayrikyan. When he was told about the perils of independence, he gave an extremely interesting answer. I do not recall what he said verbatim, but in paraphrased form he said: If a farmer thinks about the drought, locusts and other perils before he sows his seed, he would never sow his land. Perhaps that is true when applied to a farm. But the fate of a nation and that of a farm are different. The farmer may take risks and try. But the fate of a nation allows no experimentation. Policy must be based on the correct assessment of the consequences of each step, particularly in the case of nations like ours.

[19 Jun 90 p 3]

[Excerpts] It is well known that even the parties and leaders who have always spoken against the USSR and have rejected its system were alarmed by the calls for independence. I have already noted the remarks of H. Marukhian, one of the leaders of the Dashnak Party. Most recently, our television gave us the opportunity to listen to the views of Ed. Hovhannisian [Dashnak columnist] (let me add parenthetically that the appearances by Ayrikyan and Hovhannisian have been the most interesting and valuable broadcasts of our television administration). He, too, expressed strong opposition to the unwise calls for independence. I do not think that he has changed his political views. But there is something that supercedes political views: the sober awareness of a nation's fate. There seems to be a general agreement among all Diaspora forces with regard to the Soviet federation; the Dashnaks, the Hunchaks and the Ramgavars have been speaking with the same spirit.

But already some of us are angered by this cautiousness of the Diaspora Armenians. When they oppose our "revolutionary" dispositions we begin giving them lessons on unity from here. [passage omitted]

I envisage the future survival of our republic, the course of our people in the present conditions and the resolution of the Karabakh problem within the borders of the Soviet federation and through the preservation of our pact with Russia and the Russian people.

However, all of our plans may have a meaning only if our status and posture within the federation are radically altered. During the entire history of the USSR, Armenia as well as the other republics have received whatever they have received as a gift from the Union leadership and as an expression of the "paternal care of the party and the government." It is this "paternal care," or more

correctly the mentality that is associated with those meaningless words, that we must renounce abruptly. We need neither "brotherly" nor "paternal" care, but whatever a sovereign republic needs in accordance with its constitution and the mechanisms of sovereignty for republics that are being formulated. [passage omitted]

In this connection, I would like to say a few words about the APM congress and, as the saying goes, "associated issues."

The APM has been endorsed by many people as a national front, that is a pannational association within which all the newly born organizations and groups would have the opportunity to operate. Each of these new organizations wanted to resolve our fateful problems. But it was obvious from the beginning that the newly formed association was not contemplating to become a popular front and that it was not in a position to incorporate within itself all national movements. From the outset, its structure appeared to be highly centralized. It was not surprising that much was said about this issue at the congress, but the members of the initiating group clearly stated that they wanted to form a strong organization.

By saying these, I have no intention of criticizing the founders of APM for creating a centralized organization. If the APM is structured as a centralized organization with a charter based on clear and multilateral democratic centralism, then it should be accepted as such and it should be expected to do what such an organization can do. It should not be viewed as a popular front. Even the term "pannational" has a geographic sense rather than a meaning of popular endorsement.

But the APM deputy declared at an Armenian Supreme Soviet session that the APM represents the entire Armenian people. Such pretensions give rise to sad thoughts. We already have tragic experiences with a party which has declared itself the representative of all the people. Now should we repeat the same experiment from our end?

[20-21 Jan 90 p 3]

[Text] It is very important to clarify this issue. We must renounce the predominance of any single idea or ideology and must acknowledge that all the people can be represented only by a democratically elected parliament where different groups and organizations are represented.

We need a genuine and equitable dialog between all the forces. Such a dialog requires a basic political culture so that no one thinks of himself as a savior, a judge or the nation's only representative.

In this connection, I would like to state candidly that certain developments in our political life today give rise to deep uneasiness. The events are unfolding so rapidly that we have already forgotten the atmosphere that reigned when the President of the Republic addressed

the APM congress and when the congress appeared to have taken on the functions of the Supreme Soviet.

We are now thinking about the most recent sittings of the Supreme Soviet where certain deputies and invited individuals rose to the podium several times to declare that the people gathered outside are extremely angry and that if their demands are not met the consequences could be unpleasant. In that instance, those demands were substantially met after the deputies remained confined inside the Shahumyan palace for a lengthy period of time.

In this instance it was completely unimportant what those people demanded. What is important is that they denied others the right to think and to express their own ideas. They want to impose their ideas by force, purportedly in the name of the people, forgetting that even a few thousand provoked people do not represent the entire nation. That not only remains distant from democracy and parliamentarism but in fact directly contravenes them.

Once again, we need a clash of ideas and a dialog, though not in order to "crush" this or that idea but to find the best solutions.

Mobilization of 'Volunteer Army' Urged

46050012D Paris GAMK
in Armenian 18 Jan 90 pp 1, 2

[Editorial: "So That We Can Talk From Positions of Strength"]

[Excerpts] The inevitable finally happened. For the past few days Armenian blood has been flowing in east Armenia, in Artsakh, in the plains of Gantzak, in Nakhichevan and particularly in Baku. The Azeri side has apparently declared total "jihad" against the Armenian people.

The latest assault by the Azeri scourge is not confined to Nagorno Karabakh and Artsakh. It threatens every Armenian who lives within Azeri reach. As a result, it is mostly the Armenians living outside of Artsakh and in Azeri-inhabited regions who are paying with their blood the price of the latest anti-Armenian conspiracy.

The political controversy over the fate of Nagorno Karabakh is in fact a mere pretext for the Azeri side. With its government and party, its so-called "Popular Front" and its fanatic mobs, the Azeri side has finally shed the clothing that was covering its pan-Turkist essence and has sounded the trumpet of overrunning Armenia and the Armenian people. [passage omitted]

The pan-Turkist tendencies of the Azeri side would not have been so unrestrained if the leaders of the Kremlin had correctly evaluated Baku's anti-Armenian crimes and conspiracies beginning in February 1988. The Kremlin did not give appropriately serious consideration

even to the siege of Artsakh and the blockade against Armenia. Today it has to cope with the threats of Baku's leaders.

We are experiencing critical hours as a nation. If we were able to emerge from the difficult phase of the past few days as a proud front we owe that to the heroic sons of Artsakh as well as our people in the Motherland who extended their hand of solidarity. However, the scourge has not yet passed, and the coming few days remain fraught with danger. [passage omitted]

It is time to set to work. The government and party leaders of the Motherland are expected to take practical steps to overcome the Azeri threat directly by mobilizing the government forces of the Armenian nation. After all, the government of the Motherland must have its baptism of fire so that the voice of the Armenian people can be taken seriously in Baku, Moscow and other capitals where negotiations are based on positions of strength.

The demanding Armenian people, from Artsakh to the remotest corners of the Diaspora, look to the forces that control the Motherland's government with pannational hopes. In the final analysis, the Soviet leadership of Armenia is compelled to be the center that unites the dispersed pieces and capabilities of our nation. We must never forget the possibility that with its strategy of creating an armed confrontation with the Kremlin, Baku may exploit the military situation and deal a mortal blow to Artsakh. The Armenian people has no assurance but its own collective strength to deter such an attempt. The leadership of the Motherland would be committing the gravest mistake if it is not prepared in such circumstances to mobilize Armenians of the Motherland and the Diaspora as a single volunteer army, to arm them and to put them to battle on the side of Artsakh.

Exiled Nationalist on Relations With Turkey

46050011D Beirut ZARTONK
in Armenian 8 Dec 89 p 2

[Excerpts] [ZARTONK editor's note] Ufuk Guldemir, the Washington correspondent of the Turkish daily CUMHURIYET has had an interview with Baruyr Ayrikyan who was exiled from the Soviet Union and who lives in California at present. The correspondent mentions—since Ayrikyan often makes such hallucinatory statements—that "500,000 Armenians who demonstrated in Yerevan consider Ayrikyan as the 'legal representative of the Armenian people abroad.'"

An Armenian translation of the Turkish interview was published in Istanbul MARMARA. Ayrikyan himself talked through an interpreter. Knowing that, we would like to entertain the suspicion that the Turkish papers, as part of their tradition, may have distorted Ayrikyan's answers. Thus we may expect corrections from him. Otherwise, we will consider the answers of the "legal representative of the Armenian people abroad" as the true expressions of his ideas on which we will reserve judgement until another occasion.

[CUMHURIYET] What do you think about the Karabakh events?

[Ayrikyan] The Soviets are deliberately keeping the Karabakh issue alive to prevent the public from seeing the right of the Armenians and the Azeris to determine their own destiny. We proved that this is the case after the Sumgait incidents. We told the Azeris that they are being used as tools by the Soviets and invited them to reach an agreement. But Moscow was upset with these talks and deported me from the country. Karabakh's population is roughly the same as Luxembourg's. Therefore, it must decide who it belongs to through a referendum. [passage omitted]

[CUMHURIYET] What do you think about Turkey?

[Ayrikyan] Turkey is a member of NATO. It is part of the free world. It has applied to join the Common Market. In the past certain undesirable clashes occurred between Turks and Armenians, but we must not forget that the last independent Armenian state was swallowed by the Russians not the Turks. Today, the people of Armenia are enslaved not by Turkey but by Moscow.

It is a pity that my views regarding Soviet Armenia and the Soviet Union are not endorsed by the Armenians of the United States. The Armenians here consider the Soviet Union as their natural ally against Turkey. But that is not the truth. Of course, there is also the issue of the genocide which the Soviet Union keeps continually alive. That issue has always prevented any rapprochement between Armenians and Turks. Unfortunately, no contacts have so far been established between Armenians and Turks. The absence of any relations between Armenians and Turks is a natural result of the circumstances. It could not be otherwise.

[CUMHURIYET] How can the Turks establish contacts with you if you continue raising territorial demands?

[Ayrikyan] We live not for the past but the future. We must always have in mind our future interests. Sometimes two nations need very little to understand each other. That also applies to international relations. Very bad things happened in the past. But those misfortunes of the past must not cloud our future. Today Turkey is part of the democratic world. Turkey and the Soviet Union cannot even be compared to each other. Armenians have churches and schools in Turkey. It is true that there are many difficulties, but those institutions live on. Because Turkey is part of the West as soon as some voices are raised those problems are quickly resolved—and they have been resolved. However, the 2 million Armenians who live in the Soviet Union outside the Armenian Republic do not enjoy these rights. They have neither schools nor newspapers.

[CUMHURIYET] How are your views on Turkey received in Armenia?

[Ayrikyan] This is the view of the Armenian democratic movement. Now everyone knows that Moscow has been

deliberately undermining relations between Turks and Armenians. If I were a Turk I would be unsettled by the thought of being used by the Soviet Union as a scarecrow against the Armenians. Once, when they were interrogating me in prison, they asked: "Why do you keep demanding independence? Turkey would swallow you."

At the end of the interview, the CUMHURIYET correspondent says that Ayrikyan wishes to convey the following message to Turkey:

"If Armenians are constantly speaking about 1915 today, it does not mean that the modern-day Turks or the Turkish government must be considered responsible."

APM Official on Independence, 'Pan-Turkism'

46050011C Paris HARATCH
in Armenian 31 Dec 89 p 2

[Article by A. Totoyan: "The Armenian Pannational Movement Under the Historian's Magnifying Glass"]

[Excerpts] The founding congress of the Armenian Pannational Movement [APM] has ended but the uproar that has been raised about it refuses to end. Of course, no one expected a uniform set of evaluations in these times of open and unrestrained expression when all molds are being broken and all formalisms are being disregarded. However, one would expect that the same rule apply to the objections, admonishments and criticisms and that no one have a monopoly on breaking "molds."

The 28 November 1989 edition of YEREKOYAN YER-EVAN published an interview with historian Grachik Simonyan, a corresponding member of the Armenian Academy of Sciences [and a member of the APM Executive Council], on this congress and current political issues which have generally absorbed the Armenian mind. [passage omitted]

Criticisms directed against the activities and proposals of the APM have used the issue of independence as a playing card. One of the major criticisms raised against the APM is the fact that it has ignored this issue. The interviewer asked the historian his views on this issue. Simonyan said: "National independence is every nation's dream. But independence is not a goal in itself. If in a given set of circumstances independent statehood will not lead the people to greater happiness but to impossible situations and perils and if it will worsen the life of the people, then such an independence cannot be acceptable. Let us recall that when the issue of Armenian independence was discussed at the Armenian National Council in Tbilisi on 26 and 27 May 1918, there was not much enthusiasm for independence. All Armenian national parties, at that time including the Dashnak Party, were opposed to the declaration of Armenian independence in those circumstances because that could further aggravate the people's already tragic situation."

According to G. Simonyan, our current problem is "to achieve full economic, social and political autonomy within the structure of the Soviet federation." He said: "The Republic must be able to solve all of its internal problems. The people must be responsible for itself. We must have our own Armenian policy."

Commenting on the present state of Russian-Armenian relations, Simonyan said: "In this country the Armenian people owe nothing to another nation including the Russian nation" regardless of the fact that "in a speech at the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] Central Committee's plenum on 19 September 1989 the head of the government portrayed only Armenia among the 15 republics of the Union as having received everything from Russia and other republics. He never mentioned what we give to the country."

The APM leadership is also accused of upholding the principle that "a nation has neither eternal friends nor eternal enemies." Simonyan indirectly answers the people who have endorsed this view for unknown reasons even betraying their own reason: "This slogan was included in the APM's program with the purpose of making the nation renounce its mentality of servility which has indoctrinated the Armenian individual with the notion that our nation can exist only by hiding behind someone's skirt."

Simonyan does not rule the establishment of relations with Turkey when Armenia achieves economic independence and acquires the means to establish relations with foreign countries. He clearly delineates diplomatic relations from friendship: "Friendship is a broad and warm human emotion which we cannot have with regard to Turkey as long as it does not admit and condemn the horrible crime the Turks committed against our people between 1915 and 1923—the Armenian genocide—and as long as it continues its occupation and seizure of our homeland."

The last question of the interview is on another controversial issue which the critics of APM have used: What does Simonyan think about pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism? Simonyan says: "Let us make clear from the outset that the present confrontation between Armenians and Azeris is not of a religious but of an ethnic nature."

"Of course, today in Baku they are trying to exploit pan-Turkism to the maximum possible extent in the Armenian-Azeri conflict, to put pressure on the Armenian people and to intimidate them with the threat of an invasion by the "elder brother." Although we think that effort is futile, we have no right to let our people sleep comfortably. Our people must be prepared for any possible eventuality." [passage omitted]

APM Congress, Program Deployed

Dashnak Party Expresses Wariness

46050011B Paris GAMK in Armenian 4-8 Jan 90 p 3

[Article in four installments by Athens DROSHAK editor-in-chief Nubar Berberian: "Why Did the Founding Congress of the Armenian Pannational Movement Create Disillusion?"]

[4-5 Jan 90 p 3]

[Excerpt] It is not surprising that the founding congress of the Armenian Pannational Movement [APM] was greeted with mixed emotions in both Soviet Armenia and the Diaspora and led to a certain amount of wariness. That was to be expected because the Karabakh Committee which undertook to form the APM had thrown the goals of the Movement into doubt months earlier because of its wavering posture. In any event, such an outcome was not unexpected particularly for the Armenian Revolutionary Federation [Dashnak Party] [ARF] which has enunciated the need to put the Movement on the right track since last July.

Notably, even the voices which justifiably welcomed the founding congress of the APM did not attempt to conceal their feelings of dissatisfaction and disillusion. Indeed, even the Karabakh Committee was compelled to convene a public rally a few days after the congress and to admit the difficulties it is having. The modest number of the participants in the said rally was another indication of the discontent with regard to the APM's founding congress.

Why did the Karabakh Committee and its efforts to form an "Armenian pannational movement" that started in August 1988 end up in this situation? An exhaustive answer is important not only to explain the emotions created by the APM's founding congress but also to spare future attempts to form a genuine Armenian pannational movement from possible difficulties. [passage omitted]

[6 Jan 90 p 3]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] It is impossible to imagine an Armenian pannational movement without a commitment to fight for the national liberation of the Armenian people and an intent to prepare collectively a common plan that is based on this principle. There is no precedent in the history of the Armenian nation or other nations where attempts to form "pannational fronts" or "movements" out of different political currents have found any hope of success in any area other than a national liberation struggle.

Obviously, the ARF cannot picture an Armenian pannational movement any other way because this party was started a century ago with the primary purpose of creating a federation of Armenian revolutionaries. Even

when Armenian revolutionary organizations which preceded the ARF chose to pursue their activities independently, the ARF never thought and acted as an ordinary party—even though it had its own program and iron discipline—and took upon itself the responsibility to become the expressor of the pannational goals of the Armenian liberation struggle. Motivated by this principle, the ARF made decentralization the basis of its organizational structure in order to provide the selfless Dashnak Armenian revolutionaries with the opportunity to offer their maximum service and dedication. [passage omitted]

[7 Jan 90 p 3]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Apparently the APM wrote its draft program to appease primarily two groups. The first of these is the sober element of the Soviet Armenian intelligentsia which emphasized the need to return to the ideological heritage of the Armenian liberation struggle in the Declaration of the First Congress of the Armenian Intelligentsia on 9 September 1989. The second group the APM tried to appease is that wing of the Soviet Armenian popular movements which has a "pro-independence" inclination. This group believes that the principle of Armenia's independence must be included in the program of an Armenian pannational movement and made the endorsement of this principle a precondition for joining any such movement.

[8 Jan 90 p 3]

[Excerpts] In an effort to dispel the doubts of the Armenian intelligentsia, which has taken a nationally and politically sober course, the Karabakh Committee tried to round out the sharp edges of its August 1988 program. The new draft program no longer portrays pan-Turkism as a movement of the past but continues to insist that fanatic nationalist or religious movements have lost their currency. Given that the Armenian intelligentsia has been emphatic about the demand for the liberation of western Armenia, the APM's October draft program introduces a new article—while retaining the uncertain language of the August 1988 program—demanding the rescission of the 1921 Russo-Turkish treaties (the treaties of Moscow and Kars) which attempted to bury the Armenian question. Even so, the October draft program makes no mention of the historically and politically imperative need to base the Armenian pannational movement on the course of the Armenian liberation struggle. The contradiction is that although the draft program strongly emphasizes the wisdom of self-reliance it does not acknowledge anywhere that the Armenian nation was able to build its own forces only through its liberation struggle.

In order to appease the "pro-independence" wing of the popular movements, the October draft program simply borrows from the terminology of all-Union popular movements demands for distinct cultural development, economic sovereignty and autonomous government in the national republics. It thus ignores the fact that the "pro-independence" inclinations of the popular movements in

the Motherland are essentially inspired by the legacy of the Armenian Republic and embody the objective of a free, independent and united Armenia. [passage omitted]

Therefore, it is not surprising that although the Karabakh Committee set out to form an Armenian pannational movement it ended up giving birth to an ordinary party which is related to an Armenian pannational movement only in name. That party falls even outside the ideological and political course of the Soviet Armenian Committee of the Karabakh Movement [Karabakh Committee] because it participates in the battle to regain Artsakh only circumstantially. Indeed, the APM is only a copy of the popular fronts that are being formed all over the Soviet Union. [passage omitted]

Let there be no misunderstanding. The Armenians of the Motherland also need a party in the mold of a popular front. We would be the first to welcome such a party if that step did not contradict the imperative to renew the national liberation struggle of the Armenian people. As soon as the Karabakh Committee or the APM turned their backs—with their ideological principles and organizational posture—on that imperative which was consecrated by the Artsakh outburst, the ARF began to distance itself gradually from the APM initiative which is condemned to throw the Armenian people in the arms of disillusion.

It should be understood, of course, that while we distance ourselves we do not stand on opposing paths. The Soviet Armenian people themselves expressed their disillusion after the APM's founding congress and declared that the APM cannot be equivalent to an Armenian pannational movement. The curtain has risen fully, and it is now fully evident that two years after the Artsakh outburst Gorbachev's restructuring finds in APM an unofficial Soviet Armenian movement which flies its standard. There is no doubt that the creation of this movement can be considered a positive contribution to future steps to form an Armenian pannational movement provided that the APM leadership can keep pace with the national and political awakening of the Armenian people and can take its place in the renewed advancement of the Armenian liberation struggle.

In any event, in the aftermath of the founding congress of the APM, all forces which are prepared to fight for the full liberation of the Armenian people are required to rid themselves of the wavering that accompanied the first attempt to form an Armenian pannational movement.

We have no right or time to disregard this hard truth which was demonstrated by the APM experiment.

Ramgavar Writer Scores Disorganization

46050011B Beirut ZARTONK
in Armenian 9 Dec 89 pp 2, 4

[Article by Baruyr Aghbashian: "Araratian Fortresses Instead of Towers of Babel"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] So many hardships, crucial problems and economic needs have piled up in Armenia in the last one and one-half years that they cannot be

resolved in a casual manner if reason, objectivity and political thought are not to be ignored.

Despite all the welcome efforts that have been exerted so far and continue to be exerted, little seems to have been accomplished, particularly in view of the fact that most of the national groupings appear to be in a state of drunkenness and wavering thus reflecting the inexperience, immaturity and shortsightedness of some of the leaders of such movements.

The best example of this is the officially-recognized national grouping known as the Armenian Pannational Movement which held its founding congress in Yerevan recently in the presence of delegates from several Diaspora organizations.

Although the Soviet Armenian government (to its credit) participated in this congress (First Secretary S. Arutyunyan and Prime Minister V. Margaryantz addressed the meeting), unfortunately the congress did not achieve a satisfactory result.

According to initial information that has reached us, that deficiency can be attributed to the following reasons:

1. The congress did not have the organizational structure and preparation which would befit a national gathering of that scope.

Lacking experience and discipline, the presidium of the congress failed to keep the meeting under control; the voting was chaotic, and some of the speakers acted intemperately.

2. The quality of the speeches at the congress were far from satisfactory because some of the speakers did not have an adequate command or sufficient knowledge of the issues.

3. Nationally deplorable blunders were committed especially when it was declared that the "anti-Turkish battle" is unnecessary (thanks to R. Ishkhanyan) and the threat of pan-Turkism meaningless.

4. In terms of goals the Artsakh demands were given very little place in the movement's program. No matter how hard some may argue that the purpose of this meeting was to examine and to endorse the platform of this organization, it is inexcusable to downgrade one the essential issues.

5. The most objectionable political aspect of the congress was that 55 percent of the participants in the congress voted in favor of Armenia's secession from the Soviet Union.

If an officially accepted and recognized organization which calls itself "pannational" believes that it represents the voice of the entire nation with this sad picture and poor quality, it can be considered to have strayed from its fundamental objectives from the outset.

As long as the organizers of such meetings insist on such approaches and principles they will only represent only "themselves" because neither the overwhelming majority of the Diaspora nor the sober segment of the Motherland nor the people of Artsakh will allow the course of national issues to proceed on this crooked course.

As long as there is no common ground for collaboration and harmony between the representatives of the Soviet Armenian state and sober organizations born out of the people (such as in the case of the Azeri state and the Azerbaijani Popular Front)—perhaps even with some mediation by the Diaspora—we will proceed from one uncertainty and crisis to another.

It is hardly surprising that the people of Artsakh have adopted a more sound and determined posture with regard to the Artsakh demands and look beyond misleading words and speeches to seek the means of achieving their goals without resorting to the extremist actions which are taking place in Yerevan and which do not in any way contribute to the general work.

It is also not in vain that the Diaspora has taken a much wiser and more realistic and diplomatic approach to the national problems of the Motherland and has distanced itself from any adventures which may overshadow the demands and rights of the Armenian nation.

All these show that the course that has been taken is not only deplorable and unproductive but also dangerous and one which strays the nation from its basic goals.

We must keep our distance from futile exercises of building "towers of Babel," and we must set to the auspicious work of erecting true Araratian fortresses which serve our purposes.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

AL-DUSTUR Criticizes Israeli-Ethiopian Plans for the Nile

90OA0305A London AL-DUSTUR
in Arabic 22 Jan 90 pp 10-12

[Article by Jamal Isma'il: "Israel's Designs on the Nile River"]

[Excerpts] Israel's denial that Israeli advisors are taking part in the construction of a dam on the Blue Nile in Ethiopia does not change any of the well-established facts. It is an established fact that Israel has old [and] renewed designs on the water of the Nile River and that Ethiopia has its own plans and designs as well. [passages omitted]

In brief, it can be said that Israel's attempts pertaining to its old [and] renewed designs have failed and Israel has been unable to put its hands on one drop of the Nile water. Schemes aimed at blackmailing Egypt by fomenting trouble for it with, and in, the countries and regions that control the sources of the Nile are still going on and are being done in the preliminary stage along three axes: taking advantage of American influence in the region; Israel's return to Africa and its bolstered relations with the Nile basin countries, most importantly Ethiopia; and supporting and fomenting endeavors and the "movement" to separate south Sudan from the north, be it directly or indirectly or through Ethiopia, which supports this "movement" and these endeavors. It is noteworthy that the restoration of peace in southern Sudan and the termination of the civil war means that work in Jonglei and on projects designed to deal with the Nile's falling water level will be resumed to the benefit of Sudan and Egypt. [passage omitted]

An item published in the British newspaper INDEPENDENT that Israeli advisors are working for the Ethiopian Government to build three dams at Lana Tana where the Blue Nile originates, unleashed the fact that Israel has found its long-sought goal in Ethiopia. Leaked information says that Israel has conducted field studies on Ethiopian soil for this purpose, using as a basis the 17-volume study prepared by the American administration. The word "shall" has been substituted for the word "may" that preceded the Arab talks about "fears" and "expectations" vis-a-vis Ethiopian-Israeli rapprochement ever since diplomatic relations between Addis Ababa and the Zionist entity were restored last October. The situation has become ominous. It has been clearly established that Ethiopian-Israeli cooperation means, among other things, that Israel shall make use of the Ethiopian islands at the Red Sea inlets, that Israel shall be given facilities to set up listening posts to monitor Arab communications and that Israel shall construct for Ethiopia a series of dams and reservoirs to check the flow of the Blue Nile that crosses Sudan toward Egypt. It was natural, given these confirmed fears, that Egypt should react violently to these facts and should send a warning

to Israel and that an Egyptian source should publicly state that Egypt, Ethiopia, and many other countries have common vital interests that ought to be considered inviolable. It was also natural that Prince Sultan Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz, minister of defense and aviation of Saudi Arabia that overlooks the Red Sea, should caution against "political alliances between Israel and certain non-Arab Red Sea countries." [passage omitted]

Soviet troop withdrawal from Ethiopia occurred at a time when the latter was taking rapid steps in the direction of the United States, which was certainly delighted with the turn of events as was Israel, which was "ready" to undertake the required tasks in compliance with the strategic cooperation between it and Washington and in realization of its personal strategy and distant and foreseeable goals.

Whereas the motto "an Israeli state from the Nile to the Euphrates" is a distant dream, one foreseeable goal is to apply pressure on Egypt to impede any role it might play with respect to the Palestinian cause and its developments. Furthermore, impeding any role Egypt may undertake to resolve the south Sudan issue is a joint Egyptian-Israeli goal. As Dr. 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid, Egyptian deputy foreign minister and foreign minister, has confirmed, Cairo is following these news reports "in view of the sensitivity of this matter that has an impact on the river sources in Egypt," and is pursuing its efforts to set up total cooperation with the basin countries and to overstep any sensitivities or doubts in this regard. "It is also making efforts to find a peaceful solution to the conflicts of the region."

In Khartoum, Ya'qub Musa Abu-Shurah, minister of irrigation, emphasized that "building a dam on the Blue Nile in Ethiopia will affect the amount of Nile water flowing to Sudan and Egypt." He said that Sudan and Egypt are ready to enter into negotiations with Ethiopia on sharing the Nile waters.

In Ethiopia, official circles are maintaining their silence and the Israeli consulting firm "Tal" is proceeding with its work under the pretext that it is working for the World Bank!

Arab talk about "efforts to arrive at peaceful solutions to the conflict," about "efforts to establish full cooperation," and about the "subject's sensitivity" has been countered for a long time by talk about indications of water wars erupting in northeastern Africa. It is interesting that such talk always takes place in the framework of American studies that do not offer solutions to the concerned countries as much as they concentrate on "the danger inherent in the dwindling water resources of the Zionist state." These studies, publicized by the Israeli mass media, agree in content and results with Israeli Government studies, including an Israeli foreign ministry report that said that, in less than 10 years, competition for water sources will kindle a new war in the area between Israel and its neighbors.

Whereas talk about wars that may break out directly between Israel and the Arabs because of water is basically oriented around Israel's designs on the waters of the occupied West Bank, the Jordan River, the Litani River, and also the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, Israel's designs on the Nile waters could lead to wars waged through other countries such as Ethiopia. Certain facts confirm that Israel will seize every opportunity to take advantage of any tributaries or rivers in the Middle East region.

Israeli Seeds Blamed for Low Tomato Harvest

90OA0305B Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR
in Arabic 2 Feb 90 p 23

[Article by Muhammad Kishik: "Growing Suspicion Concerning Bad Seeds From Israel"]

[Excerpts] Could the sowing of seeds smuggled from Israel be behind the damaged agricultural crops in Egypt? Many suspicions have been reinforced this week following the arrest of Palestinian subjects 'Alyan 'Awad Hasan and his cousin, Salih Hasan of Gaza, who were carrying 20 bags of Israeli tomato seeds, enough to plant 1,000 feddans. Each bag weighs 50 grams and is worth 750 Egyptian pounds.

A report issued by the seed testing laboratory at the agricultural directorate in Isma'iliyah said that the seeds are not fit for use and are banned in Egypt. This has been corroborated by Engineer Fathi Mar'i, director of agriculture in the governorate. Furthermore, Brigadier General Mamduh Riyad, chief of Isma'iliyah supply investigation, said that available information indicates that smugglers are smuggling agricultural seeds through customs outlets, including the Rafah City outlet, for sale to seed merchants in Isma'iliyah. [passages omitted]

Peres' Visit Labeled 'Unwelcome,' Seen Unproductive

90OA0305C Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 30 Jan 90 p 12

[Article by Mahjub 'Umar: "Bankrupt, Dishonest, and Weak Visitor"]

[Excerpts] Shimon Peres, Israeli minister of finance and Labor Party leader, arrived in Cairo one night on a surprise and unwelcome visit that no one expected to yield any results. As if aware of his innermost thoughts and the purpose of his visit, the official and unofficial media in Egypt met Peres with the snub he deserves, demonstrating what the Egyptians, rulers and ruled alike, think of him. None of them expect him to play a productive role in the ongoing political process. This was in contrast with the reception he received two years ago when he came, unexpectedly as well, to meet with President Mubarak, claiming at the time that he had shifted political positions and was closer to the political stance calling for an international conference only to discover later that his visit did not yield any results. And that Yitzhaq Shamir had, in fact nullified everything

Peres had said even though he was at the time minister of foreign affairs and not finance minister.

The fact is that Shimon Peres' popularity is fading. No one, not the cabinet of which he is a member, nor the party that he leads, nor the analysts and commentators listen to him, now that the many years of the intifadah [uprising] have exposed his weakness and inability to stand up to Yitzhaq Shamir. Shamir, who continually threatens to break up the coalition between them on the basis that radical Israeli forces are growing in size and the Israeli Labor Party's failure in any future elections is a growing possibility, given the fact that the intifadah has polarized the Israeli voters between radical Zionists who reject withdrawal from the occupied Palestinian territories and the proponents of the land-for-peace principle.

The Palestinian intifadah and the general Palestinian offensive it brought forth in the name of peace have managed to split the Israeli ranks. There is no longer room for middle-of-the-road forces who work both sides of the street in an effort to hold on to their government seats, relying on the survival of the coalition with the Likud Party while, at the same time, appearing to be in favor of a political settlement and withdrawal from the occupied territories. Shimon Peres is the preeminent model of these forces who are being pushed by the intifadah to their destined fate. [passages omitted]

Nonetheless, Shimon Peres is trying to look for a role or at least a position to keep his post as leader of the Labor Party and to maintain his relations with both the world Zionist organizations and the United States. Yitzhaq Shamir is not giving him any chance in this respect. Domestically, he blames him for the economic slump and externally he does not let an occasion pass without emphasizing that he, Shimon Peres, does not represent the Israeli Government and does not speak in its name. [passages omitted]

Perhaps Shimon Peres' visit to Cairo will not bear any real fruit for no one believes him anymore and no one expects him to be sincere in what he says or in the positions he takes. Nevertheless, some benefit may be derived from this visit inasmuch as it will surely add to the anxiety of his followers and watchers and will play to the worry and dissension besieging the Israeli bloc. It will also intensify his conflict with Yitzhaq Shamir as well as with Yitzhaq Rabin who seems to approve of what he is doing now, but will, of course, choose to stick with Shamir until Peres is toppled.

There are no delusions about what Peres might do and no one believes what he says. What is left is for the American leadership, which is trying to use him and his like to put the screws to Yitzhaq Shamir and, indeed, to coddle him, to be convinced and to choose more useful ways to apply pressure on him, thereby giving the Israelis themselves a deeper sense of how dangerous his policy is and how radical and intransigent he is.

Other than that, no benefit can be derived from such a visit that was unwelcome in Egypt and did not fool the

Palestinians. The way for applying pressure on Shamir is open if the Arabs decide to exert real pressure on the United States and if they, rulers and ruled alike, realize that the intifadah is hitting at the enemy's Achilles' heel and is in need of their strong and unequivocal support, aid, and protection.

For by force alone can victory be achieved.

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Abu-Sharif on Peace Process

90OL0245A Lisbon EXPRESSO
in Portuguese 3 Feb 90 p B2

[Interview with Bassam Abu-Sharif of the Palestine Liberation Organization by Jose Cardoso, in Lisbon; date not given; first paragraph is EXPRESSO introduction]

[Text] Bassam Abu-Sharif is one of the closest political advisers to Yasir 'Arafat, leader of the PLO, and is regarded as one of the key figures in the diplomatic offensive launched by the PLO a little over a year ago. While visiting Lisbon a few days after the official visit by Moshe Arens, Israel's minister of foreign affairs, Abu-Sharif spoke to EXPRESSO. He admitted that his visit was intended largely to offset the visit by Arens, talked about the situation in the Israeli-occupied territories, expressed irritation at the West's "weakness" in dealing with Tel Aviv, defended Soviet Jews, again made eyes at the Jewish population, and again challenged the Israeli Government.

[EXPRESSO] What were the main purposes and results of your visit?

[Abu-Sharif] ...I came because we were interested in making official contact with the Portuguese Government following Arens' visit and inquiring about the dangerous situation in occupied Palestine. Especially after the statement by Shamir (the Israeli prime minister) that he was not prepared to withdraw from the occupied West Bank and Gaza.

We feel that if the European countries do not make it clear to Shamir that that expansionist policy is not acceptable, he will feel that he is being rewarded.... We are Semites, and because of that, we are not against the Jews; they have always lived with us.... We are defending the rights of the Soviet Jews to choose where they want to emigrate. I challenge Arens and Shamir to let independent reporters talk to Soviet Jews who are put on planes bound for Israel....

[EXPRESSO] You said that Europe should take specific steps to put pressure on Israel so as to solve the (Palestinian) problem. Can you explain what steps Europe should take?

[Abu-Sharif] In the first place, I want to say that Europe is not a superpower. Why are the European countries

afraid of Israel? Is it because of the European Jewish communities? Those are pretexts that we cannot swallow.... We believe there are many other steps that can be taken. We are not asking at the moment—we may ask in the future—that Europe and the United States adopt sanctions against Israel. But we do ask that they deal with both sides in the conflict in a balanced manner. Portugal says officially that the Palestinian people have a right to self-determination. But where is recognition? Portugal has established relations with Israel, and that involves diplomatic recognition.

[EXPRESSO] Isn't Portugal thinking of raising the status of the PLO mission....

[Abu-Sharif] We want it to raise the level of relations, because that puts political pressure on the occupiers. The only instance of colonialism in the world today is Palestine, but no one talks about the occupation of our land. If Arens is ready for peace, I am ready to stay in Lisbon another week waiting for him to sit down and talk to me—with no preconditions.

[EXPRESSO] What is the current state of relations between the PLO and the United States?

[Abu-Sharif] "At a standstill" is the clearest way to put it. We are ready to negotiate a political solution leading to total peace. A solution involving two states. We have only one answer: We are deeply jealous of Arab land, and we can never let go of Palestine. The Arab colonizers were also here, but you Portuguese expelled us because you were jealous of your land.

[EXPRESSO] One reason put forward by Israel as justification for the current standstill in the peace process is that many Arab leaders are not ready to make peace with Israel. Does the PLO feel that the process must depend on those Arab leaders as well or only on the PLO?

[Abu-Sharif] Don't you think that is ridiculous? If Poland wanted to sign an agreement with Angola and Angola laid down the condition that it would have to be signed by all the leaders of Europe, wouldn't you think that was ridiculous?... As long as the Israelis allow Shamir to remain at the top, I think they will be—or rather, are—mistaken, because Shamir...is adopting a position that is disastrous for the Israelis, not for the Palestinians. It is time for the Israelis to work hand in hand with us.

[EXPRESSO] If the current standstill in the peace process continues and, for example, if Israel decides unilaterally to hold elections on the West Bank and in Gaza....

[Abu-Sharif] Do you think that a single Palestinian will respond? Did he (Arens) talk about holding elections on the West Bank and in Gaza? I challenge him—him and Shamir—to find a single Palestinian who is prepared to vote if Israel asks. But there is another side to the coin: We are capable of holding elections independently. It is very possible that we will do so—that we will invite the

Palestinians to participate in presidential elections first, before the parliamentary elections.

[EXPRESSO] Don't you think that if the current impasse in the peace process lasts much longer, there may be radicalization on the West Bank and in Gaza?

[Abu-Sharif] We decide the time and place for our battle as well as the kind of battle. If Shamir thinks that the intifadah (the uprising in the Israeli-occupied territories) can be kept at bay, he is wrong.

[EXPRESSO] But Yasir 'Arafat said recently that patience has its limits and that the PLO leadership was under pressure to....

[Abu-Sharif] Obviously we are under pressure. From ourselves, our brothers, and the suffering of our people. That is true.

[EXPRESSO] So far, the intifadah has been only a matter of throwing rocks. But Yasir 'Arafat said recently that there was pressure and that the Palestinians on the West Bank and in Gaza might, for example, turn to weapons....

[Abu-Sharif] He did not say that. He said there might be an escalation. For the present, the initiative is ours. The intifadah is a serious matter of resisting occupation. We have two more stages of escalation: One, which we have begun preparing for, is an open general strike, and we have another one, which is national disobedience—a total boycott of the occupation forces—and there may be still another stage as well, but I can't foresee it now; I can't talk about it. But the main point in our action is that we do not use weapons in the intifadah areas.

[EXPRESSO] But a few months ago, the 40th communique from the intifadah leadership said that the Palestinians might begin killing one Jew for every Palestinian martyr....

[Abu-Sharif] Personally, I don't think those are quite the rules among the Palestinians.

[EXPRESSO] How are relations at the moment between the PLO and the Arab countries?

[Abu-Sharif] There is unanimous Arab support for our political program, and there is Arab support—but not unanimous—for the intifadah, and we are hoping that our relations with Syria will improve.

[EXPRESSO] Isn't it a matter of halfhearted support? One Palestinian official said that the Arab countries were contributing only one-third of the money expected....

[Abu-Sharif] We are asking for the other two-thirds.

[EXPRESSO] Is the PLO concerned about the recent developments in the East—the changes may have some influence....

[Abu-Sharif] The answer is no. On the contrary, we feel that those changes will increase support by the nations involved in our people's struggle. If you are struggling for democracy and freedom in those countries, you cannot be in favor of slavery for others....

[EXPRESSO] Yasir 'Arafat said a few months ago that there would be a Palestinian state within 2 years. Are you as optimistic as he is?

[Abu-Sharif] I agree with him. Within the next 2 years we will at least have put an end to the occupation, and that is the first step toward self-determination for the Palestinian people.

[EXPRESSO] But if we look at the current situation in the diplomatic area, where there is an impasse and...

[Abu-Sharif] I will say to you that steel is hard. It is not malleable, but it breaks. If Shamir is not malleable, it will be easier to break him, and it is Israeli public opinion that will do it.

[EXPRESSO] So the PLO's greatest hope for resolving the situation is that Shamir will disappear from the political scene, is that correct?

[Abu-Sharif] No. It is that the occupation will disappear. If Shamir changes and agrees to sit down with the PLO to negotiate peace, he will be well received....

[EXPRESSO] How do you see the peace process developing in the near future? What do you expect from the Americans....

[Abu-Sharif] President Bush said in May of last year that the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza should be ended. We are waiting for him to honor his own commitments.... But there will be other ways and means of stepping up our resistance. The Arab world is of great interest to the United States and Europe. There will be no stability in the Middle East without the Palestinian state.

[EXPRESSO] Does this mean that if there is no Palestinian state in 1992, the Palestinians on the West Bank and in Gaza may go beyond the two stages in the escalation of resistance that you mentioned?

[Abu-Sharif] We are not thinking about that yet.

[EXPRESSO] What is your greatest desire for the 1990's?

[Abu-Sharif] This year is a very crucial one. But we are not going to sit back and wait to see what it brings. We are going to teach 1990 what it must bring to the Palestinians: freedom.

Role of Slogans in Intifadah Analyzed

90OL0244A London AL-MAJALLAH
in Arabic 6 Feb 90 p 15

[Article by 'Abd-al-Karim Samarah: "War of Wall Slogans"]

[Text] A 14-year-old boy crosses the alleys of al-Nusayrat Camp at 9 PM, carrying a can of paint in his right hand, and writes on the walls of the alley, "The Intifadah [uprising] Must Continue! Woe to Agents! General Strike Thursday! No to Paying Taxes! My People Are Steadfast, They Do Not Yield!"

In Gaza, Jerusalem, Hebron, al-Fawwar, Nur Shams, Balatah, and 'Askar—in the entire occupied homeland, on streets, walls, and garbage wagons: every spot suited for writing is filled with patriotic slogans. There are inscriptions in colloquial and standard Arabic. There are poems, popular poems in colloquial Arabic, rhyming prose, impassioned sentences, and threats.

Slogans have a leading part in the intifadah and resistance to the occupation. Given the suppression of freedoms, they are one of the most important daily acts of resistance.

Slogans Before the Intifadah

Before the intifadah, slogans were used less intensively as a mobilization weapon than they are now, during the time of the intifadah. This may be because Palestinian attention used to focus on armed resistance. Political action remained at a lower level until 1976, when the first municipal elections under the occupation were held in the West Bank.

Slogans in that period centered around the main stations of the Palestinian resistance: carrying guns and the entry of commandos into the occupied lands by crossing the Jordan River, the Lebanese border, or the sea at Gaza. Among the slogans that appeared were: "The Palestinian has turned from a refugee into a commando." "The gun is our only alternative." "Armed struggle is the way of the Palestinian people." "Revolution until victory!" There were also slogans drawn from songs of the revolution, such as, "Give me shot and powder! Load the gun, commando!"

On the political scene, such slogans appeared as: "48+67=all of Palestine." "Yes to liberating all Palestinian soil! Yes to impartial Arab support! No to negotiations! No to Resolution 242!" These were slogans drawn from the political programs of the Palestinian groups, which were then demanding a state in all of Palestine through armed struggle supported by an Arab military front based on Egypt. Political slogans also expressed the Palestinian position on events and developments on the political scene, for example, rejection of the 1970 Rogers plan and the September events of the same year in Jordan, ending with the departure of the resistance from Jordan and its military consolidation in Lebanon.

Slogans in the Intifadah

With the intifadah, walls turned into newspapers—slogans erased, new slogans written, overlapping colors. Slogans reflect the position of the intifadah's Unified Command toward proposed solutions or the announced programs of the PLO. Slogans clarify the program of proclamations about days of striking, escalation, and agricultural or student educational action, as well as announcing the position on taxes and announcing days of mourning for martyrs. They are the citizens' daily guide to action, in addition to the central proclamations issued by the Unified National Leadership and the field proclamations issued by local leaders.

AL-MAJALLAH asked a Palestinian youth, "Why do you write slogans?" He replied, "Slogans are a weapon of the intifadah. By means of them, citizens arm themselves with the patriotic position. Through them, they express their frank opinion about events. Through them, they learn the details of the national program during a particular period; through them, they challenge the occupation authorities."

[AL-MAJALLAH] But there are the proclamations issued by the leadership. Aren't these enough?

[Youth] Proclamations are another weapon. Citizens keep them and read them carefully. As for slogans, they are a written broadcast that reaches every citizen quickly and easily.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Haven't the authorities issued an order imposing tremendous fines on anyone whose house has slogans on it?

[Youth] There are two ways of responding to the occupation. One is to take a collective position to refuse to pay the fines. The other is to turn to writing on the walls of public buildings and institutions.

[AL-MAJALLAH] A number of young people have fallen victim to occupation bullets while writing slogans. What do you think about this?

[Youth] Writing slogans is like distributing proclamations or hurling stones. The repression of the occupation exists, and the response also exists.

The occupation authorities have adopted a severe policy of repression toward writing on walls. Since the beginning of the intifadah, they have taken to raiding villages, city neighborhoods, and Palestinian camps to force people to erase slogans written on walls. Hundreds of citizens have been subjected to beating and abuse for refusing to remove slogans and obey the orders of soldiers. For example, the aged Husayn al-Samar, from the suburbs of Jerusalem, lies in Jerusalem's al-Matla' Hospital with a broken leg, lacerations on his head, and bruises on his back and shoulders. He said, "The Jews came into the neighborhood. I was fixing the windows of the house, so that the rain wouldn't seep in. The military patrol stopped, and the soldiers got out and started knocking violently on the houses—'Open up! Open up!'

They made all of the men and women of the neighborhood come out. A blond officer read us an ethics lecture full of threats and warnings, promising to break our bones and to lock up our houses, if slogans appeared on our walls. He then demanded that the written slogans be erased. Some people obeyed, but others—I was one of them—refused. The officer summoned reinforcements. They arrived quickly and beat us with their rifles and truncheons. Then they arrested me and three others and interrogated us while we were bleeding. They said we would remain with them until we confessed who wrote the slogans. They released us when it became clear to them that we wouldn't talk. I've been lying in hospital for nine days."

A new military occupation order was issued last year imposing a fine of 350 shekels (\$170) on every citizen, if slogans appear on the walls of his house and he does not voluntarily erase them. Following this, the Unified National Command issued communiques asking that slogans be written on the walls of public buildings and institutions, streets, squares, and electrical poles, instead of the walls [of houses].

Impact of Hamas in Gaza Elections Described

90OL0244B Nicosia FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH
in Arabic 4 Feb 90 pp 10-12

[Article by Ahmad 'Abd-al-Haqq: "Results of Ideas or of Sizes of Forces?"]

[Text] Election results in the engineers', physicians', and lawyers' unions in Gaza must be read in terms of democracy, nationalism, and personalities, not in terms of "secularism" or "religion." The PLO's enlightened position made it possible to facilitate democratic elections in Jordan. It should be even more receptive to the deeply democratic character of the movement of the Palestinian people in the past, at present, and in the future.

Perhaps one should not draw final conclusions about the strength of the Hamas movement in the Gaza Strip from last week's elections in the engineers' union. The movement won five seats, as against three for the National Bloc, and one for the independents. But a few days earlier, when elections were held in the physicians' union, the National Bloc won nine seats, the Islamic Bloc one seat, and the independents another. The National Bloc is expected to achieve similar results in the lawyers' union in the coming days.

In any case, if we make a quick tally of election results in the two unions, we see that Hamas obtained six seats out of 20, or 30 percent, while the National Bloc obtained 12 seats, or 60 percent. Independents obtained two seats, or 10 percent. However, these percentages will change, probably in favor of the National Bloc, with the results of soon to be held elections in the lawyers' union—unless there is a surprise.

These union results might have remained within their narrow, local context, had not many parties, especially the Israelis, insisted on drawing definite conclusions from them about the PLO's popularity and strength in local districts. For obvious reasons, they have stressed the position of Hamas, as opposed to the PLO. They are, thereby, trying to project their own hopes onto reality, rather than studying it as it is, tying this to the political settlement now being talked about, especially the proposal for elections in the occupied West Bank and Gaza. If Hamas were an alternative to the PLO, it would become easy for the Israelis to question the PLO's character as unique representative.

While these may be the hopes and evaluations of part of the Israeli political scene, the Israeli security apparatus has a different point of view, somewhat closer to objectivity. The morning the results of the engineers' union elections were announced, the Israeli newspaper HA'ARETZ quoted security sources as saying, "One must not consider the Islamic Bloc's victory in these elections (the engineers' union) a final measure of the balance of forces in the Gaza Strip. PLO men won an overwhelming victory in elections of the physicians' unions, which are considered to be the most important unions in the strip." Israeli sources say that the lawyers' union is even more inclined than the other unions to support the PLO.

As is well-known, the physicians' union election gave a seat in the union leadership to Dr. Mahmud al-Zahhar, who is considered the number-two man in Hamas, after Sheik Ahmad Yasin. But al-Zahhar holds positive positions on the PLO and its political tactic. His positions (not to mention his personal virtues) may have been the main reason for his success. At the same time, Hamas called on all its forces in the engineers' union to help compensate for the results of the physicians' union election. It tried to coordinate with the various slates in order to guarantee that its candidates would be entered on these slates. Thereby, it took advantage of the PLO's democratic position of working positively with all Palestinian forces in confrontation with the occupation authorities, in view of the fact that the PLO is the organization of the entire Palestinian people and that Hamas is represented in the Palestinian National Council. (According to Executive Committee member Abu-Mazin, its representation on the Executive Committee awaits the next session of the council.)

A study of elections such as these requires that one know how they were conducted, as well as the tactics of the parties; only then can one determine the real balance of forces. In this regard, it seems that Hamas profited from the PLO's position mentioned above. It arranged its tactics on the basis that the votes of its bloc in the union would be cast for its candidates. At the same time, it attempted to penetrate the other slates in order to ensure winning the largest number of seats. In fact, the election results show that the margin between the number of votes for the last of the victors and the highest of the

losers was very small, while the highest number of votes went for candidates of the National Bloc.

We are led to conclude that there were two logics controlling these elections. On the one hand, there was the logic of the National Bloc, intent on national unity and a coalition of all forces. This was the logic of someone who is self-confident, having already reaped overwhelming victories as usual in elections for the most important union in the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, there was the logic of Hamas, which was quite understandable: the logic of a new force concerned with establishing its presence. Hamas garnered the votes of its bloc and other votes from the National Bloc. Thus, we can obtain an idea of the real size of the Islamic bloc in the engineers' union.

Seen in this context, the results clearly indicate the existence of an important bloc that does not side with either of the two other blocs. The Islamic bloc profited from this bloc to a large extent. As is well-known, the National Bloc has the nature of a coalition of personalities with not necessarily identical intellectual and political positions, except in regards to a general tendency. So the votes of this independent bloc divided: a significant part of them went to Hamas because of the personal position of this or that candidate on the National Bloc slate. We do not find it strange that a member of the public assembly with rightist leanings, for example, would give his vote to Hamas because of a personal or political disagreement with a candidate close to Fatah. Similarly, a dyed-in-the-wool PLO member might prefer an Islamic Bloc candidate to a leftist candidate, for example, for reasons of personal ability and to try something new. On the other hand, the Hamas bloc is more alike intellectually and politically and, therefore, forms an integral bloc.

These preliminary observations may enable us to determine some of the ways in which these elections indicate the balance of forces in the Gaza Strip, although without drawing final conclusions. Perhaps the most obvious fact is that the strength of Hamas in the Gaza trade union body stands at about 20 percent, while the PLO's strength exceeds 75 percent. This does not make allowance for the fact that the percentage of independents, regardless of their affiliation or political loyalty, can be added, or at least can serve the most powerful bloc within each union.

It goes without saying that the trade union body in the occupied areas has popular weight and influence and reflects to a certain degree the size and weight of political forces at the grass roots. Therefore, the real weight of Hamas is much less than what is rumored and said in the service of obvious political aims. As is well-known, the Gaza Strip is the stronghold of Hamas, and here its current proportion in the unionist body becomes evident in the areas where it is most present and influential.

Many will say that these unions represent an educated stratum in society, one that is, therefore, more open and

secular, and that the strength of Hamas may, therefore, be different at the grass roots, especially in areas where misery and poverty are known to prevail. This is true in principle, but it is also true that this stratum has standing and influence in the society and its leadership. Furthermore, the prominent personalities who are known for the strength of their influence and prestige there are personalities known for their political loyalty to the PLO.

In any general elections under prevailing conditions in occupied Gaza and the West Bank, the union and professional organization bodies will obtain the lion's share among the candidates. In a situation like this, other considerations enter into account. These include the candidate's personal characteristics, his program, and sometimes even his family affiliation, etc. Furthermore, the fact that a broad sector of the Gaza population is religious does not necessarily mean that it supports Hamas. The way of conducting the elections and forming the slates may be among the most prominent decisive elements in this regard, especially with the bloc that has no political affiliation.

As long as the Israeli political scene sees in such elections an indicator of the possible results of forthcoming general elections, one must carefully consider the utterly different state of affairs in the West Bank, where the influence and prestige of Hamas are weak or even absent in some areas. Thus, these figures will be radically diluted, if the results for the two areas are added together.

Our assessment is that the figures revealed by a September 1986 public opinion survey conducted by an American newspaper and an Australian television network in cooperation with al-Najah University have not changed greatly. At that time, the PLO obtained over 94 percent, even though the survey was conducted at a time of stagnation and retreat because of an internal split and the Jordanian-Palestinian differences after the cancellation of the notorious February agreement.

Even if this figure has decreased somewhat, in contradiction to logic (i.e., a decrease in popularity accompanying a national revival, which is unusual), PLO strength in the occupied areas will not fall beneath 90 percent, compared with any other party. In any case, the remaining vote is not in favor of the Israeli occupation, but may have been given to parties that have adopted a resolute position and joined in our people's liberation struggle—parties that some people see as more radical in this regard than the PLO, rather than the opposite.

The main point is that one must see the union elections in Gaza as based on competition between political forces within the Palestinian national framework. The elections must not be seen as a choice between the PLO and Israel, for example, and, therefore, as representing a plebiscite on the PLO's role as representative of the Palestinian people. If such elections were to be held, it would be unthinkable for Hamas to stand against this role of the PLO, especially since the Islamic tendency can be found

deeply rooted in Fatah itself. Those who attended Fatah's fifth congress found themselves in a broad, truly nationalistic body.

We think that the union elections in the Gaza Strip must be evaluated in Palestinian terms in a very different context: the place and role of the religious tendency in the movement of the Palestinian national struggle. This tendency is not harmonious or unified in program or in organization, and it also embraces disputes of an ideological nature. To what extent is this tendency ready in practice to join the ranks of the PLO, given that the latter organization forms a framework that would guarantee that the tendency could express itself and defend its interests? The issue is not to parade one's weight and strength: these, as the results show, are not in favor of this religious current; rather, the issue is one of national destiny.

These elections have again demonstrated the historical reality that we have often repeated: our people are religious because of their heritage and spiritual role in the life of all mankind, but they are not narrowminded zealots. Never in history has Palestine been the center of a narrowminded political-religious movement. None of the narrowminded or uncompromising Islamic sects grew up in Palestine. Similarly, Palestine has never known uncompromising Christian movements. A clear example of this is the fact that the Protestant movement found a foothold in neighboring areas, such as Syria and Lebanon, but not in Palestine, the center of spiritual radiance. The Zionists can in no way claim that the Jews of Palestine played a role in founding the Zionist movement. On the contrary, some Palestinian Jewish movements opposed and still oppose Israel and Zionism.

Nevertheless, what happened in the Gaza Strip does not exempt the PLO from a lesson and a warning. Concern for the unity of all the forces of our people within the PLO's framework as the sole legitimate representative of this people means, first and foremost, entering through the broad gateways, not through the windows. Thus, falling back on pretended tactical skill in an attempt to penetrate slates is not acceptable as a means and does not serve the immediate goal of its practitioners, not to mention the fact that it harms the national Palestinian cause of our people, now that we are in a time of joining and unifying ranks.

[Box, p 12] Results: Association of Engineers, Gaza

Elections for the Association (Union) of Engineers in the Gaza Strip were held on 27 January 1990 at the YMCA. Ballots were cast by 449 engineers out of 500 eligible to vote, or 89.6 percent.

After a vote count lasting more than five hours, the results were as follows:

- Islamic Bloc—five seats.
- National Bloc—three seats.
- 'Aqil Matar's bloc—one seat.

The winning engineers were:

- Hatim Abu-Sha'ban (National Bloc)—216 votes.
- Sa'd Daramah (National Bloc)—213 votes.
- 'Aqil Matar ('Aqil Bloc)—211 votes.
- Jamal al-Khudari (Islamic Bloc)—202 votes.
- Rafiq Makki (Islamic Bloc)—182 votes.
- 'Abd-al-Salam Zuqut (National Bloc)—181 votes.
- Mahir Mudawwikh (Islamic Bloc)—171 votes.
- Ja'far Shahin (Islamic Bloc)—163 votes.
- 'Abd-al-Karim Muhsin (Islamic Bloc)—151 votes.

The remaining candidates received votes as follows:

- Salim al-Agha—140 votes.
- Walid Shahhadah—139 votes.
- Wa'il al-Shurafa—136 votes.
- Hashim Rustam—118 votes.
- Hamdi Mutayyir—104 votes.
- Ramadan 'Anbar—103 votes.

From 'Aqil Matar's bloc:

- Farid al-Ghurabi—149 votes.
- Hisham Abu-al-Fath—105 votes.
- Musa Hijazi—104 votes.
- Musa Salim—79 votes.
- Majid Abu-Rahmah—90 votes.
- Taysir Abu-'Asi—76 votes.
- 'Imad Jaradah—66 votes.
- Samir al-Tarzi—114 votes.

From the Islamic Bloc:

- Mustafa al-Farra—135 votes.
- Kan'an 'Ubayd—127 votes.
- Akram 'Awdah—142 votes.
- Kamal 'Abbas—118 votes.

After the election process was finished, 'Aqil Matar and Jamal al-Khudari ran for the office of president of the association. New elections were held, and Engineer 'Aqil Matar won the presidency of the association, with 198 votes, against 190 votes for Jamal al-Khudari.

The elections were supervised by an elections committee chaired by Lawyer Ibrahim Abu-Daqqah and included: Dr. Yusuf 'Awadallah, Lawyer Nazim 'Uwaydah, Lawyer Fu'ad Shanyurah, Engineer Nabil Abu-Sha'ban, Engineer Husam al-Khaznadar, Engineer Taj-al-Din al-Khaznadar, Engineer Yahya Shamiyah, Engineer Jamal Abu-Kashif, and Engineer Salah al-Saqqa.

DFLP Publication Views Soviet Role in Emigration

90OL0244C Nicosia AL-HURRIYAH
in Arabic 4 Feb 90 pp 6-9

[Article by Muhannad 'Abd-al-Hamid: "All Efforts To Stop Emigration of Soviet Jews"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted]

Limits of Soviet Responsibility

Throughout the seventies and eighties, efforts of international Zionist organizations concentrated on pressuring Soviet leaders to lighten restrictions on Jewish emigration

from the Soviet Union. Zionist pressure took organized form through conferences such as those in Brussels and the International Conference for the Emigration of Soviet Jews. The American administration joined the Zionist pressure campaigns, especially during the administration of President Jimmy Carter, who led the celebrated human rights campaign that culminated in a congressional resolution condemning the Soviet Union on the charge of hindering the emigration of Jews. American pressure continued during the administration of President Ronald Reagan, who linked improved East-West relations to a change in the Soviet position so as to agree to the emigration of Soviet Jews. Confronting the pressures, the Soviet Union adhered to an implicit position opposing emigration, Jewish or non-Jewish, out of the Soviet Union, other than in exceptional cases.

Soviet media used to direct organized propaganda against emigration, "life in Israel," and Zionism as a racist movement. The authorities expelled some active exponents of emigration from the country and turned to issuing laws to stop the waves of emigration. Those applying to emigrate had to give up their Soviet citizenship. They were not allowed to return once they had left. Soviet authorities insisted that emigrants should not travel directly to Israel, but only via a neutral third country. The authorities also opposed general organizations among the Jews. These measures regulated Jewish emigration within narrow limits, except for the 1979 emigration, which saw the departure of 51,000 Jews from the Soviet Union. These measures played a role in giving Jews emigrating to neutral countries the opportunity to choose voluntarily their new places of residence. The predominant choices, by a ratio of 90 percent, were America, Western Europe, and Canada.

But in the age of glasnost and perestroika, all restrictions and obstacles for Soviet citizens, regardless of affiliation, have disappeared. All who want to emigrate to any place outside the Soviet Union may now do so, as a basic part of a person's right to choose his place of residence and to move from one place to another. "An outflow of Soviets of all religions and nationalities began. Airline flights were booked up for at least six months, something that had never happened before, during the entire year"—AL-WATAN newspaper, 19 October 1989. In November of 1989, the Supreme Soviet gave preliminary approval to the draft of a new law to regulate freedom of emigration.

Thus, in the context of spreading freedom, freedom of movement, and democracy within the Soviet Union, all previous restrictions on the emigration or movement of Soviet Jews evaporated. It would be correct to say that the Soviet Government is not in a position to talk about freedom, democracy, and freedom of individual movement, while at the same time excepting the Jews from those freedoms.

Zionist organizations have picked up the climate of freedom and openness (glasnost) and have engaged in wide-scale activity in all Jewish groupings in the Soviet

Union to spur the Jews to emigrate. They have based this on the alleged danger of "Jewish persecution" and "a wave of hostility to Jews" in the Soviet Union. As a matter of fact, Jews were sometimes harassed and punished in the past for being against socialism, not because they were Jews, just as other antisocialist Soviets of other nationalities and religions were harassed and punished. It is also true that there are feelings of hostility to Jews in Russian popular circles and groups, especially the nationalistic Pamyat movement, and that the Jews in the Baltic republics (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia) and Azerbaijan are not respected or welcomed, because they do not speak the local language or belong to the culture of these nationalities. But in this respect, they are like the Russian minority living in these republics as Russian Orthodox, for example. However, anti-Jewish feelings in these areas have not risen to the danger level: the lives of Jews have not been threatened, even in Azerbaijan.

Nevertheless, Zionist organizations and their information media inside the Soviet Union have exploited manifestations of hostility to Jews, blowing the trumpet of anti-Semitism, to turn them into an imminent danger for the Jews of the Soviet Union. They offer the "Promised Land" as the only way to salvation.

Publications attacking Zionism and supporting Palestinian rights have decreased. A positive picture of Israel has begun to appear in many of the Soviet media, because some intellectuals have caved in, and because of the influence of open or secret Zionist cells and associations inside all Soviet institutions.

The infiltration of Zionist elements into the official and unofficial information media tends to mislead the general Jewish disposition toward emigration to Israel.

The encouragement of Soviet-Israeli tourism since February 1988 has had the effect of raising tourist rates to record levels. In the space of one and one-half years, 18,000 Soviet tourists visited Israel, at a time when the number of tourists from other parts of the world dropped because of circumstances arising from the intifadah. The function of the tourist trips was to prepare for more emigration. One can say that the pro-Israel imbalance that has come over the role of the Soviet media can be guarded against, so as to harmonize with the right of peoples to self-determination and human rights. Continuation of Soviet refusal for Jews to travel directly from Moscow to Tel Aviv would have the effect of giving the Jews a better chance to choose their place of residence, away from Israeli and American blackmail. In this regard, the possibility would arise for Jews to go to the Western European countries and Canada. In short, the Soviet Union's concern is not to deprive the Jews of

freedom and democracy, but rather to make arrangements and take measures to ensure that Soviet Jews are not pushed into the camp hostile to peace and human rights and to ensure that Israeli attempts to wreck the peace process are not encouraged. Everyone's common interest will thus be realized. [passage omitted]

EGYPT

Nafi' Responds to PLO Statement on Journalists

900A0374A Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI
in Arabic 9 Mar 90 p 1

[Ibrahim Nafi' Editorial: "Abu-'Ammar's Concerns: From Whom?"]

[Text] Some Palestinian institutions are preoccupied these days with an issue that is more serious than the Soviet Jewish immigration and than the hope of an independent Palestinian state.

The Palestinian Writers Federation has issued a "historic" statement assaulting a number of Egyptian writers and journalists who have criticized the statements Abu-Iyad made in the wake of the Israeli bus incident and urging the Journalists Union to suspend these writers' membership. If the federation could, it would demand that the heads of these writers also be hanged at the union's doors!

As for the Palestinian Workers Federation, it has issued a "more historic" statement denouncing the apostate campaign against the Palestinian revolution's "historical" leadership—a campaign led by a number of mercenaries such as Ibrahim Sa'dah, Musa Sabri, Ibrahim Nafi', and Anis Mansur!

In its statement, the Palestinian federation has urged the Egyptian Workers Federation to "take a stand" against these mercenaries and against their campaign, which only serves the terrorist Shamir and his henchmen, and serves primarily the U.S. imperialist schemes!

As part of these "revolutionary struggle" calls, Abu-Iyad accused some Egyptian journalists of being "trumpets" because they denounced the Israeli bus incident and urged the PLO leadership to condemn the incident more strongly and explicitly.

The struggle still goes on but, as usual, in the wrong direction, against the supporters rather than the foes, and against the partners rather than the enemies!

There is nothing new or surprising in this situation. These are some of our amazing conditions that have contributed to complicating matters and this is the same famous "historical" struggle method which has caused the loss of numerous opportunities!

Because we understand the lesson well and because we know that only the foes and the enemies of the Palestinian revolution and of the Arab right benefit from our

ridiculous side battles, I will not permit myself to succumb to the temptation of this proverbial Palestinian rashness. It suffices that I stress here that the Egyptian Workers General Federation has not responded to this cheap instigation and that colleague Ahmad Harak, chief editor of AL-'UMMAL, the federation's organ, countered this statement with a strong frontpage article in his paper in which he denounced the accusations made against the Egyptian writers and journalists and rejected any slighting of their dignity or of the dignity of any Egyptian. Harak also stressed that what these journalists wrote was not aimed against the Palestinian revolution leadership or against the Palestinian people, as the Palestinian Workers Federation had alleged, but was a mere expression of opinion and a response to the allegations that some Palestinian leaderships had made in their statements to the BBC against Egypt, the Egyptians, and the colleague journalists.

This is enough for me because I do not wish to again fight the windmills or to contribute to the chain of actions that disperse the efforts in the wrong direction.

Moreover, I do not wish to add to the concerns of Yasir 'Arafat, the Palestinian revolution leader, who at times suffers more from the outbursts of the members of his leadership than from some of his foes and from the foes of his people's cause.

So out of appreciation for 'Arafat, for his national role, and for his burdens, I will add no more. I will just say that if we are "mercenaries" in the eyes of the Palestinian Workers Federation's statement because we have denounced somebody's perpetration of a terrorist crime on Egypt's soil, not Israel's soil, then we thank God for being mercenaries of Egypt and its people and not mercenaries of Egypt's enemies or of the Arab nation's enemies. If we have been angered by a terrorist act committed on Egypt's soil and by the stance of some Palestinian leaderships toward this act, then we have done nothing but that which every Egyptian and Arab must do, namely condemn the individual terrorism that is perpetrated on the Arab soil, not in the battlefield. This is what is proclaimed by the PLO's official positions and by its declared policies.

If we have been angered by and have criticized Abu-Iyad's statements which have disclaimed Egypt's role in the Palestinian cause, then this is what we always do with everybody. We pause to discuss their positions and to defend Egypt and the Arab nation from those who slander it falsely. Otherwise, AL-AHRAM's pages testify to the paper's dedication to the Palestinian right, its support for the Palestinian revolution, and its defense of the Palestinian people's legitimate leadership. What I have written in support of the Palestinian objectives fills volumes and volumes and I have addressed what I have written to nobody other than the Arab people and the world conscience.

The article I wrote immediately after I criticized Abu-Iyad's statements was on the Soviet Jewish immigration

to the occupied Arab territories—an article which has warned against this marching danger. My future articles will also be on whatever possibilities and dangers confront the Palestinian right. Here also, there is nothing new or surprising. This is a principled, not a phased, position. More than 90 percent of Israel's protests over what is written about it in the Egyptian press are protests voiced against AL-AHRAM, its writers, and its journalists who, the Palestinian Workers Federation believes, serve "with their positions" the terrorist Shamir and the U.S. imperialist schemes.

Because this is prattle that merits no pause and no discussion, we will not pause before it, considering that we have things that are more important than these statements and utterances and that are worthier of attention and consideration.

We have the future of the Palestinian cause, restoration of the Palestinian right, liberation of the Arab territory, support for the Palestinian people's intifadah [uprising], confronting the Israeli intransigence, and consolidating the efforts to wrench and establish a just peace.

This is what is truly preoccupying us and what merits dedicated efforts and time from us. As for the statements of the Palestinian Writers Federation, the Palestinian Workers Federation, and other federations, the only comment on them is: O God instill in some of those concerned with the Palestinian cause the wisdom to make a distinction between the fundamental and the marginal, the distant and the near, the supporter and the foe, and between the truly genuine objectives and the mirage and illusion!

Without this, the arrows will miss their mark and will hit the partners instead of the enemies. The enemies will rejoice and the supporters will grieve. Without this, we are entitled to ask: We wonder, who are the people who serve Shamir and the foreign schemes with their actions? They or we?

I leave the answer to the reader's insight and wisdom!

Columnist Sees Interior Ministry as Threat to Musa

900A0331A Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 6 Feb 90 p 12

[Article by Muhammad 'Abd-al-Quddus: "Danger to Interior Minister"]

[Text] I see absolutely no sense to this suspicious attack on a police officer in 'Ayn Shams. I reject and repudiate it. I also condemn the leaflets ascribed to the Islamic group attacking the new interior minister, Major General Muhammad 'Abd-al-Halim Musa, in a crude style alien to the general principles of ethics and civility, not to mention Islamic civility.

To my great sorrow, I have no evidence that would enable me to say that I doubt that all these acts were arranged by Investigation Bureau agents loyal to Zaki

Badr—so that they might say to the new minister, "The best course for you to take is that of your predecessor: force, repression, aggression, and insolence against people."

To be exact, my point of view is that I see the change that has occurred in the Interior Ministry as a positive development. It is not just that they have taken away X and brought in Y. The new minister who has succeeded Zaki Badr is a clean police officer with no record of wrongdoing. He was a successful provincial governor in Asyut. Unfortunately, the minister on whom we set our hopes for good has fallen prisoner to the old school of police, whose most prominent figure was Zaki Badr. The school believes that a successful interior minister is one who is severe and repressive and who looks down on people. Accordingly, Major General Muhammad 'Abd-al-Halim Musa has fallen into a number of errors and has had a bad beginning in his administration by killing two members of Islamic groups, one in Asyut, the other in 'Ayn Shams. He has retreated from all the statements he previously made. He has announced that he rejects dialogue and that his task is merely to do his job as a professional security man. Then came the suspicious events that I mentioned and pushed him strongly in this direction. They were like a free gift to students of the school of despotism.

I say to Major General Muhammad 'Abd-al-Halim Musa: The greatest danger that threatens to undermine your entire term in office does not come from extremist organizations. It comes from the heart of the Interior Ministry. I fear that you will be captured by the school that believes in repression and aggression. Instead of your impressing your own personality on the Interior Ministry, the opposite may occur. You may fall victim to the "Badr School" and its deep-rooted history of wrongdoing.

The new minister has announced that there is no change in Interior Ministry policy. However, a change of methods is certainly something necessary. Conditions in prisons must be improved. Torture must be ended once and for all. The stopping and searching of religious and political people at the airport must be abolished. There must be dialogue with all social groups and political parties. The shoot-to-kill policy, which means deliberate murder, must be revised. Shots should be fired only in extreme necessity.

I believe that Major General Muhammad 'Abd-al-Halim Musa's success in the Interior Ministry depends on his making public opinion believe there has been a major change between him and his predecessor: not merely that the curses, obscenities, and insults have stopped, but that the ministry's entire method of operation has changed. This will never happen unless radical changes take place in leadership positions of the Interior Ministry—unless responsibility is given to pupils of Major General Muhammad 'Abd-al-Halim Musa, not pupils of Zaki Badr.

Contractor Discusses Apartment Costs, Market

900A0331B London AL-MAJALLAH
in Arabic 6 Feb 90 p 53

[Interview with Hisham Amin al-Nasharti, cofounder of the Egyptian Real Estate Group: "How Do You Buy an Apartment in Egypt?"; date and place not given; first three paragraphs are AL-MAJALLAH introduction]

[Text] If you want to buy and register [title to] an apartment in Egypt, read these lines.

The company is the Egyptian Real Estate Group. The interview is with Hisham Amin al-Nasharti, one of its three cofounders, along with his father, Amin al-Nasharti, and his brother, 'Umar Amin al-Nasharti. The company is an Egyptian joint stock company operating under the investment law. It is currently involved in implementing 600 apartments: 400 of them classified as "above average" and 200 as "average housing," at numerous locations in Cairo and al-Jizah.

Concerning the real estate building system in Egypt, Hisham al-Nasharti says that building for rental has become a losing proposition and unproductive due to the increasing cost of buildings. He says that the increased cost of building materials has led to the inevitable result that building for rental produces no profit. Because of this, the tendency has been toward a system of building for ownership.

[AL-MAJALLAH] But some owners do not abide by the prices announced when the sale of apartments at a certain location is announced. What is your view?

[Al-Nasharti] True, some people do that. It can be traced to the fact that real estate building studies are imprecise. But the system we follow is that we never announce the selling price of any real estate until we complete at least 50 percent of it. This is so that there will be no unexpected changes in the price of building materials or other components.

[AL-MAJALLAH] How does the real estate market in Egypt compare with other markets?

[Al-Nasharti] The cost of buying real estate in London or Madrid is \$6,000 or \$7,000 a [square] meter in superior areas, and you pay \$1,500 or \$2,000 a meter in average areas. In Egypt, the most luxurious and expensive places sell for no more than \$1,000 a meter, with outstanding and luxury levels of finishing. However, prospective buyers of apartments should know that prices in Egypt are increasing 10 or 12 percent a year. In London, prices have become stable and are not increasing, since they have already reached a very high level, and the interest rate has risen tremendously.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Isn't there a problem of registering [title to] real estate for foreigners in Egypt?

[Al-Nasharti] Currently, following the recent changes in this regard, any Arab or foreign citizen of any nationality

can buy an apartment in his own name and can register it by transferring the purchase price of the apartment in free currency through an Egyptian bank to the account of the owner of the property. He accompanies the apartment registration application that he submits to the relevant real estate registry office with a certificate from the bank to which the price of the apartment has been transferred, and registration takes place easily.

I would warn prospective buyers of apartments against dealing in an illegal manner, lest they lose their rights. Arabs or foreigners are not allowed to buy in any other way than this.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Can any citizen purchase any amount of space?

[Al-Nasharti] The space has been set at 1,000 square meters per individual.

[AL-MAJALLAH] What is the registration procedure?

[Al-Nasharti] The individual may carry out the registration himself or through a company. Among the registration procedures, the purchaser must write a power of attorney for one of the legal counselors in the company to represent him before government bodies such as the Real Estate Registration Department. This counselor takes care of completing all the other procedures.

[AL-MAJALLAH] There are said to be problems about registering real estate that was bought before the recent changes.

[Al-Nasharti] What I would stress here is that there are no registration problems for recent buyers—those who made purchases after the issuance of the changes. Those who bought earlier face certain problems. A discussion is now under way concerning procedures for approving the registration of unregistered units for Arabs in Egypt—units bought before the recent changes. The problem is expected to end soon.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Does the owner of the real estate obtain the price of the apartment in the free currency that was transferred through an Egyptian bank?

[Al-Nasharti] The owner receives the selling price of his apartment in Egyptian pounds at the announced exchange rate for the day on which the price of the apartment was transferred via the bank. In other words, the bank receives the free currency and gives the owner its equivalent in Egyptian pounds. Following this, an initial contract is drawn up between the owner and the buyer, so that registration can take place afterwards.

[AL-MAJALLAH] A final question: What are the areas in which Arabs prefer to buy apartments?

[Al-Nasharti] Arabs generally dream of an apartment on the Nile, either in al-Zamalik or al-'Ajuzah.

[AL-MAJALLAH] And prices?

[Al-Nasharti] The price ranges between \$800 and \$1,000 a meter in these areas.

Plan To Increase Public Sector Productivity Discussed

90OA0327A Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH
in Arabic 28 Jan 90 p 5

[Article by Dr. Jamal al-Din Sadiq: "Overemployment in the Public Sector"]

[Text] In 1976 the public sector accounted for nearly 50 percent of the gross national product (GNP). Public sector employees amounted to one-third of the aggregate work force. Then, employee density was higher in the private sector than in the public sector. In other words, productivity was higher in the public sector than in the private sector. The situation has been totally reversed since 1983.

A worker's share of GNP was 3.5 times higher in the public sector than in the private sector and about four times higher than in the government sector. Public sector worker productivity then began to slide until it dropped to low rates disproportionate with the huge number of men and women employed by that broad sector.

Public sector managers blame this passivity and frightening decline in productivity on the brain drain caused by emigration abroad. They also blame it on the stacking of excess workers under a state policy [for the full employment] of [university] graduates and veterans by forcing them on public projects.

Despite indications of some recent improvement, project board chairmen continue to attribute their company losses and low productivity to the drain of trained workers and the stacking of the unskilled.

A private study of public sector projects in the textile industry (the Warner Report) used European mills that utilize equipment of the same age and type employed in Egyptian facilities as a basis for comparison. The study concluded that overemployment in Egyptian public projects amount to some 80 percent in spinning and weaving, 70 percent in semimanufacturing, and 80 percent in manufacturing. The study also found that equipment productivity was low compared to Europe and concluded that it was feasible and tenable to effect improvements of 15 percent in spinning, 30 percent in weaving, 30 percent in semimanufacturing, and 50 percent in dyeing. It is not surprising that Egyptian equipment is lower in productivity than its European counterparts. This, after all, is a matter of development. It is worth noting, however, that machine output is closer to European standards than labor productivity, indicating that the problem is not so much with technical management as it is with the workers themselves. Extremely low worker productivity is attributable in part to educational and training standards that are lower in Egypt than in Europe. But a great deal of the disparity could also be

attributed to those workers imposed by government policies with which public projects previously complied.

In fact, we should not look to the stacking of workers for a solution when labor markets develop and unemployment rises. Experiences of the 60's and 70's indicate that worker stacking as an employment policy tends to burden public projects with financing what is essentially unemployment assistance. Actions like this negatively impact public sector liquidity and profitability as well as its ability to fund maintenance, restoration, retooling, and new investments. Productivity ultimately suffers.

Firing is not a solution to the problem of stacking because that is an empirical impossibility. Job security as an innate social value is at the core of the Egyptian economic system and is now, under labor laws, a fundamental concept in public sector companies as well as some, if not all, private sector companies and organizations.

And yet, job security is in itself a negative productivity incentive and must be coupled with work incentives (material and moral) to raise productivity. It may be possible to institute a piece-meal system in certain public sector companies. That may be the optimal remedy and solution to low productivity.

But implementing a piece-meal system would create serious practicality problems that would have to be resolved. Output may be difficult to market or may suffer market fluctuations that would require adjusting and reducing working hours in line with price and demand fluctuations and with the size of inventory.

At any rate, piece meal is a more practical solution and is the system of preference sociologically and economically. The impact of sales declines must be reduced even if inventory size would rise indefinitely.

In conclusion, this proposal must be subject of careful study within the framework of the general wage reforms that Egypt is expected to implement shortly.

Government Criticized for Failed Farming Policy

90OA0327B Cairo AL-WAFD in Arabic 24 Jan 90 p 7

[Article: "Sugarcane Growers in Upper Egypt Insist: The Government Tricked Us; Sugarcane Crop Deteriorates Because of Flawed Ministry of Agriculture Policies"]

[Text] The government has decreed a increase in the price of sugarcane from 37.5 pounds to 50.5 pounds a ton as an incentive to growers and to elicit their attention to the crop. But the government also decreed simultaneous price increases for fertilizer and other farm supplies. The costs of harvesting and shipping have also risen as a result of the escalating cost of living to farm workers. One wonders if the farmer received a real producer price increase that would encourage the planting of sugarcane. We sought the answer in the region where sugarcane is produced.

The oldest sugarcane center is in Qina governorate, specifically in Armant county where AL-WAFD interviewed farmers fresh from "figuring out" the increase in sugarcane prices against the increase in farm supplies. Their painful conclusion was that the price of sugarcane has declined rather than risen. But how did they arrive at that?

Farmers were upset to learn of the sugarcane price increase just as the Bank of Development and Agricultural Credit began insisting that they consent in writing to retroactive price increases for fertilizer and other farm supplies. Fertilizer prices also rose. Farmers forecast average sugarcane harvest at only 33 tons per feddan thanks to the ministry of agriculture's repeated failure over the past 10 years to develop new sugarcane strains, causing the median crop to deteriorate from 38 to 33 tons. This is where the problem lies. A feddan of sugarcane, based on current averages and new prices, would realize about 400 pounds.

Rising Prices and Increased Burdens

But how about the rise in costs?

The cost of fertilizer phosphates rose from 3.8 pounds to 7 pounds. The cost per feddan has therefore increased by 22.5 pounds because each feddan requires 350 kilos of fertilizer.

The increase in nitrogen fertilizer costs amounts to 152 pounds since a minimum of 800 kilos is needed [per feddan] of good soil. Seedling costs, payable over four years, increased by about 22 pounds. Irrigation expense jumped from eight to 12 pounds per feddan per "run." About 15 runs are required. The cost of irrigation has, therefore, increased by 50 pounds a feddan. Land-leasing costs also increased by about 100 pounds a feddan. The cost of transporting the crop from production centers increased by 20 pounds; 15 pounds if sugar company trucks are used. Farm worker wages are also constantly rising over the various stages of harvest and are 50 pounds at a minimum.

Accordingly, costs have increased by 404 pounds a feddan—higher than the increase in sugarcane prices.

The farmer has also to contend with increasing consumer prices, including sugar, without a corresponding increase in income. How, then, can officials claim that sugarcane price increases would entice the farmers to produce and plant sugarcane?

The government has given farmers a sugarcane price increase with one hand, then took it back with the other.

How much profit goes the government realize from manufacturing sugar?

It is common knowledge that a ton of sugarcane produces between 100 and 120 kilos of sugar not to mention molasses and alcohol. Sugarcane is also used in the manufacture of perfumes, fiberboard, and fodder.

Certain sugar company executives, who prefer to remain anonymous, believe that 120 pounds or more in profits are realized per ton of sugarcane after manufacturing costs. That gives the government a profit margin of 140 percent extracted from the sweat and toil of farmers.

Will the government persist in monopolizing the toil of farmers in return for annual producer price increases that fall behind escalating production costs? How long will the government keep this up?

These questions permeate the travails of farmers in sugarcane-producing centers. Will some official provide a satisfactory answer?

Consultative Council Condemns Soviet Jewish Immigration

90OA0374A Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI
in Arabic 7 Mar 90 p 3

[Article by Sharif al-'Abd: "Consultative Council's Foreign Relations Committee: Soviet Jewish Immigration Means Invasion of Arab Territories and Threat to Peace"]

[Text] At its meeting yesterday under the chairmanship of Mufid Shihab, the Consultative Council's Foreign Relations Committee asserted that the massive Soviet Jewish immigration to Israel, made in large numbers and in a premeditated manner, poses a threat to all the efforts seeking to establish peace in the region and seriously endangers the region's security. This immigration even means a new invasion of the Arab territories and constitutes a violation of all the international laws.

The committee urged both the Soviet Union and the United States to act promptly to stop the immigration and to pressure Israel to show respect for international charters. The committee also appealed to the world parliaments to exert effective efforts to halt this crime. The committee further demanded that the Arab countries act promptly and it urged them to hold a summit immediately by virtue of the serious situation.

The committee also stressed that the immigration activities taking place are, (in its legal opinion), premeditated activities aimed at settling groups in territories other than their own, thus constituting a flagrant violation of all the international charters and laws.

Kamil al-Dab' said that there is something more dangerous than the Soviet Jewish immigration, namely the AIDS which is infiltrating our country with the Israeli tourists and which represents a real war that threatens our people and youth. The Israeli tourist enters Egypt without any restrictions. The least that can be done is to require this tourist to present a reliable health certificate asserting that he is free of this disease to whose transmission he contributes very strongly as of the moment of his arrival.

'Id Adam said that popular diplomacy must play a positive role by contacting the world parliaments to explain the dimensions of the crime of Soviet Jewish immigration to the occupied territories and the degree by which this immigration contradicts all international laws.

Yahya al-Zayyat said that it is difficult to prevent the Soviet Jewish immigration, but that it is possible to consolidate the efforts to slow it down and, at the same time, to speed up the negotiations and to pressure the United States to prevent as much as possible the completion of this crime.

Kamal Abu-al-Khayr said that both superpowers (have washed their hands of this issue). The Soviet Union's recent agreement to permit immigration, which it had totally forbidden previously, did not emanate from the developments that have taken place, but because the Soviets need the U.S. technology and financial aid. The U.S. sympathy and support for Israel show that the United States will never change. This is why it has negotiated with the Soviet Union.

Interviews Sample Students' Political Awareness

90OA0270A Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 17 Jan 90 p 7

[Article by Hanan Hammad: "This Is How New College Students Think"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] The first question put to the students was about Egyptian parties. What are they? What are their orientations and newspapers and who are their leaders. Cairo University liberal arts student Rim 'Ali answered, "I know the National Party, which is the totalitarian party, the Wafd Party, which is the undemocratic one and the Grouping Party, which is communist, and its leader is Muhammad Khalid. The Muslim Brotherhood joined the party following its quarrel with the Wafd Party!"

'Ayn Shams law student Hiyam said: "There is the National Party that does whatever it pleases and I do not know who its leader is. There is the Labor Party that puts out the AL-AHALI newspaper (!) and there is the Wafd Party that puts out the AL-WAFD newspaper, but I do not now who its leader is."

Al-Rawdah Institute student Khalid Mahmud gave this categorical answer: "I do not know the Egyptian parties." Asked about the name of the ruling party, he said: "What does that mean?"

Superficial Parties

Cairo University communications student Khalid Idris distinguished himself with the following reply: "Do not ask me about the parties. They are superficial formations that do not play a role in the Egyptian political arena.

Even their members do not have any ideological affiliations, as evidenced by the fact that a member may quit his party to join another party totally different from the first one."

Parties Returned in 1952

Asked what the date of the parties' return to life in Egypt, communications student Hisham 'Iraqi said: "Parties returned after the 1952 revolution, were abolished by al-Sadat and he brought them back toward the end of his life."

Riem 'Ali agreed with him on the date, saying: "Parties came back during 'Abd-al-Nasir's regime."

The strangest answer came from 'Ayn Shams University student Sharif Muhammad who said: "Parties came back during the days of Sa'd Zaghlul."

Presidency for Life

About how the president is elected, English-language student Ghadah Qandil said: "The president is elected every four years and he must be Egyptian and a Muslim."

Law student 'Abir Hasan said: "I am not interested in the presidency because it is not handled properly. A referendum is held and whatever they want goes."

Sharif Muhammad added: "The presidency is for life and age is in God's hands!"

None of the students had a voting card.

Beirut Capital of Tunisia!

There were different answers to the question about the number of Arab states, none of them right. In answer to a question about the capital of Tunisia, Sahar, 'Abdallah, Zizi, Muhammad, and communications graduate student Hanan Madani Tahmidi said it was Tunis while others said Banghazi. Hiyam said it was Beirut and Khalid Muhammad did not know.

Camp David, 1970

In reply to a question about Camp David, 'Ayn Shams University student Zizi Salim said that it was a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, but she did not know the terms of the treaty. Zizi's answer was typical of all the other answers, for everyone knew that Camp David is a peace treaty, but they did not know its terms. Cairo University liberal arts student Ghadah 'Abd-al-Ra'uf gave the unique answer that Camp David was concluded in 1970, prior to the October 1973 war, that is!

September, the Demon

No one knew about Black September, the symbol for the liquidation of the Palestinian resistance in Jordan, except for Ghadah Muhammad who said it was a demon or something like a black tiger!

Midwife

In the public figures category, we asked about Nabawiyah Musa, a pioneer in the women's movement. The only correct answer was given by law student Hiyam Rim. She said she was a reporter for AL-AKHBAR newspaper; Ghadah Qandil said she was a professor at 'Ayn Shams University; and Khalid Idris said she was a midwife!

As for Muhammad Kamil Ibrahim, president of the Arab Human Rights Organization, all the young people unanimously agreed that he did not exist in the world of their assigned books and the only dissenting voice was that of law student Hiyam who said: "Muhammad Ibrahim Kamil rejected Sadat's peace treaty with Israel and wrote the book 'Peace Lost in Camp David.'"

The Star

Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto has achieved star status among female college students who all knew about her. 'Abir Hasan said: "The fact that a woman has made it to the premiership means that she is an extraordinary woman capable of governing men and standing up to opposition."

Youth Revolution!

Our talk with young people led us to the question of unemployment, which has become synonymous with a college degree. Everyone says the government is the cause of the problem and the solution is to change the government. This is what Sahar, Zizi, Hisham, Khalid, and Reem, who are about to join the unemployment ranks, said. They had no concept of the problem's dimensions, development, and possible solution, except for Hiyam who said that young people must undertake a revolution to force change. The unemployment issue led us to a question about the current worries and concerns of young people.

Khalid Idris gave a bitter answer, heard many times before. He said: "Our problem is what to do after graduation? Where is my right to work, to have a place to live and, to get married?"

'Abir Hasan brought up an issue of personal concern to her, namely the children of Egyptian women married to Arab nationals. "My mother is Egyptian and my father is an UAE [United Arab Emirate] national," she said, "and, therefore, I face a lot of complications in applying for residency and college admission in Egypt." Khalid Muhammad said his dream was to go to Italy to work at a gas station owned by a relative until the institute results come out!

Put Economic System on Trial

On to Dr. 'Abd-al-Basit 'Abd-al-Mu'ti, president of the Arab Social Studies Association, who said: "Do not put the young people on trial for their shallow awareness and narrow horizons. Let us put on trial the economic and political conditions that are to blame, beginning with the

harsh economic conditions that consume the parents' energy outside the home in their effort to make a living, thus paying no attention to their children's awareness.

"These are the same conditions that force young people to work at summer jobs, without taking time out to become informed and to dream about going to oil-producing countries to make money.

"Put on trial the mass media, TV in particular. TV offers entertainment and not education. It presents soccer stars, not intellectual and cultured people, as role models. Add to that the absence of neighborhood and village schools and libraries that were expected to offer an alternative amid the high prices of books and magazines.

"There is also the absence of a civilizational project that brings people together and raises their awareness in an effort to achieve it.

"The upshot of all these conditions is that our young people suffer frustration and emigration, are subject to an awareness drain, and are incapable of envisaging solutions to their problems. This gloomy picture notwithstanding, there is still hope in some young types we see assembled at seminars, conferences, and the Cairo International Book Fair. For the young people of Egypt to educate themselves, they need the government and the political parties to raise their awareness."

Real Crisis

Dr. Rifat Sayyid Ahmad, a researcher at the National Social and Criminal Research Center, commented on the answers the young people gave by saying that they indeed reflect a real crisis in the kind and quality of the political and social education of Egyptian youth.

This crisis is a natural outcome of the role the political system plays in sidelining young people's awareness and education, a role that began with undermining the educational role of the Egyptian universities in the seventies and the deliberate defamation of the national and educational movement leaders in exchange for magnifying interest in soccer and soccer players in all the mass media, which may be called media for the subversion of young people.

Add to that the deadly economic crisis that is destroying everyone. For those who do not have their daily food cannot be expected to know the name of the ruling party leader.

ISRAEL**Water Supply Threatened**

44230090D Tel Aviv HADASHOT
in Hebrew 14 Jan 90 p 7

[Text] Jordan has recently completed excavating an 800-meter channel which will be used to divert streams spilling into the Yarmuk river in its territory toward the

Jordanian-Syrian border. On that site the Jordanians plan to build a huge dam to collect the stream waters and stop them from continuing to the Yarmuk. Jordan carried out the project with the agreement of the Syrian Government.

Jordan has reported that once the excavation was completed, it applied to the International Bank for financing the dam. If the application is approved, the construction work will begin in about 6 months. Jordan explained to the International Bank that if it does not solve its water problem, it may be left without water within the coming 10 years. The problem was created by Syria's building a system of dams which captured water from various streams that had been leading to Jordan.

The new reservoir is planned to hold up to 200 million cubic meters of water, most of which will be used to water the Irbid hills. The Jordanians will thus also be able to control water allocation downstream from the Yarmuk into the Ghawr channel, and to water the Jordan Valley.

Israeli water management sources said that the government must ensure that Jordan observes the 1955 Johnston agreement that regulates the division of the Yarmuk's water between Syria, Jordan, and Israel. According to that agreement, Israel is to draw 25 million cubic meters during the summer season from the Yarmuk near Hamah. The sources warned that if the water supply is not ensured, the new reservoir may have a harmful effect on Israel's water supply.

Minister Levy: No Talks With PLO

44230090C Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ (Supplement)
in Hebrew 12 Jan 90 pp 4,7

[Interview with Deputy Prime Minister David Levy by Gid'on Levi; date, place not given; first five paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] These are the main conclusions from a lengthy talk this week with Deputy Prime Minister David Levy: First, he doesn't use a blow dryer and all the talk of pathos and hairdos is ridiculous. "If my hair were uncombed, they would say, look at this wild mane," he said. "It might have been better if I had been bald." Secondly, it is difficult to detect any signs of dovishness in him, or even of political moderation, to the attention of those who thought they saw such signs in him during the Lebanon war. David Levy leaves no room for doubt: As far as he is concerned, never the PLO and never any Palestinian state. Is this to be linked to the "constraining" conjuncture in which he is now, on the same side as Sharon and Moda'i? Or is this the real David Levy?

Between the lines, however, one can read that if negotiations with the PLO were unavoidable, he would prefer them to be clear and open, without fooling the people as the government is now doing.

We talked for over 2 hours: about the constraints and the PLO, Yitzhaq Shamir, and David Levy. He loves Rita and says he discovered her talent long before the rest of us did. Yes, he is now both sad and angry because of his government. He won't say because of the prime minister.

Every night he drives to his home in Bet She'an—two Amidar apartments joined together, five rooms, wife, and 12 children, seven of them still at home. Their names are: Etty, 32; Jackie, 30; Shim'on, 28; Ury, 25; Edna, 23; Ziva, 22; Eshkol, 22; Ilanit, 19; Orly, 15; Moshe, 14; Sima, 12; and Tali, 10. Yes, Eshkol was named after Levy Eshkol. He said he couldn't forgive himself for not devoting more time to them.

During the talk he was nice and frank, especially when the tape recorder was off. When it was on, the pathos frequently came on, too. We began with politics.

[HA'ARETZ] Does the Likud now have a united position?

[Levy] "I think so. Except that certain members' zigzags are giving the impression that some of our members want to appear more moderate."

[HA'ARETZ] What's wrong with that?

[Levy] "Nothing wrong, the question is whether it is true. We are marching along a path that the Likud did not cut out, only in order to make a certain impression on the American... and on our partners, during which time we don't pay attention to what is really important."

[HA'ARETZ] Which is bad.

[Levy] "Yes, it contains many dangers, because there will either be an explosion, or you will in the end cede, once you have let it be understood that you are flexible."

[HA'ARETZ] You know the prime minister well. Is he heading toward an explosion or toward collapse?

[Levy] "I cannot give you an unequivocal answer in this matter, but the way things are, either explosion or collapse is unavoidable."

[HA'ARETZ] When?

[Levy] "I think we are very close to it."

[HA'ARETZ] Even before the elections in the territories?

[Levy] "Certainly. Now you must ask the main question: If you are faithful to your party's ideology, how does it agree with those elections? The elections will not go exactly the way you want. Even if you set security conditions, you are not alone in this arena and you are unavoidably going to involve the PLO in one way or another. You are in fact going to talk about things that you said in government decisions that they will never be brought up."

[HA'ARETZ] The PLO is not yet involved?

[Levy] "We are burying our heads in the sand—we don't see and don't know. The worst is that you know that they know that you know, but it's better to pretend that you don't know. That's what's so absurd. Whatever the position, there is one thing I don't want, namely that we should act like idiots."

[HA'ARETZ] Maybe it's convenient to be idiots at this time.

[Levy] "I don't think we should want to be idiots."

[HA'ARETZ] So the PLO is involved in the process?

[Levy] "From our viewpoint, not yet, but from the viewpoint of the process, yes. And I don't want us to be idiots, if you'll pardon the expression. Everything points to the fact that we are on our way, but we are being given the medicine in small doses. Whoever doesn't see it is covering his own eyes in order not to see, not to know, and let's see what will happen. That's what worries me."

[HA'ARETZ] And the prime minister doesn't see all this?

[Levy] "I don't doubt that he does, but the method is built on hopes and on 'let's go on, perhaps.' But this is a road of no return, it means both the PLO and the loss of Judaea and Samaria."

[HA'ARETZ] Do you really believe that you can promote a process without the PLO?

[Levy] "Look, if you mean this process, then no."

[HA'ARETZ] What is your alternative?

[Levy] "Had we remained faithful to what we had decided with the United States, which a U.S. president endorsed with his signature, we would have had a powerful political anchor. I am talking of the Camp David process. But as soon as we deviated from it, we released the Americans from their obligation. That is the real tragedy."

[HA'ARETZ] Let's pretend that you are the prime minister today.

[Levy] "There is nothing more amateurish than to take a situation I opposed—this process, which was born of Yitzhaq Rabin and which even Shim'on Peres opposed—and to say what I would do now. This is a situation in which you give legitimacy to democratic elections for the same public that is fighting you with the intifadah; once its representatives are elected you will not be able to deny them the decision to declare themselves PLO followers."

"So what do you do then? Repress them? Arrest them? Deport them? Any of these options will make the situation much worse, and the world will view you as oppressing the ones you allowed to express their wishes."

[HA'ARETZ] Maybe there is no other way?

[Levy] "I claim that there is. We should have observed what we agreed with the Americans, having paid such a high price through the agreement with Egypt. Now look at what was 5 months ago and laugh at how all the things that the government decided came to nothing. Also, we lost the chance of achieving peace with the Arab countries, which is the main thing, rather than the Palestinian problem."

[HA'ARETZ] So it's too late anyway.

[Levy] "It's never too late. The Alignment and the Likud must be made to admit that this is the game and we are not idiots. You can't watch something coming and say, it won't happen to me. If we intend to go thus far and no farther no matter what, this is the time to decide. We evaded it through all kinds of maneuvers, and we find it convenient that others come up with their maneuvers, and that's sad. You want the PLO? OK, then decide. But don't let's fool ourselves on purpose."

[HA'ARETZ] To what are the Palestinians entitled altogether?

[Levy] "I supported the agreement known as autonomy, and I am against a Palestinian state, which would threaten the existence of my state. Not because the PLO was capable today, if it had a state, to defeat me. Did anyone think 20 years ago that Iraq would achieve such technological progress? It is not on the basis of the present situation that we must decide what is dangerous and what is not."

[HA'ARETZ] But what prevented you, the Likud government, from implementing autonomy?

[Levy] "I was always for it, but there were also objective difficulties. At one point Egypt wanted it, then it blew cold, at one point the United States wanted it, then it cooled off."

[HA'ARETZ] What about the Gaza Strip? 'Ezer Weizmann said in that telephone conversation that as far as Gaza is concerned, the prime minister can be more easily swayed.

[Levy] "Others said that before him, too. But who's going to take Gaza? Let's assume, speaking of Weizmann's view, that I give Gaza away. What will come into being there? A pressure cooker that no one will take over from you. So you would withdraw unilaterally, without anything, without any agreement? Then there will be despair, and they will organize, then you'll have to do there what was done in Lebanon, and then what will you be, nicer or uglier? What will you do then? Blow them up? Reoccupy them?"

[HA'ARETZ] In the meantime there is the 2 and 1/2-year-old intifadah and everything you said applied to the situation prior to it. How will you stop it?

[Levy] "In this respect, too, Israel must decide its position. You can't fight on the one hand, and say you're getting used to living with it on the other. You must be

done with it, but do you have the determination to do so? Don't misunderstand me, I'm not one of the brutal ones who ignore feelings and values. But can you pursue any process as long as the intifadah continues?"

[HA'ARETZ] So how will you stop it?

[Levy] "I am very sorry that the necessary steps were not taken from the very beginning."

[HA'ARETZ] Military steps?

[Levy] "You say military and what you see before your mind's eye is already a cruel scene. I'm not saying we should take drastic steps against a civilian population."

[HA'ARETZ] So what are you saying?

[Levy] "From the very beginning the situation was not correctly assessed and the reaction was not appropriate. We are planting in their minds the belief that without a political solution this will not end, by which we actually say that we do not intend to put an end to it."

"We nursed some of them along, and now we take steps against the very same people, although the government even talked with some of them. We let them understand that they were partners, but the moment they utter the word PLO, we take steps against them. Here, too, we must decide what our real position is. Perhaps this government has exhausted its resources. By the way, I think so."

[HA'ARETZ] Last Thursday, on television, you seemed angry about it.

[Levy] "Because I am angry. The public is angry, and I am perhaps somewhat more so, because it is a matter of my government and my party. The prime minister brings very serious accusations against Weizmann, turns the public into a jury, and 2 days later everything is over, but serious questions remain."

[HA'ARETZ] The prime minister complained that you didn't support him during those days.

[Levy] "Sir, did anyone hear any criticism from me when the prime minister revealed to the public what he had not revealed to me? I'll let you in on a secret: I heard about it on the telephone from the prime minister, after I had heard it on the radio, because that day I had left the government meeting before the end. I said to him: You must know what you're doing, and if the situation is that bad, then I'm with you. That's it."

"I didn't know how the affair ended even one hour or one minute beforehand. So how can one say that he didn't have support. Support for what? Good God, if there was something in those accusations, how come they were dropped the next day?"

[HA'ARETZ] Do you now support the idea of a legal suit?

[Levy] "I will not express any view on the matter. I was not a participant. There were also additional revelations that no one is mentioning. So I don't know who knew. Is there more? Parallel handling is against government decisions, who was in on it? Who are the officials who knew? There were meetings in prison, after which released prisoners traveled the world. And I don't know a thing. What is the extent of it and what was said? Were there any messages? This whole situation didn't come to be in one day, there must have been a process. Was the process ignored or known? I don't know."

[HA'ARETZ] Does it seem right to you that Ezer Weizmann should be in the USSR and Abie Nathan in jail?

[Levy] "Certainly not. That is certainly their place. I'm not the one who is hurling accusations at Weizmann, but if accusations were made, then you can't say you were lucky, a proposal was made and I was out of it. Where is the seriousness? Where is justice? Everything is unclear, like our political situation. The prime minister asked his interviewers why they were sad. As far as I'm concerned, I'm both sad and angry."

[HA'ARETZ] From the picture you presented it sounds like you don't have any influence in this government.

[Levy] "What's influence? In debates you have to fight for your opinion. But no power in the world can define a chance for influence when in this government the Alignment and part of the Likud coordinate things at their convenience, until there is an explosion, and then the rest of the Likud will have to come to the rescue of this part of the Likud. It's abnormal. There is no responsibility and no comradeship. I am speaking harshly, but that's how I feel."

[HA'ARETZ] Have you considered resigning, since you are the deputy prime minister of this government?

[Levy] "Of course I have. What do you think I'm made of, steel? I'm human. The question is, if I do, will it help anything? No."

[HA'ARETZ] You, the three constraints ministers, did not exactly grow up together and weren't exactly friends in the past.

[Levy] "Right, right. One hundred percent."

[HA'ARETZ] So can it be said that this is a temporary conjuncture and that tomorrow you may be selling each other out?

[Levy] "Look, there is one thing on which we stand firm, and that's the political aspect. There is a group of ministers known as 'the prime minister's inner circle.' But there is a hierarchy in the party. So do we have to become accustomed to a situation in which major issues are not cleared with us?"

[HA'ARETZ] The impression is that the three of you are personally embittered.

[Levy] "What's personal bitterness? Maybe you should ask what caused the bitterness. That's the question. We are, after all, prominent in the party. So if we see the right political path and we see who's in charge of it, of course there is bitterness. But we are not a coalition of bitter men, only the reflection of an abnormal situation."

[HA'ARETZ] After all that, I must ask again, is Shamir your candidate for the premiership?

[Levy] "Why are you asking? He is the prime minister."

[HA'ARETZ] THE WASHINGTON POST last week described him as a "wooden leader."

[Levy] "You may be sure he'll know how to react."

[HA'ARETZ] Did you draw any local or personal conclusions from the events in Eastern Europe?

[Levy] "I think we are going too far in trying to draw parallels or create similarities we wish were there. Who among us is not pleased to see the formation of democratic regimes, in keeping with the wishes of the people? It certainly gives one the feeling of vicarious participation in it. But from there to drawing parallels...."

"The mood now is that the ideal will envelop everything and will make everything right. We have been through all this, we are a democratic country, and nothing happened or is happening around us. So what do we want? We are at risk. I would like us to shed some of the feeling that we are immune and to remember that there are still countries that want to destroy us. A comparison with the Berlin wall? To what can you compare that in our region? To the collapse of the Wailing Wall? We want the same sort of sweep here, but against whom? Against ourselves?"

"For example, I look at the elections in Jordan and what happened there. Is this our idea of a democratic partner? Who will turn us dozens of years back from the viewpoint of hostility toward Israel? Are we suicidal? Somehow, I have to say the next sentence, even if people will say that I'm an extremist: No one will care about Jewish life here if we don't take care of ourselves and if we don't defend our future and our existence. If it sounds bombastic, then so be it. We sometimes try to show that we are greater pacifists than any other nation, more than the English and more than the French, and at times we struggle to throw our weapons aside, because they're frightening and inhumane. But who will defend us then? That, too, has to be remembered."

[HA'ARETZ] Do you sympathize with the residents of development towns who oppose immigration?

[Levy] "I deny, from the bottom of my heart and my mind, that there is such a thing. Perhaps only marginally. There is unemployment and there are hardships in development towns, so it's only natural that they look to the government for some solutions. They say, we want the new immigrants to come to us, then it'll be good both for them and for us. Mayors of development towns told me they saw an absorption map at the Finance Ministry

on which it said: no development towns. Why? Because in the center of the country one doesn't have to strain as hard, build plants, it's enough to throw a few bones to the existing ones. That's not what we should do today in view of this historic chance."

[HA'ARETZ] Do you go home to Bet She'an every night?

[Levy] "Every night."

[HA'ARETZ] You have 12 children.

[Levy] "That is a sacrifice, a very heavy one. I will never forgive myself for having deprived them of a father's warmth and of the guidance that a child needs to feel, of the feeling that there was someone by their side. I will never forgive myself. On the other hand, I wanted—perhaps it was a dream, or perhaps it wasn't worth it—to disprove some of the belief that when someone is successful, the first thing he does is move away from his neighborhood and his town to join the elite."

[HA'ARETZ] Where are your close, intimate friends?

[Levy] "If by intimate you mean those I live with, those I pray with on the Sabbath, then they're in Bet She'an. If by intimate you mean those I share my doubts with and my innermost thoughts, then they're all over the country."

[HA'ARETZ] Tell me something about your children.

[Levy] "If I tell you that they're all wonderful, it will sound subjective. What does successful mean? I have seen people make it on the success scale and be unhappy in other respects. And then there is another kind of success, people who remained part of the same reality I reached years ago, on the fringes of success, who didn't get any help from papa, but cut a path for themselves, and raised families, and who are happy and joyful and don't have any claims against anyone. To me, that is success."

[HA'ARETZ] Do you know, for example, how they do in school?

[Levy] "Only after the fact, when there is nothing I can do."

[HA'ARETZ] Do they share their personal problems with you?

[Levy] "The Sabbath is the day when there are no limits to our warmth and our talks. There are no phone calls, no travel, no nothing, only in cases of force majeure, there is only the family. Everything is devoted to them and to games."

[HA'ARETZ] Do you read them stories?

[Levy] "Of course, all kinds of encyclopedias and stories. Stories from the Bible, Marco Polo, Columbus, all the

way down to David Levy. This is also part of the stories: 'Daddy, aren't you fed up,' and 'Daddy, how can you keep going?'"

[HA'ARETZ] Do you talk to them with the same pathos as in your public appearances?

[Levy] "What do you think I do, orate to my wife and children? I've heard this more than once. Without this question there is no interview with David Levy. What, you were with David Levy and you didn't ask him about pathos? It depends when and where.

"Take for example my old picture from the Histadrut Executive Committee and my picture on Moqed, and compare them. Here is protest and manifesto, and here is discussion. I also don't understand why Jews shout so much in synagogue on Yom Kippur. You say what you feel, not play a part. Then, people saw me on 'Private Screen' and said: Oh, you were so nice, you won us over. And I say: It's the same man."

[HA'ARETZ] Is this Menahem Begin's influence?

[Levy] "This is another thing I keep hearing. Why isn't the question asked of others? Sometimes I hear the defense minister raise his voice, rising a few octaves, and I wonder why he needs it. And I hear Shamir sometimes, oho. And the interesting thing is, no one asks them if they followed Begin's example. Maybe they were following my example? But if it is from Begin, it's no shame, on the contrary."

[HA'ARETZ] Do you ever watch impersonations of yourself?

[Levy] "Yes."

[HA'ARETZ] How do you feel about them?

[Levy] "I laugh. Sometimes I don't think they're successful."

[HA'ARETZ] Tuvya Tzafir imitates you well. Is this really what you look like?

[Levy] "If I really looked like that, he would lose his livelihood."

[HA'ARETZ] He comes on stage with a blow dryer in hand. Do you use one?

[Levy] "Since I don't have a blow dryer, I leave that to him."

[HA'ARETZ] Is this perhaps the moment to ask you how you style your hair?

[Levy] "This is also amazing, isn't it? If I were unkempt, what would people say then? The wild man from Bet She'an. Instead they say: He's probably fussing with his hair all day long. Some of the people here spend whole days with me, they know I don't do that. I sometimes think to myself, perhaps the answer is to go bald."

[HA'ARETZ] So what's the secret, if you don't mind the slip?

[Levy] "Listen, I'm not responsible for it. That's how my parents planned me, and that's how I came out."

[HA'ARETZ] Books, movies?

[Levy] "I never get to the movies. Books, yes. I know the approach—be among the vanguard that points to the latest book that a politician must read to fit in with the nouvelle vague, the new wave. I'm not in that race. I like to read, and I usually do. Anything, from Tolstoy to Dumas to science fiction, which I love. Whatever is there. Those who like Alterman are classified under that label. I read and liked Françoise Sagan, as well as Ya'el Dayan."

[HA'ARETZ] Music?

[Levy] "I like everything. If you're expecting me to talk about Beethoven and Bach or about this work or the other, then no. Classical music, I can take it or leave it. I can't say that I'm particularly fond of it. Doesn't bother me. I love Rita, I loved her even before anyone else did, when they were still laughing at her gestures. I love my friend Yves Montand, Yardena 'Arazi, Ariq Einstein, the singer that caused all that storm, Hava Alberstein with her special charm, 'Ofra Haza, and Zohar Argov—he's great."

[HA'ARETZ] One question to wrap it up....

[Levy] "Wait, I admire the Gashash Hahiver [comedy team], as well as Arabic songs, Umm Kulthum, 'Abd-al-Wahhab, and Farid al-Atrash. I like flamenco, Julio, and French chansons. In English I like a whole bunch of things from Sammy Davis Jr. to Bing Crosby, not to mention that a man like Frank Sinatra can still win hearts at his age and get to sing in Moscow. You see, age has nothing to do with love."

[HA'ARETZ] Will you become prime minister?

[Levy] "I don't know. Can I, after all the tests, the difficult hours, the decisions, and the performance, tell whether it built up the capability in me? I think so. I look around me and, without God forbid looking down on anyone, I get no feeling that one is less worthy than another, or not yet, or that there is no maturity, or things like that."

[HA'ARETZ] Are the chances increasing?

[Levy] "I think so. At the time I stood before a coalition of eight ministers and I came out of it very well. I do think the chances have increased. I learn, I do, I make great efforts, and I try to retain my humanity. If I'm asked whether I want it, I'll say, yes."

New Arab Communist MK Profiled

44230090B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 12 Jan 90 p 2B

[Article by Roman Priester: "Hashim Mahamid Promoted"]

[Text] On Tuesday at noon Hashim Mahamid went to Hadera to try on a new suit. The next day he was expected to make his debut in Knesset, and he had been told that it was not nice to stand at the podium in jeans. The only suit hanging in his closet at his home in Umm Al-Fahm had been purchased 4 years previously for the president's visit. In the meantime, like most men in Israel, his midsection had thickened and the suit was giving at the seams. But on Wednesday, when he repeated the Knesset Member's [MK] oath, his most pressing concern was not his outer appearance, but his inner feelings. It was the first time that Hashim Mahamid, an Arab with a strong Palestinian identification, was compelled to swear allegiance to the Jewish State. On the eve of the Knesset ceremony, Hashim admitted that he had a conscience problem with that oath of allegiance, since a Jewish, Zionist state in its present form, was not exactly the answer to his prayers. "The very definition of 'Jewish state' is against the principles of full equality that I demand for Israeli Arabs," he said. Nevertheless, he willingly accepted the party's ruling to send him to the Knesset to replace the senior Me'ir Vilner. Next month, Muhammad Nahfa, a 49-year-old Druze writer from Bayt Jin will replace Tawfiq Ziyad, and in March Tamar Gozansky will take Tawfiq Tubi's place. Tubi warmed his seat in Knesset for 41 years running.

The communist party and its public affiliate, the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality [HADASH] hope that this face lift will restore to them the strongholds they had lost to the Muslim movement (such as the Umm al-Fahm town hall, which Hashim Mahamid was forced to pass on to Shaykh Abu-Shaqra), and may even permit it renewed penetration into Jewish society. 'Uzi Boorstein, an Israel Communist Party [MAKI] Politburo member, praised at length Hashim's impressive appearances at the Tel Aviv University and other institutions that held discussions on Jewish-Arab coexistence. Hashim himself used the first days of the week to hold explanatory talks with Dadi Zucker on the possibility of his joining Betzelem [Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Territories], and attempted to determine how realistic cooperation with Jewish leftist parties could be. "I believe it is possible," he summed up his first efforts.

The replacement of the old guard in the Knesset by the new trio is not merely the result of clashes with outside political foes. The move was primarily designed to reassure MAKI and HADASH. Until a few months ago, the ideological leadership still supported its traditional positions as if the winds of glasnost had been scattered on the long way from the Soviet Union to Israel. Last

May the HADASH committee had rejected a recommendation that Tawfiq Tubi cede his Knesset seat to Hashim Mahamid. It seemed that Me'ir Vilner's statement that that was only the first step in a series of upcoming changes scared off the audience in the Baytenu hall in Haifa. Shortly after that, efforts failed to pave his way to the Knesset by shifting Charlie Biton to the Histadrut. The realization that a thorough house cleaning was unavoidable penetrated the leadership's awareness only when the seismographs began registering the message carried by the collapse of the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe, which shook MAKI, too.

The crisis did not have an ideological character, actually. Most MAKI supporters and HADASH voters are not exactly permeated with socialist awareness. They are mostly people who in this way try to express their national identity and who view HADASH as the spearhead of the struggle for equal rights and for the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside the State of Israel. The ground began to burn under the old leadership's feet when, in the wake of the changes in Eastern Europe, Israeli Arabs, too, began taking a new look at those who had led them onto the barricades. Like a brushfire, rumors began circulating about the material advantages that went with the party positions, and all of a sudden unseeing eyes were open to the truth. "We came to the conclusion that it was better that one man should fill one position," Hashim Mahamid explained to us, and chose not to expand. Wise men will understand the hint. He was referring to Tawfiq Ziyad, MK and mayor of Nazareth, and probably primarily to Tawfiq Tubi, deputy party secretary who also serves on the International Peace Committee, is responsible for the financial transactions of the party, and is also the editor-in-chief of its newspaper, AL-ITTIHAD, in addition to being a Knesset member. Some of those lofty positions also bring in a salary. His two brothers also hold good positions with the left. Shafiq Tubi was appointed to the party institutions in the northern district and as director of AL-ITTIHAD, while George Tubi is in charge of distributing party scholarships to students and in organizing outside appearances. The wives of the three brothers draw salaries or allowances from the party purse, and one of Tawfiq Tubi's brothers-in-law, Politburo member Zahi Qurqawi, holds the party's foreign affairs portfolio and edits its ideological monthly AL-DARB.

That, of course, is only one example of the nepotism that had invaded MAKI. Now it is also remembered that the husband of Attorney Felicia Langer made a fortune under the aegis of the party from years of dealing in Soviet rejects and other businesses which, even if they were not illegal, were certainly in complete opposition to party morals. The replacement of the three MKs was designed to take the edge off the criticism, which is expected to come to a peak at the MAKI congress scheduled to be held in May. When we asked 'Uzi Boorstein if the congress will rid the party of its traditional leadership, he replied: "There is no doubt that in

May newer and younger faces will be added to the leadership. It is too early to speculate whether that move will involve replacement of veteran leaders."

The lights of Wadi 'Ara villages sparkle through Hashim Mahamid's windows in the evening. MAPAM [United Labor Party] used to have a strong following in some of them, like 'Arara and Barta'a, but that's no longer the case. Extremism has not skipped over this part of Israel inhabited by Arabs.

The house stands at the top of a hill, on a plot Hashim and his five brothers inherited from their parents. Our host stresses that although they were illiterate, they taught their children national pride. Three brothers are active in MAKI. He himself, he stressed strongly, is not a communist, but he has adopted the HADASH platform, especially those issues dealing with the struggle for full equality of rights and with the establishment of a Palestinian state. His Danish wife Susan, who converted to Islam to neutralize the family's negative reaction, served coffee, and Hashim added with a pinch of humour that he was also in favor of equality for women, because "they are needed for demonstrations."

In the past, the authorities were not happy about his public activities. Even before the intifadah he used to refer to the IDF [Israel Defense Force] as the "Occupation Army" (about 15,000 dunam of land belonging to Umm al-Fahm residents were taken up for exercises), and only a reprimand from inside the party persuaded him to moderate his statements. He did his master's at Tel Aviv University on stereotypes, and at a previous meeting he pointed out that in the eyes of the Israeli authorities he himself has become a stereotype of a "negative Arab." When he served as mayor, Interior Ministry officials predicted that he would make trouble and declared total war against him. Exactly 2 years ago, in January 1987, when the water supply to the town was turned down because of a 90,000-shekel debt, HA'ARETZ wrote: "Whoever turned off the taps in Umm al-Fahm obviously views water as a political weapon. If the campaign organizers succeed in removing the mayor, an aggressive and uncompromising HADASH activist, there may not be enough water to put out the fire that local Muslim fundamentalists will build up." The article was lying on the table, and Hashim said: "There is a prediction that came true." Indeed, at the latest elections for the local authorities, the Muslim movement won and, following in the footsteps of other councils, the communist party lost its control of the second largest Arab town, too.

Mahamid is aware of the political implications of conversion, but he attributed his defeat in the elections not only to the vengefulness of the authorities and the rising clout of religion in political games, but also to his party's internal problems. "It's enough to look at the local secretariat for an example. It was not elected democratically," he said. "Now, after the warnings from Eastern Europe, things will change here, too. Whoever claims that the changes in Eastern Europe don't have a direct

impact on our world is simply burying his head in the sand. Repeat, secret elections will be held this month. There will be no recommendation from above and everyone will have a chance to be elected. I personally have drawn one simple conclusion from the collapse of the regimes there: Nothing is sacred. Anything may happen; we must learn to express clear views and to examine things as they are, even if the results may be bitter."

Mahamid avoids expressing open criticism of the MAKI and HADASH leadership. Vilner, Tubi, Ziyad, et al are still firmly in their politburo seats. But his example carries an unmistakable message: Just as he didn't compromise in his outside battles, he will not compromise on inner conflicts, either. He is only 45 years old, full of energy, educated, and represents to a great extent the Arab national intelligentsia, without whose support MAKI and HADASH stand no chance of survival. With him the traditional leadership will have a hard time, but without people like him they may not have any political life at all.

As an MK, he said, he will take a pragmatic approach to his relationship with the Jewish left. It is doubtful whether he will attain his objective—lifting the boycott against the non-Zionist camp—but he will do his best to establish a common front with the parties left of the Alignment, at least on special issues on which there is a basis for cooperation. He will frequently visit the territories to compete for souls with 'Abd-al-Wahhab Darawishah and Muhammad Mi'ari, who are also combing the territories.

[HA'ARETZ] What is your message to the residents of the territories?

[Mahamid] "Ahmad Yasin and his Hamas [Islamic Resistance Movement] people are dreaming a dream that will never come true: a Muslim state across all of the Land of Israel. They don't understand that the days of the teachings of Ahmad Sa'id [political commentator, al-Nasir supporter] and Ahmad Shukayri, 'Arafat's predecessor in the PLO, are passed. Whoever wants all of Palestine is gambling at the expense of the refugees in the camps. My message to them is very clear: the establishment of two states on both sides of the Green Line. This message also carries an explanation, that not all the people of Israel identify with the two Yitzhaqs, and that there are other kinds of Jews, too."

This wink toward the Jews is not to be interpreted as a cease-fire in his battle against the administration. When he said "he had a problem" with the oath of allegiance, he clearly pointed out that the problem stems from the contradiction between his philosophy and the inability of the State to ensure full equal rights to one-sixth of its population because of its very definition as the Jewish State. "A Jew who immigrates from Brooklyn wins all his civic rights the moment he lands at Lod, while I, who was born here, must struggle desperately for every scrap of the same rights. This is unacceptable from my viewpoint.

That is why I will swear allegiance to the discriminatory laws of the State only because I have no other choice. I will do it, because I don't intend to bring the intifadah inside the Green Line, and the only alternative is to make a difference from the inside."

Some of the HADASH leaders requested that at the swearing-in ceremony he should deliver in plenum a fiery speech, and that he should publicly exhibit his political calling card. Hashim Mahamid consulted with Yosi Sarid and decided that it was better to wait for another opportunity. He has a lot to say, he is aware of the impact of things said in that forum, and he will make sure he fully capitalizes on that. Attempts within his party to block his way failed, and the efforts of the Israeli establishment to subdue him in his own home base in Umm al-Fahm also failed. The ones who didn't want Hashim Mahamid as mayor are now getting him as MK.

Kafr Qasim Leader Interviewed on Islamic, Local Affairs

90OL0240B Nazareth AL-SINNARAH
in Arabic 2 Feb 90 p 17

[Interview With Shaykh Ibrahim Sarsur, head of the Kafr Qasim Local Council, by Shawqiyah 'Aruq-Mansur; first paragraph is AL-SINNARAH introduction; date and place not given]

[Text] I entered the Kafr Qasim council, and I found it like a beehive. I felt that there were people working quietly and earnestly. Shaykh Ibrahim Sarsur, a clever, ambitious, cultured, well-mannered and quiet young man; the curriculum vitae: Ibrahim 'Abdullah Sarsur, 31 years old, married with a child. Holds a university degree in English literature from Bar Ailan University. He completed his studies in 1981 and dreamed of working in the Training Corps, but he felt that his beard, so he says, was an obstacle to entering this field since the Ministry of Education ignored him for seven years without his knowing why. He has worked all this time in an engineering office.

[AL-SINNARAH] How do you think the citizens in Kafr Qasim are responding to the new council, compared to the previous councils, and the projects you are now undertaking?

[Sarsur] The Islamic movement in Kafr Qasim has under its roof a very broad human cross-section, and the citizens have been responsive in a pride-provoking manner. We the council assumed a debt of 3 million shekels, and hundreds of checks to contractors were not paid. Employees did not receive their pay for four months. We appealed to the debtors in writing and in person, and we distributed a flyer in which we explained the story of the debts and asked those owing to pay the amounts they owed without interest, in comfortable installments as they could. We also held a 12-day work camp in which we implemented numerous plans, and the citizens responded to us. Now, thank God, the trust between the council and the people is the trust of one

family. Our projects now are many, such as preparing a skeletal map of the town, extending the sewage system, changing the water network and organizing and widening the streets. We have a plan that will be inaugurated within days for a dental clinic which will serve children, women, and the aged of Kafr Qasim free.

[AL-SINNARAH] We have heard that the town council in Umm al-Fahm is about to separate the instruction of male students from that of female students. Do you approve of this idea, and do you intend to apply it in Kafr Qasim?

[Sarsur] I hail this idea, and I hope it is achieved in Kafr Qasim. Our schools these days have reached a low level from the moral and learning standpoints, and it is our responsibility now to apply force to rescue the educational operation and push ahead. We know that this will take a long time since this work is not easy and entering into it will present difficulties. Under God's direction we will be victorious. We are now working diligently with the Ministry of Education.

[AL-SINNARAH] Do you consider the Islamic movement in Israel to be a regional movement? If not, why is it not regional? Why has it not been turned into a political party?

[Sarsur] The Islamic movement is a popular movement. If you mean by "regional" that it includes all the Arabs within Israel, well the great hope of the Islamic invocation is that the masses in their entirety will evolve to experience themselves anew the sweetness of their Islamic religion on which their culture is based, just as our culture was previously a source of pride for Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Therefore we consider the Islamic movement a regional popular movement even if it does not include within it systematically all regions of all Muslim Arabs, because we are not judges imposing infidelity on some and faith on others. We are propagandists offering our wares as God ordered, and the outcome remains for God to establish as He wishes, especially since we will not be held accountable for the results, but only for being negligent in the work. As for why not a political party, it is because our work is not restricted to politics only, although politics is a part of us and one of our supports and a field of our work.

[AL-Sinnarah] In the case of the Knesset and Histadrut elections, you leave the citizens at a loss. After your firm positions, some of you boycott the elections and some of you call for voting, even if indirectly, and sometimes you leave the supporters of the Islamic movement to choose themselves. Isn't this called deception?

[Sarsur] We have a scale on which we weigh matters. The decision must be taken within a limited scope, into which the factors of time and the slates presented are entered. For example, in the recent Knesset elections, we found it in the interest of the invocation and in the general interest to give individuals full rights in the elections. We did not obligate anyone to elect so-and-so or so-and-so.

[AL-SINNARAH] There are many concerns about Shaykh 'Abdallah Nimr Darwish's relinquishing his post as official spokesman for the Islamic movement and your selection.

[Sarsur] At the beginning of 1970, the invocation was like any other invocation in the world, religious or nonreligious, remaining totally committed to its founder in everything pertaining to its causes. Shaykh 'Abdallah Nimr Darwish was the axis around whom the Muslim youth revolved. He was a beacon of guidance until 1980 when its policy crystallized and the scope of work in the Islamic movement expanded. The Islamic expansion from the Galilee area to the Negev area became filled with academic faces and intellectuals, all of which imposed itself on the invocation, its policy, and the crystal of its final positions. We felt that we must inject new blood into the arteries of the movement for the good of the movement, lest they accuse us of domination and petrification and hegemony like the rest of the other parties. Shaykh 'Abdallah is still the number one leader in the Islamic movement because he has all of the qualifications for the man of leadership. I was elected with the blessing of Shaykh 'Abdallah, and Shaykh 'Abdallah will remain our leader. It is he who crystallizes the final positions of the movement.

[AL-SINNARAH] Recently there were some statements about the elections even though they are still far away. [What is] your position on the coming elections?

[Sarsur] We think that the role of the Islamic movement is to work among the masses, and our assumption of the local powers is to set up and anchor bases for realizing the goals for which we are striving. As for the Knesset, the talk about it was premature, but I personally believe that the most we can hope for, as Arabs in Israel, from the Knesset member, is that the Arab legislator would shout in the face of authority whatever pains him, such as political causes and discrimination and development, etc.

[AL-SINNARAH] What is the position you propose for solving the Palestinian issue?

[Sarsur] The Palestinian people have the full right to live independently on the soil of their homeland under a solution which would guarantee total intermingling between three circles—the Arab circle, the Palestinian circle, and the Islamic circle—because whoever studies history will arrive at a conclusion that Arabizing the Palestinian cause is destructive, and I say that the Palestinization of the cause could, God forbid, lead to its ruin also. If we guarantee cooperation and harmony among the three aforementioned circles, we guarantee an honorable solution to a cause which is one of the most noble causes for which the Muslims in the world are honored to be fuel.

More Israelis Reportedly Indifferent to Democracy
44230095C Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT
in Hebrew 25 Jan 90 p 19

[Article by Dov Ginakhovski]

[Text] When almost half of the Israelis agree that "in Israel's present situation strong leadership is needed to bring order to the country independent of elections or a Knesset vote," that is not yet the end of democracy in Israel. But it is a clear symptom of the danger. In 1987, before the Intifadah, only 34 percent of those asked agreed with that assertion. We've slipped that far since then.

More serious is the fact that only 44 percent of those asked opposed the statement that "every slight danger to national security justifies strict limitations on democracy." In 1987 56 percent of those asked disagreed with that statement. In our view, this may be the greatest accomplishment of the Intifadah thus far.

With all the disclaimers about surveys and their formulations, the latest survey of the "Institute for Policy Planning in Israel-Diaspora Relations" must not only arouse concern, but also produce conclusions: Its findings show that the Intifadah has succeeded in undermining security on our roads and in our political and social structure.

The democratic regime in Israel was never free of critics. There were always those who yearned for a "leader" and for "leadership" that "would put our affairs in order." There were always those who sang enthusiastically, "So-and-so, King of Israel." There were always those who feared the possibility of "tanks in the yard of the prime minister's office." But until recently it was just the fringe elements. No more.

Two factors must shoulder the responsibility for this slide: The political system and the educational system.

The politicians have held democracy up to scorn and contempt; their weakness and unending search for every kind of possible compromise so long as they can stay in power; their saying yes and no at one and the same time (as happened recently in the Weizmann incident); the creation of the world's only two-headed government; the continual belying of principles and the bending of them at every opportunity; the dipping into the public treasury as the "price of democracy"—all these things have had their effect.

The educational system has failed to inculcate democratic values. Maybe we should be a bit more forgiving here: After all, what could the system do when students live within their nation and see and breathe what goes on around them? The Ministry of Education in fact declared last year as the "Year of Democracy," but the sad reality speaks for itself.

Let us not delude ourselves: The issue is not just half the population that expresses passive agreement with cutting

the wings of democracy and yearns for strong leadership. There are plenty of "leaders" lying in wait for the opportunity to satisfy those who have despaired of democracy. That is the real danger. Surveys can only hint at it. The answer has to be given in other places.

Kibbutzim, IDF To Help With New Immigrants

44230095B Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR
in Hebrew 25 Jan 90 p 4

[Article by Yosef Galili, Avi Benyahu, and Yitzhaq Shur]

[Text] The kibbutz movement, the National Kibbutz and the Religious Kibbutz, will join in the absorption of the new immigration, in a campaign called "First Commonwealth in the Homeland."

The details of the campaign were worked out in a meeting between the secretaries of the kibbutz movements and the Deputy Treasury Minister, Yosi Beilin, and its execution will begin immediately after the general managers' committee under his direction gives its authorization. "Any delay in authorizing the programs by the responsible institutions will severely affect absorption of the new immigration," said 'Ezra Rabin, secretary of the National Kibbutz.

The frameworks of absorption in the kibbutzim will be operated by regional councils, and in the first stage the immigrants will be absorbed in the kibbutzim of the regional council of Mate Asher, in the western Galilee.

Within the framework of "First Commonwealth in the Homeland," the immigrants will spend the first six months of their stay in Israel in kibbutzim and learn Hebrew in Ulpanim. Over the course of time the immigrants will be organized for absorption and will examine absorption possibilities in the kibbutzim, the cities, the development towns and the communal settlements in various parts of the country.

The kibbutz will supply the immigrants all of their needs such as housing, education, health, and other services.

Associates of the kibbutz movements are getting a lot of requests from kibbutz members to view the issue of immigration as a high-priority main objective.

The kibbutz movements' central committee will meet this morning in Afal to discuss organization of immigration absorption in the kibbutzim and the working committee of the National Kibbutz will discuss the subject Monday in Giv'at Haviva.

Deploying the IDF for Absorption

Chief of the General Staff Dan Shomron said yesterday in a discussion held in his office on the subject of the involvement of the IDF [Israel Defense Force] in immigration absorption that he sees the drafting of the IDF to aid in the treatment of immigrants as a national mission that the military takes upon itself out of awareness of its great importance.

The Chief of Staff stated that the manpower branch in the General Staff will take charge of the IDF absorption effort and that also joining in the staff work will be the planning and quartermaster branches and, to the extent necessary, the IDF's major services and corps.

Our correspondent notes that last week some officers were heard to claim that there is no room for overinvolvement of the IDF in the immigration issue, especially because of budgetary limitations. But also philosophically the IDF's mission, as they see it, is to drill and prepare for war. Arrayed against them are senior officers headed by the Chief of Staff who believe that the military must deal with national missions, as it has done throughout the years.

Absorption of Teachers and Doctors

The Ministry of Education hopes that the absorption of teachers immigrating from the USSR will save science instruction within the educational system, which suffers from a severe lack of teachers. Since the beginning of the academic year, about 600 immigrant teachers and 8,000 students have been absorbed, and if the forecasts of the Absorption Ministry hold true, this year about 2,500 teachers and 10,000 students will be taken in.

The teachers and administrators in the schools have started educational and social activities for absorbing immigration.

The general manager of Qupat Holim HaKlalit [General Sick Fund], Nahum Pasa, said yesterday that the health system can absorb only about a quarter of the doctors and some of the nurses expected to arrive from the Soviet Union during the coming year.

Sharon on Likud, Peace Prospects

44230095A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT
(Supplement) in Hebrew 19 Jan 90 pp 4, 5, 28

[Interview with Ari'el Sharon by Dan Shilon; date, place not given]

[Text] [YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Ari'el Sharon, where did your public courage disappear to?

[Sharon] It didn't disappear.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] What kind of courage is it to profess no confidence in the prime minister and then continue to belong to his party?

[Sharon] I will stay in the government as long as I can have some influence.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] You don't influence anything. May I remind you that a year ago you said that if things wouldn't move in the government, you would draw some personal conclusions. A whole year has gone by. What are you waiting for?

[Sharon] If I haven't made a move, I have at least stopped some important things. Were it not for the

decision made by the Likud central committee last July—the decision that I helped author—we would be facing a much more serious situation today. Indeed, I did not convince anyone how to conduct political negotiations, but I did manage to insert a stone to stop the slide of Israeli policy, which is slipping.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] The prime minister, Yitzhaq Shamir, has been defined by you as a man who doesn't function under pressure. I still find it hard to understand how you can continue serving in this government.

[Sharon] I did, in fact, say those things and I see no reason to add to them. I am not serving in the government for the sake of someone but for the sake of some thing.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] But the "some thing" is done, as you well know, by "someone," and in this instance the someone is Yitzhaq Shamir, whom you scorn. You told him you scorn him in the presence of the Likud ministers.

[Sharon] I am struggling with the dangers that lie in wait at our door.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] You accused Yitzhaq Shamir of leaking the most sensitive state secrets to the Arabs. Is that what you are referring to, among other things, when you talk about dangers?

[Sharon] I think it would be a mistake to turn the interview in this direction.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] What is your reaction to Yitzhaq Shamir's assertion that the Likud is not Ariq Sharon and Ariq Sharon is not the Likud?

[Sharon] The question is, what is the Likud. To me the Likud is a political movement that believes the State of Israel is the Jewish homeland. The Jews are permitted and obligated to live there safely. The Likud concept, to me, denies any possibility of a 19-year-old female soldier being attacked with seven knife wounds in her abdomen and hips, in broad daylight, in Old Jerusalem.

Jerusalem, according to the true positions of the Likud, is the capital of the Jewish people, and there will be no negotiation over its future. The Arabs of East Jerusalem will not participate, neither as voters nor as candidates, in the proposed elections of the Israeli peace initiative, which is, by itself, extremely dangerous. A Palestinian state already exists today in Jordan. Those are the true concepts of Likud.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Do you see a trend in Likud toward abandoning those concepts?

[Sharon] There is in Likud today, certainly, a retreat from the true principles of the movement. For some of the members of the movement it is a real retreat and for others a tactical retreat that becomes real over the course of time.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Do those two groups constitute a majority in the Likud today?

[Sharon] I don't think so. You have to discriminate between Likud party members and Likud voters. Among the voters, if you can judge by the surveys, you see the true Likud positions.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] What conclusion is to be drawn from that?

[Sharon] The government is not free to deal with vital matters like peace and defense through the tactic of playing for time. A clear policy must be established and implemented. For example, the terrorist organizations have a political arm that resides in Jerusalem: Faysal al-Husayni, Jamil al-Turayfi, Sari Nusaybah—and we don't act against them.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] What do you want to do to Faysal al-Husayni and colleagues? To kill them? To expel them?

[Sharon] There is no room in Israel for Faysal al-Husayni. He is a foreign citizen, a citizen of Jordan. Would anyone in France, or any other Western country, even imagine that a foreigner could incite, could mislead, could break the spirit of the nation?

The least that we should do to him is to take him to the airport and deport him. With us, not only does that not happen, but some Likud leaders were actually among the first who went to meet PLO leaders in the territories.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Don't you think that if you expel Faysal al-Husayni a thousand other Palestinian leaders will arise in his footsteps?

[Sharon] I say that we deal, first of all, with the existing leaders. The security services once presented a list of 43 leaders/agitators. We should deal with them first. Everything in accordance with the law and international practice.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Why do you, Ariq Sharon, a Sabra, a fighter and a commander, a man who has more than once described Israel as a military power—why do you of all people today raise the banner of natinal paranoia, the banner of the "persecuted Jew," the banner of "the entire world is against us?"

[Sharon] I supported the peace agreement with Egypt and I support a peace agreement now. But I don't see where we have shown a whole lot of wisdom up to now in the political arena. Those who have boasted of that wisdom argued that they could create a split between the "Jerusalem PLO" and the "Tunis PLO." All such assumptions have proved illusory.

Afterward they promised us that the good course we were following would lessen tension between us and the United States. The result has been that since 1977 we have never been in a more serious situation in our relations with the United States. There isn't a single

arena, political or defense, in which our assumptions have turned out to be right. So what if I am a sabra, a native Israeli, and participated in all of Israel's wars? Does that mean I have to adopt an irresponsible position?

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] But you of all people, who took part in Israel's wars, should be free of complexes and extend the hand of peace to our enemies. You of all people know that you make peace with enemies and not with friends.

[Sharon] There are enemies you don't speak to and don't make peace with. Those enemies must be pursued to extinction. We will never talk with 'Arafat and his gang. But I am ready to propose ways for a solution. I also see what is happening in the world. People ask us why we don't change in light of the changes taking place in the world. I answer that everyone has to change. In the Middle East, for the moment, there is no change. Syria has not changed.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Syria is cutting her defense budget.

[Sharon] Syria continues to train her army very intensively. She is equipping herself with the best of modern weaponry.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] But she has lost the military backing of the USSR. Certainly she no longer has the military option of a joint war with Egypt against Israel.

[Sharon] In fact I don't believe that Egypt, a signatory of the peace agreement with Israel, will start a war against us. But if war breaks out and other Arab states are involved in it, Egypt will not be able to stay out.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] You mean you see a possibility of Egypt's joining a war against Israel?

[Sharon] She won't be able to stay out.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Then what do you suggest we do?

[Sharon] We have to take extraordinary steps. The present political process, through no fault of Israel's, has stalled. It was a very dangerous process and it is good that it stalled. We should now announce that we are no longer bound by the dangerous and irresponsible idea of holding elections. The elections in the territories could only lead to war and bloodshed, not to peace. Certainly we should not agree to the abortive idea of one-sided elections.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Do you have a new political initiative?

[Sharon] We have to try to lower tensions between us and the Arabs. We should tear down the walls and open the borders between us and Jordan. We should allow

Israeli citizens, in large numbers, to visit Jordan and Jordanian citizens to visit us. That would lower the tension.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] That sounds like an artificial, impractical attempt.

[Sharon] Why is it less practical than tearing down the Berlin wall? Why is it less artificial than the idea of democratic elections in the territories? I know people in the upper echelons of Likud who say that elections won't happen in any case and that we are only gaining breathing space.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] To implement your idea of open borders, don't we have to have a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan?

[Sharon] Is there a peace treaty between East and West Germany?

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Certainly, and, of course, there is no state of war between them.

[Sharon] Nor, in practice, is there a state of war between us and Jordan. The Israeli-Jordanian border today is more lively than even the Israeli-Egyptian border. The opening of the borders with Jordan to free mass crossings would create a positive dynamic between the two peoples and lessen tensions.

But that is not my only suggestion. You must come to an immediate solution of the problem of the refugees in the camps. With the assistance of the United States and the EEC we have to put up modern housing units on the outskirts of the cities and settle them there. I also suggest that Israel demand from the United States the dismantling of the terrorist organizations now located in the Arab states. Terror has a clear address today. The Western nations can bring about their dismantling.

That is what has to be done next year. Meanwhile we ourselves can deal with the central issues on our agenda—immigration absorption, for example. We need to speed up the exodus of the Jews from the USSR so long as it is possible for them to leave. We have to find every possible way to bring them here—by plane from various airfields, by ship and by train.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Then what will happen in the upcoming session of the Likud central committee? Is a last minute compromise deal again to be expected?

[Sharon] No deal is expected. Nor was there any deal in the previous session.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] There was a vote on just one proposal.

[Sharon] In the previous session of the central committee, the Prime Minister got the true Likud positions.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] On the day after the session, in your opinion, it had no practical significance.

[Sharon] It's true there was no practical expression, apart from one thing: Were it not for that session of the central committee, we would still be deep in the political quagmire today.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] You did gain time, after all.

[Sharon] That time was important. Things have happened in the meantime. In July, if you remember, the Soviet empire was still intact. That was only six months ago. The United States—that was before the Panama invasion, which was undertaken following the killing of one American soldier. The world today is not the same world. That decision in Likud was a clear signal to the world of our unwillingness to talk to the terrorist organizations.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Such a clear signal that it was impossible for a government minister, 'Ezer Weizmann, to meet with PLO people and, after all the brouhaha, keep his seat at the government table?

[Sharon] The case of 'Ezer Weizmann was very serious. I expressed my opinion about it, succinctly, when it occurred. Nevertheless I didn't believe it had to be a reason for bringing down the government. I also didn't think I had to sink my teeth into Weizmann's thin flesh. There were plenty of others to do that. I also didn't believe for a moment that the Prime Minister would take it, aggressively, all the way to the end.

'Ezer Weizmann, in my opinion, is a horrible tragedy. You have to recall the things he said, even in the 80's, about the overwhelming importance of the territories of Judaea and Samaria for Israel's existence. The man is a tragedy, and that incident was extremely serious. What is even more serious is that no steps were taken against him. In that way legitimacy was given to contacts with the PLO.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Don't you believe that Yitzhaq Shamir's fear that Shim'on Peres could set up a narrow government in the event of the collapse of the national unity government is legitimate?

[Sharon] Shim'on Peres had no option for a narrow government.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Just this week Peres repeated that he has the option of a narrow government.

[Sharon] He did, indeed, say that and I am telling you again that against that background, the existence of direct contact with the PLO by a senior minister of his party, Shim'on Peres could not form a government. I say that on the basis of my contacts, ties and acquaintances with the Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox sectors in Israel. Nevertheless the Prime Minister could have put together a narrow government.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Does Yitzhaq Shamir still have that option today?

[Sharon] That is an irrelevant, hypothetical question. Mr. Shamir doesn't want a narrow government. He didn't want a narrow government even after the elections. Some of his reasons are substantive and some are personal.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Do his personal reasons have something to do with his unwillingness to give you the Ministry of Defense?

[Sharon] At no stage was I going to be defense minister in Mr. Shamir's government. Even a year ago, when I managed to put together a narrow coalition, I didn't believe for a moment that he would allow me to be defense minister in his government. He has both substantive and personal reasons. I don't want to get into right now how much is personal and how much is substantive.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Given all the problems at home and abroad, isn't the preservation of the national unity government important to you?

[Sharon] Not if the price is too high. If the price is undermining our security, for example, then maintaining the national unity government isn't worth it.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Isn't a coalition government with Rehav'am Ze'evi too high a political price for you?

[Sharon] The time has come to put aside hypocrisy. I don't support forced transfer. You don't have to and you can't load people onto cars and move them out. But let's be honest with ourselves: How many Jews in the State of Israel would oppose a voluntary exit on the part of the Arabs of Judaea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip?

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Then you don't rule out the voluntary transfer that Gandhi proposes?

[Sharon] By definition, voluntary transfer is not invalid. What's wrong with it? Are we expelling them? I never suggested expelling them by force, but people who leave voluntarily will incur certain benefits. Let's stop being hypocritical on this issue.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] This hypocrisy, in your opinion, is attributable to some Likud leaders? In the not too distant past, I would remind you, you accused them of that.

[Sharon] I am not going to repeat what I said.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Why, in your opinion, has Yitzhaq Rabin failed to suppress the intifadah?

[Sharon] Rabin failed because he never believed in his power to eradicate the violence and the terror. He also never set himself that objective. He spoke only of the need to lower the level of violence, not to eradicate it. His words were well-understood by commanders at all levels of the military. During the entire period of my military service, at every rank and every position, I never

dared to think, when a task was assigned me, that the solution was political and not military.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Perhaps the military really can't solve the problems of the intifadah?

[Sharon] We have a marvelous military. But when we don't assign it a mission, that is the outcome. All the military needs is the order to impose calm. There is a government in Israel and a Prime Minister. If they say they won't replace a defense minister who failed in his duty because that is the price of a national unity government, I say the price is too high.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Do you have a military solution to the intifadah that would not include mass slaughter in the territories?

[Sharon] Of course. I never suggested mass slaughter. You never heard that from me. I also never asked for harsher measures. I spoke of the need for other, wiser, more diverse steps, including legislative means, as is accepted in the world.

I want to tell you in this connection about a general in the IDF [Israel Defense Force], known for his leftist ideology, who came to my house and told me: Tell your government that I am ready to give the Palestinians everything. But when they hurt Jews in Jerusalem, I have but one response: to set up the shooting machines and open fire. The same holds true for attacks on Israelis in Wadi 'Arah.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] You agree with that? Setting up shooting machines and opening fire on every passer-by?

[Sharon] I don't agree, because it isn't necessary. There are other ways. But in that man's voice there was a real outcry. There are red lines. I will say again: There is a government in Israel and a Prime Minister.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] A Prime Minister that you don't have confidence in.

[Sharon] I am speaking about the institution, not about the man. There is a government in Jerusalem.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Still this man, Yitzhaq Shamir, defined your style about a month ago as a "despicable style." What can you say about his style?

[Sharon] Spare me from having to deal with trivial things. Let's talk about serious matters.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] The Prime Minister claims that in the next meeting of the Likud central committee there will be a vote on just one proposal. Isn't there a chance you will agree to that?

[Sharon] If the Prime Minister brings up a draft resolution containing the true Likud positions on the vital issues, there is no reason for more than one vote. If he doesn't do that, there will certainly be more votes. There is no more room for worthless, nonbinding resolutions.

We have to decide, among other things, that the Palestinian negotiating team will contain no one who sees the PLO as his legitimate representative. We have to put an end to the lie known as "PLO identified."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Where will I be able to find you five years from now? In the minister's office, in the prime minister's office, or on your farm?

[Sharon] I don't know, but I am sure I can do all those jobs you mentioned—as prime minister or on a tractor on the farm—in the best way possible.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] What qualities make you fit for the job of prime minister?

[Sharon] Of course you know that in this question about capabilities there have already been people who were burned in the past. In any case, I have the requisite talents.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] I would like to remind you that in five years you will already be past retirement age.

[Sharon] Tough. I can assure you that if I were prime minister, and I am not sure that I will be, I will carry out the job exactly the way it should be carried out.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Thank you.

Civil Administration Budget Increasing Seven Percent

90OL0249A Tel Aviv BAMAHA
in Hebrew 7 Feb 90 p 13

[Article by Dor'am Gonet: "An Increase in Investment in Judaea and Samaria"]

[Text] The budget of the Civil Administration in the occupied territories for 1990 will be seven percent higher in real terms than the budget for 1988 [as published], which came to IS [Israeli shekel] 420 million, Brigadier General Freddie Zach told BAMAHA.

The increase in the budget was made possible by the growth in the revenues of the administration in Judaea and Samaria towards the end of 1989.

Nevertheless, it should be remembered that the budget for 1988 was three percent lower than in the preceding year. (In the years before the outbreak of the intifadah, the budget had gone up 10 percent annually.) A forum of military economics experts found that had the intifadah not broken out, the budget for 1990 would have been about IS 700 million. The IS 250 million that will not be included in this year's budget would apparently have been invested in infrastructure development in the territories.

It was also noted that the budget of the Civil Administration is not the only budget that is invested in Judaea and Samaria. International organizations, the largest of which is UNRWA [United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East], also are

investing, with the approval of and in coordination with the Israeli authorities, between \$150 and \$180 million.

"Moderate economic pressure," says Brig. Gen. Zach, "has a value in reducing the level of violence. Before the intifadah, the conception was that the better the situation of the residents, the lower the probability would be that they would participate in the cycle of violence. Today, we must maintain a situation in which, on the one hand, work in Israel and economic ability are a privilege given by the authorities to those who do not participate in the violence, and, on the other hand, in which the residents will not arrive at the situation where they have nothing to lose. Uncontrolled pressure and a high level of unemployment may also increase the violence and impair security."

Israel also has suffered economic damages due to the intifadah. The direct damage is the boycott of Israeli products, which has resulted in a decline of IS 500 million in purchases of Israeli goods. This decline occurred also because the residents are buying only staples and don't have the cash for luxuries. This damage was offset by a decline of approximately IS 140 million in purchases by Israelis in Judaea and Samaria on the Sabbath.

The gross national product in Judaea and Samaria declined only eight percent during the two years of the intifadah, as opposed to a decline of 23 percent in Gaza. In the industrial, construction, commerce, and services branches, the damage was approximately 25 percent.

In 1988, for example, inflation in Judaea and Samaria was 8.7 percent, in contrast to inflation of 16.4 percent in Israel.

The damage to the economy of Gaza was much worse. The productive branches were hit the same as in Judaea and Samaria, but agriculture was stagnant and didn't compensate for the losses. Only about half of the residents of Gaza make their living from work in Israel, an average of 14.2 days each month, in contrast to 24 days a month before the outbreak of the intifadah. Only 10,000 persons are registered for work in Israel, as compared to 25,000 in 1987.

Ansar-3 Detention Facility To Expand

90OL0249C Tel Aviv BAMAHA
in Hebrew 7 Feb 90 p 10

[Article by Ya'el Shapira: "Within a Few Months, Ketzi'ot Will Be Able To Hold 12,000 Prisoners"]

[Text] A new jail block was dedicated last month in the Ketzi'ot detention facility, in addition to the three existing blocks. The Ketzi'ot facility, which was built to provide a temporary solution for the approximately 3,000 administrative detainees, is a permanent installation that holds 4,627 prisoners. In the last two years, the place has received broad media coverage, which reached its peak due to the riots that broke out there in August

'86, in which two detainees were killed by gunfire from soldiers. There was sharp and considerable criticism of the conditions in which the detainees are kept, and the facility received the nickname Ansar 3. The affair went as far as a judgement of the High Court of Justice in November 1988.

[BAMAHA] Colonel David Tzemah, commander of the facility, a High Court of Justice ruling determined that the speediest action was required to solve the problem of crowding in the prison. Was the new block erected as a response to this demand?

[Col. Tzemah] Not at all. We replied to the decision of the High Court within a week, by adding tents in the plots, so that the number of those in each tent went down. The problem was that a growing number of prisoners began to arrive, who, in contradiction to what had been planned, included not only administrative detainees, but also persons who had been tried during their imprisonment. It was decided to turn the facility into a real prison, and the construction of Block 4 was begun.

[BAMAHA] What is the composition of the population in the facility?

[Col. Tzemah] There are today 4,627 prisoners. Of these, 970 are administrative detainees, and this is a significant decline. Their number had approached 2,000. Of the others, 2,886 were tried and are serving their terms, 687 are under proceedings, and 85 are here due to the extension of their detention by a judge, until an indictment is drawn up. Today we are actually thinning out the population of the Prison Service's facilities, and are receiving not only stone-throwers, but also those who have been sentenced to long prison terms—of up to eight years. This is an especially difficult population, because they have an incentive to escape. By the way, most of them have already served time in a civilian prison. These prisoners are concentrated in the new block, where we have applied the lessons that were learned in the last two years, such as division into sub-plots, in order to allow more control over what is happening.

[BAMAHA] In view of the number of prisoners that is expected to arrive at the facility, is there a plan for another expansion of the prison?

[Col. Tzemah] With the opening of the fourth block, the prison has a capacity of approximately 6,000 prisoners. Actually, the fifth block is already in the final stages of construction, and, with its completion in a few more months, we will be able to hold 12,000 prisoners. There is also a plan to renovate finally Prison 7, in order to house the prisoners who are considered dangerous—the reference is to those who were convicted of the murder of collaborators—to the local heavies.

[BAMAHA] There is no other prison facility in the country which has received so much press coverage. How were you influenced by the sharp criticism of what was done here?

[Col. Tzemah] I don't go to war to win over public opinion. As this system handles a negative subject—it will always appear in a bad light. The only consideration that interests me is the requirements of the law and the Army's orders. If the prisoners appeal to me, the attorney of the command, or the Red Cross with any request—I consider it.

[BAMAHANE] Why is it not possible to give them the same conditions as in the ordinary prisons?

[Col. Tzemah] The Israeli public forgot that these are prisoners. The norms of the Prison Service cannot be applied to a military prison. Our routine includes a daily struggle of searches. We have seized weapons here that were constructed from every possible material, for example, a stiletto that was made from the handle of a toothbrush and a large pin that had been smuggled inside. Not long ago, such pins were found hidden in a pair of sneakers that had been brought for one of the prisoners. In the past, there was a shocking wave of murders of persons suspected of collaboration. We now have a special plot, in which approximately 30 prisoners live who came to us out of fear that they would be liquidated. We end up on the edge of the pressures between the needs of the Army and the needs of the law, and there are unceasing pressures from both sides.

[BAMAHANE] What about the numerous complaints about a lack of water and winter clothing, denial of visits from family, harsh and degrading punishments?

[Col. Tzemah] First of all, no one in this prison is beaten or degraded—as that is a basic rule. In my opinion, it hurts more than it helps. In the past, there was a method of escalating punishments, so that every commander was allowed to impose punishment according to his rank, with the maximum being that provided by law—14 days in solitary confinement. The High Court determined that the punishment will always be what is provided by law, and that indeed is what is done today. Family visits can occur only through the Civil Administration—that is the body that was authorized to grant entry permits to the area, which is a closed military area. As their leadership does not recognize the Administration, they do not succeed in coordinating visits. The Red Cross cannot handle this, as it is not authorized to do this from the military viewpoint. We still transmit to the Administration lists of those who may receive visitors. The prisoners have received winter gear—sleeping bags, blankets, sweaters, coats—and the attorneys are allowed to bring them clothing according to the basic rules that we laid down. The quantity of water is measured out at 75 liters per person per day, which is three times what a soldier receives according to General Staff orders. Water is exhausted when faucets are left open out of the desire to fight the system.

[BAMAHANE] Last August, censorship of the books that are brought to the prison caused a public outcry, after a book by Amos 'Oz was banned. Why is such a book banned?

[Col. Tzemah] According to our agreement with the civilian censor, we receive a list of the books that the prisoners wish to have in the prison, and he rules on the matter. By the way, there was no justification for the public outcry—the book by Amos 'Oz was banned by mistake. The introduction of books without censorship is another standard of the Prison Service that we, in a military prison, cannot meet.

Technology Gap Between Israel, Arab States Viewed

90OL0249D Tel Aviv BAMAHANE
in Hebrew 7 Feb 90 pp 32-33, 36-37

[Article by Hayim A. Raviv: "The Missile and the Arab Question"]

[Text] Iraq announced to the world last December that it had sent a three-stage missile into space. In this manner, the existence of a space research station in the al-Minbar region near Baghdad was revealed, and there was a report of an Iraqi program to develop an early-warning plane similar to the American AWACS, named 'Adnan 1. In Israel, there are those who view with concern signs of a closing of the scientific-technological gap between Israel and its neighbors. A preliminary study on this subject was carried out by the Haifa Technion in cooperation with the Dayan Center of Tel Aviv University and the Ministry of Science and Technology. Interim findings from the research, which is coordinated by Brigadier General (Reserve) 'Amos Gilbo'a, show that Arab science is in the process of development towards closing the gap.

The Technion's Prof. Ze'ev Tadmor and his colleagues, the researchers, state that the Arabs enjoy a tremendous scientific-technological potential, and that there is no reason that they shouldn't have a command of high-level science and technologies. Meanwhile, there is still a gap of more than one decade between the scientific progress of Israel and that of the Arab states, a gap that is expressed in the quantity of scientific articles, in industrial exports—not of raw materials, such as petroleum—and in high-tech products.

It is interesting to examine, against the background of the findings of Israeli research, what the Arabs themselves think about their technological and scientific achievements, mainly in comparison to Israel. The scientific community in the Arab world is conscious of the existence of the gap, and many in that community exercise strong self-criticism. Thus, for example, the Egyptian scientist Rushdi Rashid, a senior researcher in the French Center for Scientific Studies, says, "The Arabs lag far behind world scientific-technological progress. We've almost missed the boat not only in the fields of mathematics and the exact sciences, but also in studies of man." The Arab researcher and scientist Antoine Zahlan notes that the gap in the field of scientific research between Israel and the Arab world as a whole widened three times from 1967 to 1983.

Israel serves to a great extent as a stimulus to scientific-technological development in the Arab states. In fact, the beginning of the Arab renaissance in science and technology is in the period after the Six-Day War, which intensified the consciousness of the importance of these two fields in the national struggle. At that time, opinion crystallized in the Arab world that Israel had defeated the Arab states due to technology, and, in order to be victorious, the Arabs must adopt the same weapon. Since then, the Arab regimes were seized by a frenzy of purchasing modern technology and large quantities of advanced weapons.

The Yom Kippur War accelerated the process, and intensified the interest of the Arab states in obtaining knowledge and technology in the Western countries, and in the possibilities of applying them not only to military needs, but also to the solution of social and economic problems. Against the background of the rapprochement between the Arabs and the West, wide-ranging contacts were developed with Western firms. The interest went far—at times to the point of attempts to steal Western technology. About a year and a half ago, U.S. authorities arrested the Egyptian scientist Dr. 'Abd-al-Kader Hilmi on charges of smuggling from the United States to Egypt chemical substances intended for coatings for ground-to-ground missiles.

An important portion of Arab scientific potential lies in the educational systems in the Arab states. The number of students in these countries has risen three times in the past year, from 207,000 to almost 2 million. At the same time, there has been a considerable increase in the number of universities, technical institutes, and colleges. Egypt has the highest percentage of students. The number of students in Syria has risen from 40,000 in the early 1970s to 110,000 in the mid-80s. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are investing enormous sums in developing university education systems and research. There are seven universities and 77 institutions of higher education in Saudi Arabia, which enjoy fat budgets. According to estimates, the number of academics in the Arab world in the 21st century will come to five percent of the population.

There is also considerable expansion in the field of primary education. In Iraq, for example, all children aged six to 11 years are in school. In Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, almost all children are receiving primary education. The tremendous expansion in educational systems, at all levels, is reflected, of course, in the improved quality of manpower that is drafted into the Arab armies, but it most of all raises the prospects for building a scientific-technological infrastructure.

But the blossoming of institutions of higher education, which occurred mostly after the Six-Day War, did not bring about the results that were sought by policymakers in the educational-scientific community—impressive and immediate achievements. Quantity did not bring forth quality. This was due mainly to the conditions of

learning: overcrowding, lack of study aids and laboratory equipment, and low motivation of the teaching staff due to difficult economic conditions. An Egyptian periodical described the situation in the universities thusly: "The general level is very low; there is almost no contact between the universities in Egypt and the world scientific centers; books and studies published outside of Egypt almost do not arrive, not to speak of lecturers; the situation of the laboratories is at a nadir; there is insufficient seating; researchers, lecturers, and professors work at several jobs, and refuse to give up any of them; the students overflow from the lecture halls, and sit on the windows and the platform. They leave the lecturer one square meter. He often can't be heard in the last rows."

Under the circumstances, a new approach crystallized in the Arab countries, which is based on establishing centers of excellence, in which emphasis is placed on quality and not on quantity. So we have seen in recent years a special effort by these countries to establish select science centers, in which a reserve of local technicians and scientists is being prepared. According to reports in the Lebanese press, many Arab states—including Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, and Libya—have begun to establish specialized institutes in high technology, including atomic and laser radiation. Biological and medical research in the Arab world is also developing rapidly. One Arab newspaper relates that about 10 years ago the Arab states began to prepare hundreds of thousands of children through intellectual-scientific activity for the sake of increasing future scientific-technological output.

An additional component of the scientific-technological potential of the Arabs is the great masses of Arab academics who work in the Western countries. Since 1961, their number grew from 41,500 to 217,000. There are inconsistent reports regarding the number of Arab scientists who emigrated from the Arab world and work in sensitive positions, civilian and military—ranging from 10,000 to 38,000. In the United States about 500 Arabs are employed in atomic energy and electronic engineering, 1,000 in agronomy, 400 in physics and mathematics, 950 in chemistry, and 975 in biology. In Britain, as well, there is a scientific-technological reserve of young Arabs, who are studying for higher degrees.

According to the study, this potential can be used when and if there is a significant advance in Arab scientific circles, and an Arab technology emerges that will constitute a center of attraction for that manpower. Such a development could bring about a revolution in the scientific-technological capability of the Arab countries. The Arab scientist Salim al-Husni, a lecturer at the University of Manchester, believes that the Arab-Islamic community in Britain has a tremendous technological potential, which could be placed at the service of the Muslim world. "The shoulders of the young generation," he says, "bear the goal of transferring modern technology to the mother countries." When asked to address the subject of his dual loyalty—to the Arab homeland and to

the establishment in which he works—he replies, “What we provide our region does not constitute a threat to anyone.” That could be debated.

Industry is another channel in the Arab world that has scientific-technological potential. Of course, it is difficult to speak today of civilian Arab industry in terms of advanced technology. Arab governments are drawing up many five-year plans for industrial development, but in industrial development, as well, the main characteristic is quantity, and not quality. Most of the exports of the Arab countries are in the framework of what could be called light industry, producing consumer goods and electrical appliances. However, one should not ignore the existence of a flourishing petrochemical industry in several Arab countries. Saudi Arabia, for example, which purchased advanced technologies from the West, has a large comparative advantage in this field. Iraq's and Egypt's impressive development in military technology could have an impact on civilian industry and, in certain circumstances, the military industry could shift from military to civilian production.

There are atomic energy councils in all the Arab countries, and a few of them have nuclear reactors. These councils maintain relations with the International Atomic Energy Commission and with other international bodies. In the framework of these relations, they strive to acquire a nuclear capability for their countries. The scientific and technological awakening in the Arab world is striking in relation to the growing Arab presence in international scientific forums. The number of young Arab researchers who participate in scientific symposia throughout the world is growing every year. Another expression of this awakening is the increase in the number of Arab scientific publications and journals that deal specifically with science and technology. Among the most prominent are the journals *SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY* and *MODERN ARAB THOUGHT*. Two communications satellites were sent into space with French assistance: *Arabesque-1* and *Arabesque-2*. A number of Arab states are planning to establish an Arabic network for science and technology, that will supply to the Arab world information about innovations in technology, science, and industry throughout the world, with the intention of using the innovations and to conduct exchanges of information.

The penetration of technology into the modern Arab world is reflected also in the invasion of computers into the systems of higher education, and their becoming an important factor in advancing academic studies, especially in the schools of medicine and engineering. The number of banks, factories, and army units that use computers also is growing. In several Arab states, there are plans to produce computers. The Arab League, in cooperation with officials in the United Nations, discussed ways of promoting the use of computers in the Arab world, and the training of manpower to operate them in every area of life, as well the use of computers for creating a system of information coordination in the Arab world.

The shortage of experienced professional manpower in the Arab countries in general, and in the Persian Gulf states in particular, forces governments and industrial institutions to acquire and introduce computerized techniques. For example, Saudi Arabia is purchasing the most advanced computer techniques in almost every field of interdisciplinary planning and project management. All government ministries, business centers, public bodies, educational institutions, and research institutes use computerized data processing systems. The level of the sophisticated equipment and the ability to use it are today at the level accepted in every other advanced country in the Western world. Signs of scientific-technological progress in medicine, for example, also include organ transplants. Arab countries are taking their first steps in these fields in an attempt to become part of the international scientific community.

Egypt takes first place among the Arab countries in the fields of science and technology. It has the best scientific-technological infrastructure in the Arab world.

Recently, the trend has been evident in Egypt for the concentration of the universities on applied research, in the fields of building engineering, land improvement, and wilderness cultivation. All this requires a considerable financial investment, which Egypt finds it difficult to mobilize from internal resources. Not long ago, it sent out feelers to other Arab states for founding a joint Arab fund for scientific-technological research. In this manner, it also seeks to reduce Arab dependence on foreign experts in scientific-technological research.

Iraq has ambitious plans in science and technology, and there are signs that it seeks to take the leadership role among the Arab states in these fields. In the early 80s, Iraq allocated more than \$800 million for developing the institutions of higher education. In the field of military-strategic technology, it improved the ranges of its ground-to-ground missiles, produced and is producing chemical weapons, established a space research station for launching a space satellite, and renewed its efforts to develop nuclear weapons. In the opinion of researchers, Iraq succeeded in maintaining a high level of scientific output despite the war, and it is reasonable to assume that with the conclusion of the war, all of the scientists who are employed in the military industry will be released and they will accelerate scientific development in Iraq.

But at this stage, a surge in scientific-technological development is, as was noted above, only a potential, and most of the plans are still far from the stage of productive realization.

In recent years, there has been a slowing in scientific-technological development in the Arab world. The reasons include: a drastic decline in petroleum revenues due to the slump in the world market (from \$180 billion to \$40 billion annually), and the lack of jobs for academic manpower. As in many other fields, the development in the field of science and technology in the Arab countries

is not organic, not the fruit of internal social growth, but the result of an attempt to impose it from above by importing technology from the outside. Arab writers and intellectuals argue, with wisdom after the fact, that the leaders of the Arab states erred by thinking only of importing technology from the outside, without creating the appropriate human-scientific infrastructure that would know how to absorb and properly use the technology. "It is not enough to transfer Western technology to the Arab countries," says Dr. Nawil Sa'adawi. "It is also necessary to create the socioeconomic-cultural conditions that will make possible its use and exploitation." In order to illustrate her point, Dr. Sa'adawi relates, "In every home, institution, or factory that I visited, I noticed a broken foreign-made electronic device, which stood useless, after no one was found to repair it or because of the lack of spare parts on the local market."

The level of science and technology in the Arab countries also is influenced to a great extent by the prevailing political-cultural atmosphere, or, to be more exact, the absence of an appropriate scientific environment. Many holders of higher degrees feel neglected, and suffer from the lack of possibilities for advanced study, and most of them are forced to engage in work outside of their specializations or leave their countries. In his book "A Backward Economy," Prof. Siegfried Stapke notes that a university graduate in the developing countries earns \$135 per month, while the salary of his peers in industrialized countries approaches \$2,000 per month. Only about 40 percent of the graduates remain to work in their countries of origin, while the rest choose to emigrate. Generally, the best Arab scientists, engineers, and technicians emigrate. The Technion researchers estimate that approximately 70 percent of the Arab students that are sent abroad to study do not return to their countries upon completion of their studies. This causes great economic damage. The Arab countries spend more than \$850 million each year on study abroad. "The Arab states must create the necessary material conditions in order to halt the brain drain to the Western countries, and to attract back those who have already emigrated," say the critics. The weekly AL-'ALAM went to the extreme in self-flagellation, writing on this subject: "We were once a model nation, and now we are a nation that suffers from some of the worst poverty and ignorance in the world. The Arabs even lag behind Poland, which is a backward country. As part of the Third World, we flocked to ideologies, while they, in the West, ran after technology."

Another factor that interferes with the efforts to promote science in the Arab states is the scanty financial resources that they allocate to scientific research for social and development needs. The Arab regimes choose to invest their main effort precisely in the field of military technology, and this fact raises a big question mark regarding the intentions of Arab leaders. Are they really ready to exploit scientific-technological progress in order to bring socioeconomic welfare to their peoples, or will they prefer to use it also in the future to advance their military ability." [quotation marks as published]

The launching of the Israeli satellite Ofek about a year ago aroused serious concerns in the Arab world. Arab rulers were called upon to act so that the Arabs, too, would have a foothold in space. "The Arabs have the necessary material and scientific potential, and there are dozens of Arab scientists working in world space centers, especially in the United States," it is said in Arab scientific circles. "The big and serious question is whether the space over the Arab region from the ocean to the Gulf is now under surveillance by Israeli satellites that are intended both for civilian and military purposes, and also for espionage?" wonders the weekly AL-USBU' AL-'ARABI. The veteran journalist Kamal Zuhayri says in the periodical AL-FURSAN, which is published in Paris, "Israel's technological progress (development of missiles, launching of satellites) requires the complete utilization of the scientific research potential in the Arab states, and I estimate that we have the ability to do that, because the main lesson is not in the concentration and stockpiling of modern weapons, but in the concentration of Arab minds, including those of the emigrants, in order to cope with the new challenge." Former Egyptian Minister of Education Hilmi Murad was not satisfied by the Arab response to the launching of the Israeli satellite: "Talk is not enough," he said. "The Arab defense ministers should have been convened urgently, in order to review Arab military strategy and the dimensions of armament, after Israel penetrated the sensitive and serious field of space."

Arab worry given Israel's scientific superiority is not limited, as noted above, to the military-security sphere. There is talk in the Arab world of the challenge from Israel that the Arabs will have to confront in the future—in various fields of technology. Critical articles in the Arab press point to the Arab failure in this sphere: "If the Arab world continues to ignore Israel's development in this field, and does not devote the resources to develop it, then the danger to us from Israel will not be limited to the nuclear sphere—all the Arabs are liable to find themselves in a situation where they will need food from their Israeli enemies," writes the Lebanese weekly AL-USBU' AL-'ARABI.

"The Arabs' problem," states the Arab scientist Salim al-Husni, "is that scientific research does not meet the needs of development, and the Arab and Islamic states in many cases do not provide the necessary assistance to scientific research. In Israel and the West, three percent of the budgets go to scientific research, while the Arab and Islamic states in most cases devote approximately one-half of a percent, and even this small proportion is directed to channels that do not contribute to development." Dr. Muhammed al-Rumayhi says, in an interview to the Saudi weekly AL-MAJALLAH, "The scientific backwardness of the Arab states in comparison to Israel is not the result of the lack of material or human potential, but the result of incompetent management and misunderstanding." According to him, there is insufficient awareness among the Arab leaders of science and technology: "We don't understand science, and we don't

attribute to it the value that it deserves...concessions are not granted to Arab research institutes...there is no concern for scientists and capable persons...we are squandering resources, and do not understand that the struggle in the world is now decided by science."

At the beginning of the 21st century, there will be in the Arab world 150 million persons at the height of their creative ability and activity, but this tremendous quantity of manpower will be bereft of the skills and technological ability that would make possible industrial production in various fields.

Long before the Six-Day War, the Arab states were aware of science and technology as a tool in the struggle against Israel. That war, and the ones that followed, spurred their efforts to close the gap with Israel. Despite their progress in this direction, there is still a long road ahead of them. The estimate is that scientific-technological development in the Arab states will continue to proceed slowly, and their status in the foreseeable future will remain that of receivers of technology. Nevertheless, it should be stressed that even if they haven't yet taken off into the blue skies of science and technology, the Arabs are already on the runway. "This situation," the study states, "gives Israel a period of grace that it must exploit in order to maintain the qualitative gap between it and the Arab states."

Effects of Arab Boycott Updated

44230101C Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 28 Jan 90 p 2A

[Interview with Yitzhaq Minervi, former Foreign Ministry deputy director general for economics, by Yerah Tal; date, place not given]

[Text] [HA'ARETZ] The meeting of the Arab Boycott Committee has reminded us that the boycott is still in place. Has it grown stronger or weaker in recent years?

[Minervi] "First of all, the meeting was a routine annual meeting. Countries that have 'proven themselves' are taken off the list, and others, which did not yield to the boycott, are added. The boycott exists, although it has not grown worse."

[HA'ARETZ] To what extent did the U.S. legislation against succumbing to the boycott help?

[Minervi] "It considerably reduced the impact of the boycott, but firms that are so inclined can find ways of circumventing the law. The situation is more difficult in Europe. Except for France, in which a law was enacted against the Arab boycott, other European governments are not fighting the Arab boycott, claiming that they are in favor of free trade and leaving the decision up to the industrial companies."

[HA'ARETZ] Can you estimate the number of firms that gave in to the Arab boycott?

[Minervi] "It is very difficult to tell. There are many firms that comply with the boycott formally but find unofficial ways of offering their goods to Israel."

[HA'ARETZ] How do you explain the fact that the Arab boycott manages to hold on, even though the oil weapon has weakened and global changes are changing the political realities of the world?

[Minervi] "It is true that the oil weapon has weakened, but there are still more than a few countries, including Japan, that are completely dependent on oil imports. The Japanese claim that in a few years there will be an oil shortage in the world. Consequently, the Japanese give in to the Arab boycott perhaps more readily than others. Nevertheless, even in Japan, an increasing number of firms is violating the boycott. In Europe, the oil weapon is less important, but they find it more important to preserve the larger Arab market."

[HA'ARETZ] What is the impact of the boycott on Israeli exports?

[Minervi] "That is indeed more worrisome, although it is difficult to pinpoint to what extent Israeli exports are affected by the Arab boycott. Another alarming problem is the reduced influx of capital into Israel, especially from Europe, because of the boycott; this problem may even worsen after 1992. If giant corporations are then formed, they may be more sensitive to the boycott."

[HA'ARETZ] How does Israel deal with the Arab boycott, and is there a chance that we will ever win this war?

[Minervi] "Israel tries to fight the boycott every way it can. This is done through various means, some of which are better not divulged. The Jewish lobby is sometimes activated. Wealthy Jews in the United States have the means of persuading firms, even outside the United States, to change their mind and not give in to the Arab boycott. There are also attempts to influence legislation in Western countries, such as the United States. But this struggle is not easy. For example, according to one paragraph in the agreement between Israel and EEC countries, a European firm may not be discriminated against for reasons such as the Arab boycott, but those are things which are difficult to prove."

[HA'ARETZ] Is there any chance of a Jewish-Israeli boycott against Arab countries?

[Minervi] "I can only say that we must support a free economy."

Moshe Ma'oz Comments on PLO Confederalism, Peace Process

90OL0236A Jerusalem AL-USBU' AL-JADID
in Arabic 1 Feb 90 pp 17-19

[Interview with Professor Moshe Ma'oz, Israeli expert on Palestinian and Syrian affairs: "The Solution Is To Establish a Confederated Palestinian State With

Jordan;" first paragraph AL-USBU' AL-JADID introduction; date and place not given]

[Excerpts] Professor Moshe Ma'oz is an Israeli expert on Palestinian and Syrian affairs, whose name repeatedly crops up in meetings with many Palestinian personalities in more than one place. He believes in our people's right to establish their state in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. In this interview, which we conducted with him, in the context of our desire to learn varying Israeli ideas and positions, we differed with him with regard to more than one opinion. However, we have given room to all his views, so that all our readers may learn about the reality upon which political lines are being drawn at the present time. [passage omitted]

[AL-USBU' AL-JADID] Today, there is talk in Israel about the danger of a new war breaking out between Syria and Israel. Is there danger of such a war, and has war come nearer?

[Ma'oz] One cannot know that, but one can talk about the possibilities and estimations. The Arab-Israeli struggle, which has gone on for many years, has changed recently into a Syrian-Israeli struggle. The most dangerous problem is the Palestinian issue. However, that is not a military problem, it's a political one. In military terms, Syria has succeeded in attaining a quantitative balance with Israel, but not a strategic balance. By that I mean, in terms of numbers of troops, tanks, aircraft, and missiles, it has the same as Israel, but the quality varies.

[AL-USBU' AL-JADID] Are you prepared to talk with the PLO?

[Ma'oz] Naturally, but unfortunately, I am not the prime minister!

[AL-USBU' AL-JADID] However, Israel rejects talking with the PLO.

[Ma'oz] This is a children's game. Before anything else, most Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip support the PLO. This is first, and secondly, we today are conducting indirect talks with the PLO. We wait for what the PLO's reaction will be, what the Central Committee said. The Egyptians are talking with the Palestinians and they talk with us. The Americans talk with the PLO and they talk with us. This is also a game for children. We talk with the PLO and the minister of defense met with Faysal al-Husayni. Isn't he the PLO?

All of them are PLO. The problem that I see is that there must be discussion with the PLO, because the alternative to the PLO is Hamas and the Islamic Jihad. It would be in the best interests of Israel and the PLO to reach a solution. If a solution is not reached, then Hamas will become stronger than the PLO, and the centrist force within the PLO will be weakened. Israel cannot talk with Hamas; they do not want a compromise. There is another possibility. A year and a half ago, Bassam Abu Sharif published a provocative paper, which I received. In it he said that the PLO was prepared for a popular

referendum in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. What do they want? I believe that the overwhelming majority would support the PLO and, in my opinion, the percentage would be less in Gaza, because there are more Hamas supporters there than in the West Bank. However, I also believe that a part of Hamas would support the PLO. Therefore, it is clear that it is in Israel's interest to sit down with the leaders who represent the Palestinians; i.e., the PLO. The Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are a part of the Palestinian people, not all of them. If we reach an agreement with the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, we will not have solved the remaining problem in Jordan, the refugee camps and the other areas that the PLO represent. If we get an agreement with the PLO, we will have resolved the problem, and the battle will not continue. Therefore, it is important for Israel to talk with the PLO, because it represents the Palestinian people.

[AL-USBU' AL-JADID] But Israel rejects giving rights to the Palestinian people, and is not prepared to accede to the PLO's demands for the establishment of a Palestinian state, or even a Palestinian confederation with Jordan.

[Ma'oz] With regard to that subject, one must distinguish between the majority view in Israel and my personal opinion. We must be more realistic; we must reach a solution that will be acceptable to all parties. I mean that we must respond to the two important conditions of the two sides:

1) Israeli—they must feel that each solution will bring them security. We know that Israelis have fears with regard to security for several reasons, including terrorism, etc. Israel must not fear the Palestinians, on the contrary, the Palestinians do not have the power, but the Israelis have fears, and that is the situation.

2) Palestinian—they must establish national institutions, a flag, currency, government, parliament and, in order to guarantee Israel's security, there must not be an army, but only a police force. I think that the Palestinians would agree to that. I talked with Bassam Abu-Sharif and Nabil Sha'ith about that, and they agreed with me. There is another factor. It is possible that a confederation with Jordan would satisfy the Israelis, because that is an additional guarantee for Israel, and the Palestinians would agree to that. Without a doubt, a confederation is important for the Palestinians (despite the fact that I don't want to intervene in their domestic affairs) because there are 1.25 million Palestinians in Jordan who must be united with the Palestinian state.

I see the solution represented by the establishment of a Palestinian state, united in a confederation with Jordan, with an effective leadership and cooperation with Israel and, perhaps, an economic unity with Israel. Palestinians, Jordanians, Egyptians, and some Israelis are capable of persuading the Israelis.

I am forced to say that the problem is Israel's problem. How can we persuade the Israeli masses to go in this

direction, because they have massive fears. The PLO must convince the Israelis, and many have been striving to do that. Perhaps this is not enough, perhaps the PLO must declare the abolishment of the Palestinian National Charter because that frightens the Israelis, and repudiate terrorism again, despite having done so. There is another factor that impacts on their fears, as well as on my own fears. That is the right of return, since the right to come back into Israel will not gain the support of Israelis. There are many Israelis who would not be concerned about the right of return, if it were to the Palestinian state, and not to Israeli areas. Faysal al-Husayni said that the right to return was to the Palestinian state, but that must be clearly declared, in order to convince the Israelis and to allay their fears.

[AL-USBU' AL-JADID] Why do the Israelis fear the right to return?

[Ma'oz] Are you telling me that the Israelis want a million Palestinians to come into Israel?

[AL-USBU' AL-JADID] Not into Israel, but into the Palestinian state?

[Ma'oz] I personally would agree with that. The Israelis are afraid that the relocation of Palestinians to the Palestinian state would lead to pressure on Israel.

The world today is changing, wars have ended. Thinking must be positive and the Palestinians are realists. It is true that they wanted to liquidate Israel 20 years ago, but things have changed. Sadat wanted to put an end to Israel, but he came to Jerusalem. It is impossible today for anyone to liquidate another. Coexistence must be attained. Israel needs a leader who can obtain peace for Israel with the Palestinians, because security with regard to Israel is peace with the Palestinians. As for other matters, Israel is strong and capable; the Israeli Defense Force is capable of defeating several Arab states, but it is incapable of winning over the intifadah [uprising].

The intifadah is a true, national uprising. There is no military solution for it, but rather a political solution. Most Palestinians today are ready for a political solution, and we must be prepared as well. Let me repeat that the problem is our problem. The Palestinians must help us by demonstrating that they want to reach a solution. We need a leader in Israel who will lead us to peace. I personally feel very hopeless about this matter, because Shamir certainly will not do that. The only person capable of that is 'Ezer Weizmann, who thinks correctly and is capable. However, he is not a popular man; he is more popular outside the country. Another one, and I say this with some distress, is Yitzhak Rabin, despite the fact that I do not accept his policy in the occupied areas. He is a popular person, perhaps because he is harsher than necessary, I don't know. Rabin announced a popular referendum about the solution with the Palestinians, a guarantee of Israel's security, and national rights for the Palestinians. Even in this matter, he is not about to agree tomorrow to a Palestinian state; he would not do that. No sooner had I told him, before the outbreak of

the intifadah, (a month before the outbreak of the intifadah) that Israel must give a clear pledge to the Palestinians, in which Israel declares that it is prepared for a national home for the Palestinians, or else the intifadah will begin and, in fact, this was what happened.

We must issue a declaration, recognizing the rights of the Palestinians, and we must take steps toward establishing a Palestinian state. In this regard, Rabin is most regrettably an important leader. Unless that happens, we will continue in a circle of violence, bloodshed, and hatred. This is not in anyone's best interests and, God forbid, could lead to a full scale war in the Middle East. The best internal, political, and moral interests for Israel is to live in peace with the Palestinian people, and with the Arab world, despite the fact that Israel has entered the Arab world, through agreement with Egypt. However, unless the Palestinian issue is solved, the agreement with Egypt will crumble, which will result in a new war, except that internationally, Israel would be isolated.

[AL-USBU' AL-JADID] Have you had meetings with Palestinians who are PLO members?

[Ma'oz] Within the framework of international conferences, due to Israeli law, I have met with Bassam Abu Sharif, Nabil Sha'th and 'Afif Safiyah. Here at home, I have met many times with Faysal al-Husayni, Hanna Sinyurah, Sari Nusaybah, and Ziyad Abu-Ziyad. I am convinced that they are sincere people who wish to reach a solution and one could talk with them.

[AL-USBU' AL-JADID] What do you think of Secretary of State Baker's five points?

[Ma'oz] With regard to Israel, the five points are an excellent beginning, because these points do not mention a Palestinian state or the PLO. This will be an excellent start and I think that President Mubarak's 10 points are also a good beginning for negotiations. Israel must accept them without any reservations, guarantees, and conditions. Israel must declare its good intentions vis-a-vis the Palestinians, its readiness for a national home for the Palestinians, and before that, start with elections.

[AL-USBU' AL-JADID] What is Egypt's role in the peace process?

[Ma'oz] Egypt has a very important role, which is to work in this direction. Egypt is trying to bring together Israel and the PLO in a meeting about the peace process. The PLO is agreeable, but Israel rejects that. I think that Egypt must try to persuade Israel of that, in coordination with the United States, because Egypt is a friendly nation to both parties, as it has signed a peace initiative with Israel, as well as having excellent relations with the PLO. Egypt's role is very positive.

[AL-USBU' AL-JADID] What are the steps that Israel and the PLO must take to achieve peace?

[Ma'oz] I have already talked about that. With regard to the PLO, announce abolition of the Palestinian National Charter, and 'Arafat has announced that, but the

announcement must be clear. The cessation of terrorism, and the right of return should not be to Israel, but to the Palestinian state. This will result in convincing many Israelis with regard to declaring mutual recognition and the right of the Palestinians to a national identity.

[AL-USBU' AL-JADID] With regard to Syrian-Iraqi relations, what is the impact of these relations on Israel from the security standpoint?

[Ma'oz] Syria has no military support. The Syrian-Iraqi struggle is a major one and might be bigger than the Syrian-Israeli dispute. This is very dangerous, and I think that if Israel agreed to talk with the PLO, it would gain not only the support of Egypt and Jordan, but also Iraq as well, which would result in Syria's isolation. This might push Syria toward a peaceful solution.

[AL-USBU' AL-JADID] After two years, what do you expect with regard to the intifadah?

[Ma'oz] The intifadah will continue for a long time, although I wish it would stop, and a peaceful solution be found. However, in the absence of a peaceful solution, the intifadah will continue despite all the problems. There is the killing of agents (but this occurs in certain national movements) and the violence, but the intifadah is a true, national uprising, pure courage. The Palestinians are not prepared to end the intifadah before achieving anything; after all these victims, it is impossible to come up emptyhanded, without any recompense. The intifadah will continue; perhaps the intifadah will take on another form. I hope that a peaceful solution will be reached because the Palestinians are suffering bodily, but not morally, spiritually, which is more difficult than bodily suffering.

[AL-USBU' AL-JADID] After the elections in Jordan, will there be cooperation among the Islamic movements in the region, especially Jordan and the West Bank and Gaza Strip? Will that have an impact on the peace process?

[Ma'oz] With respect to Islamic movements in Israel's neighboring countries, each movement is set up differently from another, so that one cannot talk about a general force. In Syria, their situation is difficult, because President al-Asad killed tens of thousands of Muslim Brotherhood members in Hama in 1982. In Egypt, their situation is difficult, and in Jordan they succeeded in the elections. In the West Bank and Gaza Strip, their situation is different.

[AL-USBU' AL-JADID] There is a Syrian-Egyptian rapprochement. What is the impact of that on the peace process.

[Ma'oz] This will force Syria toward a peaceful solution. If Syria would declare that it is prepared for a peaceful solution with Israel in exchange for the return of the Golan Heights, Egypt would support that.

[AL-USBU' AL-JADID] Al-Asad has no hope. Israel is not prepared to return Golan, or even negotiate.

[Ma'oz] At least, al-Asad can put Israel in a corner, and that would be a tactical or strategic success, if Israel agreed.

[AL-USBU' AL-JADID] Have you met with Syrian officials?

[Ma'oz] No, but I met the Soviet Ambassador to Syria, Zotov, who weeks ago called on Syria to abandon the strategic balance. A year and a half ago, I published a book about Hafez al-Asad. I sent him a copy with a dedication, by way of an American diplomat, but I never received a reply from him. I know that the Arabs don't do that, but I expected him to invite me to visit Syria. (Said sarcastically)

I got a promise from Yitzhaq Shamir, when he was foreign minister, that I would be the first Israeli ambassador to Syria. At another time, during a meeting with Prime Minister Shamir, when we discussed Syrian-Iraqi-Israeli relations, Shamir said to me: Do you know that al-Asad is against a Palestinian state? I replied: You are as well; perhaps there is a connection between the two of you?

JORDAN

Abu-Zant Comments on Muslim Brotherhood, Parliament

90OL0224A Paris AL-YAWM AL-SABI'
in Arabic 22 Jan 90 p 14

[Interview with Shaykh 'Abd-al-Mun'im Abu-Zant, Muslim Brotherhood parliamentary deputy, by Badr 'Abd-al-Haqq in Amman; date not specified; first five paragraphs are AL-YAWM AL-SABI' introduction]

[Text] The sweeping success of the Muslim Brotherhood and their allies among other Islamic currents in the Jordanian parliamentary elections has raised a wave of questions about the role that the Brotherhood could play in the political life of Jordan, and indeed about their ability to deal knowledgeably and skillfully with the economic problems that developing societies such as Jordan face.

In fact the slogans raised by the Brotherhood and other Islamic tendencies made many wonder whether the leading figures of this tendency were preachers who inflame the passions of the believers, or thinkers who paint a picture of the future of an enlightened Jordanian Islamic society capable of having a dialogue with other intellectual currents, through the course of Islamic thought which the Islamic Brotherhood embraces.

Shaykh 'Abd-al-Mun'im Abu-Zant (age 49) holds a bachelor's degree in Islamic law from al-Azhar University. He worked for a few years in the position of spiritual guide to the Jordanian public security system, where he held the rank of captain. Afterwards he left the security system and went to Kuwait where he worked as a preacher in one of its great mosques, and he attracted the

attention of the Islamic multitude in Kuwait. Shaykh Abu-Zant was subjected to arrest and imprisonment four times in Jordan because of his fiery sermons which he used to give in the popular district of Hayy Nizal in Amman.

In the parliamentary elections Abu-Zant got 58.3 percent of the votes in Amman's second electoral district, which is the highest percentage obtained by a deputy of the 80 who won in all the electoral districts.

AL-YAWM AL-SABI' met with Shaykh Abu-Zant in his home in Hayy Nizal and had the following interview with him:

[AL-YAWM AL-SABI'] What are the factors which allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to win the highest number of votes and a large number of parliament seats?

[Abu-Zant] The first and direct factor is that we have a "firm, divine course" characterized by human comprehensiveness and disposition, and steadfastness of thought and belief, as well as steadfastness of balanced legislation which rejects racism, regionalism, and tribalism. This human comprehensiveness gave the Islamic extension a steadfastness and forcefulness in the Islamic awakening which left the other tendencies powerless before it.

As for the second reason for the victory, it is the injury and suppression to which the Islamic movement and its precepts have been subjected in modern Arab history, since no perfecting movement has arisen (especially in the Arab states) that has suffered and been oppressed as has the Islamic movement.

[AL-YAWM AL-SABI'] But the other political organizations in Jordan were not allowed to operate openly, as is the case with respect to the Brotherhood, and the leaders of those secret organizations were persecuted, and they suffered more than the Brotherhood did, but they were not able to build organizational structures like those set up by the Brotherhood with the knowledge and consent of the Jordanian authorities. What do you think?

[Abu-Zant] In Egypt, for example, the Muslim Brotherhood was not allowed to carry out political activity openly, but in spite of that they attracted grassroots support and ran in the elections, under the aegis of other parties, because the Egyptian authorities had not given them a license to establish a party. Thus, it cannot be said that the suppression and pursuit of the non-Islamic currents in Jordan prevented them from getting to the Parliament as much as the Brotherhood did, or getting their number of seats.

[AL-YAWM AL-SABI'] In your slogans during the election campaign you implied that you had your own point of view regarding the Palestinian issue, the PLO, and the intifadah [uprising]. What is your real position towards the PLO, and are you on the side of the "Hamas" movement, as is rumored?

[Abu-Zant] We deal with the Palestinian issue from an Islamic viewpoint. As far as we are concerned, the issue is not a Palestinian one or an Arab one. Rather it is first of all an Islamic one, because all of Palestine is an Islamic possession, no part of which can be taken away, no matter how small. Everyone realizes that the Islamic movement within the intifadah has a force that cannot be denied, and in this humble house (the home of Shaykh Abu-Zant) Brother Hani al-Hasan visited me a short while ago, and he acknowledged the forcefulness of the Islamic movement. So has Brother Yasir 'Arafat. The "Hamas" movement is no longer a secret movement going on in cellars, and everyone now knows that the "Hamas" is the military arm of the Muslim Brotherhood. The force of the intifadah, and its escalating pace of producing lines, have enriched the Islamic movement, which is known for its steadfastness of constructive opposition. For we do not oppose for the sake of it being said that we are opposing, but rather because we are trying to make the PLO adopt the Islamic way of thinking which we have adopted. We have told Brother 'Arafat, through numerous channels, that the PLO ought to raise the banner of Islamic jihad, and when it does so, with strength and faith and determination, there will be no opposition or conflict.

[AL-YAWM AL-SABI'] It is said that Israel bargained with Shaykh Ahmad Yasin to stop the intifadah in exchange for improving the situation in Gaza. Does that mean that Israel is trying to inflate the person of Shaykh Yasin to create an alternate Palestinian leadership to the PLO?

[Abu-Zant] Shakh Yasin is a symbol of the jihad, to whom God gave a mind, a soul, and native genius. The Israelis have approached him many times to stop the intifadah in exchange for the Palestinians getting their rights, but Shaykh Yasin's response was, "I will not bargain, and I will not allow myself to take part in an attempt to create a new leadership in place of the leadership of the PLO."

[AL-YAWM AL-SABI'] The Brotherhood now constitutes an influential parliamentary force within the Jordanian parliament. Jordan faces many problems: social, economic, and political. Do you have a clear view on how to deal with the economic situation, for example?

[Abu-Zant] Our view of the economic situation in Jordan is based on several provisions, some of the most important of which are as follows:

- 1) Finding out the real reasons of Jordan's high foreign indebtedness by demanding that a just and impartial investigation be held which would show in figures the extent of the administrative or financial failure or corruption which has happened in the past. After the results of this investigation come out, there will be an accounting, after which there must be punishment.

- 2) We will work to encourage national industries so as to put an end to unemployment and employ the labor force. But in order for us to succeed in that, there must

have "freedom of thought and action." To explain that, I will give the following example: About 10 years ago the shoemakers' union submitted a complaint to the prime minister, in which it demanded that the shoe industry be supported and that small industries be encouraged. But the prime minister's response was: "If you can save 4 million dinars, (that being the amount of customs duty on imported shoes), we will do as you ask." And with that reply the discussion ended. But if those workers had had "freedom of thought and action," they would have been able to give an appropriate response, and to get what they had asked for.

3) We in the Muslim Brotherhood believe in a guided economy, and by that we mean educating the people through policies. We are against waste and spending large amounts of money on it, and we will try to take a stipulated amount from the rich amount for the poor, for that is the mutual social responsibility that Islam created. It is a call to charitable work in the interest of the group and not in the interest of the individual, and whosoever does not comply with this commitment to the general good, will be made to comply with the stipulations of the law.

[AL-YAWM AL-SABI'] The economic system in Jordan depends heavily on banking activity, and the banks as you know deal in interest. Will you try to abolish the interest system?

[Abu-Zant] The issue of interest is a part of the precepts of Islamic law, and our view of these precepts is comprehensive and not partial. It is no secret that in the intelligence files there are reports that say that the "Islamicists" will deal with the question of interest by blowing up the banks. That is an erroneous idea that is not true, and we will never accept it. Our view on the problem of interest is like that of a compassionate doctor towards a patient with appendicitis, which can be easily removed. However, we cannot solve the problem in one stroke, but gradually step by step, until we are able to create a true Islamic economic pattern.

[AL-YAWM AL-SABI'] With which political forces in the Parliament will you be able to enter into alliance? Or will you avoid alliances?

[Abu-Zant] As a matter of principle, we are convinced that all powers and parties, whether they be Marxist or nationalist, constitute a single front opposed to the Islamic front. But in spite of that, on certain positions we might resort to accepting a formula of temporary alliance when we find that we come together with others on the position itself, for that would serve our movement and enable us to be flexible, without us renouncing our Islamic principles.

Here we will make an important observation, namely: in the battle to elect the speaker of the chamber of deputies there were three candidates. One of them was the candidate of the Brotherhood, Yusuf Mubidin; the second was an independent Islamic candidate, Layth Shubaylat; and the third was an independent candidate not from the

Islamic tendency, Sulayman 'Arar. The elections took place in two rounds: in the first round the Democratic Grouping (on the left, with 14 deputies) supported the Islamic candidate Layth Shubaylat, and after Shubaylat left the field, the Democratic Grouping gave its votes to deputy Sulayman 'Arar, whereas the Muslim Brotherhood lost the battle, perhaps because they did not conduct the battle of alliances well enough to let their candidate win.

[AL-YAWM AL-SABI'] What about applying the precepts of Islamic law? Will you adopt the establishment of the legal penalties, such as cutting off the hand of a thief, for example?

[Abu-Zant] The process of applying the precepts of Islamic law must be preceded by preparatory steps. Islam has established educational and procedural rules, one of which is that cutting off the hand of a needy thief, or one who is forced to steal to get the necessities of life, constitutes a judicial error that Islamic law does not concede to. The noble *hadith* [narrative relating deeds and utterances of the Prophet and his Companions] of the Prophet says: "Avoid penalties through judicial errors." Thus the conditions for applying the penalty must be met before it is implemented, and that is exactly what the caliph 'Umar Ibn al-Khattab did in the famine year.

LEBANON

Butrus Dib Suggests New Form of Government

90OL0198A London AL-HAWADITH
in Arabic 5 Jan 90 pp 19-20

[Interview with legist, constitutionalist, and diplomat Dr. Butrus Dib; first five paragraphs are AL-HAWADITH introduction; place and date not given]

[Excerpts] Virtually everyone currently agrees that the solution for Lebanon outlined by the Ta'if agreement is the solution which comes closest to Lebanon's reality and offers the best prospects for Lebanon. We have seen and heard how most countries, major and minor, have recognized the legitimacy of the new Lebanon represented by President al-Harawi and his government, which constitutes a first step in applying the course of national reconciliation based on the Ta'if document.

The cabinet will soon begin to draft the laws mentioned in the Ta'if document. These laws will be submitted as constitutional draft laws to the Chamber of Deputies for enactment, amendment, or rejection, and they will become constitutional after they are approved. Some law and constitution experts believe that the Lebanese cabinet currently has a golden opportunity to formulate these draft laws in such a way as to strengthen the constitutional cast and structure and to make it difficult to subsequently oppose it or violate its integrity.

AL-HAWADITH met with Dr. Butrus Dib, renowned legal and constitutional scholar, professor of ancient history, and brilliant diplomat. He apprised us of a plan which he drafted to solve the Lebanese crisis, but which he put on hold immediately after the meeting of the deputies in Ta'if lest he appear to oppose the meeting or wish to emend its course. Dr. Dib states that the Ta'if document is good because it is a general framework for Lebanese national reconciliation; "however, in my plan, I introduce details of the national reconciliation, which pertain to senior and other posts in the state. I also deal with numerous specific issues, such as 'the social-economic council,' 'the supreme court,' 'the organization of the justice administration,' the establishment of 'a senate' and 'a presidential council,' etc."

Dr. Dib confirmed that he is placing his plan at the disposal of the Lebanese cabinet, which he assumes has already begun drafting the required constitutional draft laws, or at the disposal of the deputies, who will discuss these bills after they have been presented to them.

In the following interview, Dr. Butrus Dib reveals some of his plan, which complements, and does not contradict, the Ta'if document.

[AL-HAWADITH] The newspaper AL-HAYAT published a statement by Sayyid Ahmad Ghazzali, Algeria's foreign minister and a member of the Arab Higher Tripartite Committee, which contained the following: "...We see no other solution except the Ta'if agreement. If any other party has another solution, let it present it. We are presenting the only solution." What is your comment on this statement?

[Dib] I have so far abstained from entering into criticism or commentary out of a desire for the welfare of the peace process. However, when a notable authority, whom we esteem and respect, calls—for the sake of maximum insight to be sure, not provocation—on anyone with a view to present it, we face a moral responsibility, which need only be toward Lebanon and its Arab sisters. This is a matter of a crucial period and a common destiny. If silence was permitted previously for the sake of opting for the best situation, continued silence is impermissible in the face of the call to abstain from it.

[AL-HAWADITH] Does this mean that you do not support the content of the Ta'if agreement?

[Dib] The expression "I do not support it" is meaningless. If it was used in this context, it created the wrong impression. Therefore, I say that there are positive aspects and numerous merits in the aforesaid agreement regarding the principle of pursuing equality, sharing, collective decisionmaking, respect for the character and rights of each sect, and the establishment of more than one legislative and consultative body by means of an unambiguous provisions, not by customary law alone. [passage omitted]

[AL-HAWADITH] Shall we conclude from your remarks that you have specific alternative suggestions?

[Dib] Anyone experiencing life's general problems naturally thinks about developing the framework in which he lives based on these considerations. I formulated a program which I wanted to be as complete and integrated as possible, starting from the apex of the pyramid and ending at the lowest-ranking positions. This program envisages and regulates the establishment of new institutions.

I presented this plan to many friends from different sects, and it met with great approval. However, because of the escalation of events, I did no more than speak of it.

Then, the Ta'if conference took place, and I placed it aside, because publicizing it would have perhaps impeded the course which we hope will succeed. This plan does not radically contradict the Ta'if decisions, but complements them. It is another step on the positive road toward eliminating sectarianism. It shows deference for sensitivities, and it combines the interests of the fraternal groups in the best way.

The space provided here is too limited to detail the plan and its particulars. We are placing it, however, at the disposal of any official who wishes us to do so.

[AL-HAWADITH] Nonetheless, it could be beneficial not to wait too long, especially since the deputies will soon draft the provisions.

[Dib] Every event is subject to discussion, and nothing stands in the way of publishing the program in detail and informing about it if necessary, whether today or tomorrow.

[AL-HAWADITH] We would prefer to hear something today, for example: How do you propose to organize the apex of the pyramid?

[Dib] I will present my suggestion here without commenting on the Ta'if conference and without making a comparison. It was decided at the Ta'if conference that the [leadership of the] executive authority would be decided collectively in the cabinet. I propose that the decision remain collective, and that the presidency also be collective, such that the major sects would share the presidency, and, as members of the presidency, would participate in the cabinet, as is the case in Switzerland. When confessional representation is effected in this way, there would no longer be a need to appoint a sect as heads of the legislative authority, the cabinet, or the other constitutional authorities to be created eventually.

[AL-HAWADITH] What do you mean by making the presidency collective? Are you suggesting that there be more than one president at one time?

[Dib] Let us take Switzerland as an example. This republic has no one president, but rather a committee composed of members jointly engaged in the work of the

presidency. However, sometimes, it is not feasible for all members of the presidency committee to simultaneously share in exercising the mandates of the presidency, as in foreign representation. Therefore, members of the Swiss presidency council rotate in the presidency of this council. At the same time, they are ministers with portfolios, in which capacity they participate as a matter of course in cabinet activities. I propose this for Lebanon, although my proposal differs in that the members of the presidential council would not have ministerial portfolios. Instead, they would have the title of minister of state in the sense accepted in France for example, where a minister of state ranks higher than other ministers. If it became necessary to establish secondary ministerial posts attached to the main ministries, those holding these positions would be called "ministers in charge of such and such," not "ministers of state for such and such."

[AL-HAWADITH] Could you clarify the last point?

[Dib] Let us take the Education Ministry as an example. This ministry includes the branches of education, fine arts, and youth and sports, each of which can be made into a ministry. Nonetheless, at the same time, it is desirable to maintain the unity of educational affairs. Therefore, a minister of education could be appointed to supervise all of these branches, and he would be aided by individuals bearing the title of minister. However, they would be subordinate to him. For example, the posts of minister in charge of fine arts, or minister in charge of youth and sports, etc. would be established. These ministers would not be called "ministers of state in charge of," because the title of minister of state is higher than the title of minister.

[AL-HAWADITH] Who would make up the Lebanese presidency council, and how long would their tenure be?

[Dib] The presidency council would be comprised of representatives of the major Lebanese sects, who would rotate in the council's presidency for equal tenures. The length of this tenure would preferably correspond with the tenure of the legislative authority, with deference to the time difference, imposed by the fact that the presidency council would be elected by the legislative authority.

[AL-HAWADITH] How do you propose to avoid a conflict between the election of the presidency council and the election of the Chamber of Deputies? Would not a constitutional vacuum occur if the terms of the Chamber of Deputies and the presidency council ended simultaneously?

[Dib] This could be settled in numerous ways, including, for example, the election of the presidency council by the legislative authority two or three months after the start of the latter's tenure. It should be known that I propose that the legislative authority not be restricted to the Chamber of Deputies alone. Rather, I suggest the election of a senate, whose election would differ somewhat from that of the Chamber of Deputies. Democratic

systems are rich in examples. The Chamber of Deputies and the senate would meet to elect the presidency council and to vote on matters of special importance defined by the constitution. With this solution, namely, the election of a presidential council, we will have:

The first, satisfied all the factions regarding the principle of participation in the presidency, which they are demanding.

The second, created equanimity among the sects through their participation and equal footing in decisionmaking at all levels.

The third, assured true equality, which opens the field to all to occupy any presidency, regardless of sect.

The fourth, Taken an effective step in extinguishing sectarian strife through the establishment of equality among all sects at all levels.

[AL-HAWADITH] What do you mean by the establishment of a senate?

[Dib] In parliamentary systems, we frequently see two legislative houses differing in their designation, and differing greatly in their mandates as well. These are the "elders," "lords," "notables," and so on. The basic goal in establishing senates is the idea of conservatism, in the sense of avoiding deep, rapid changes. The concept of a senate also entails principles regarding the representation of specific aspects of society and the method by which areas not comprising a state are represented. One of the clearest examples of this is the American Senate. Each state of the United States of America elects two senators, regardless of its population. In this way, representation through a senate and through the Chamber of Deputies becomes integrated in the sense that the land and the population are represented. If we look at the map of the United States we see many straight borders between states, in other words, artificial lines. Lebanon, on the other hand, has historical areas whose borders have been established by nature, politics, and general history, such as al-Shuf, al-Matn, Kasrawan, al-Zawiyah, al-Dinah, and 'Akkar, and the cities of Ba'labakk, Wadi al-Taym, Jazzin, Zahlah, and Aqlim al-Tuffah. We will not go on and on to spare tedium. There are also cities which have their own special character. All of these facts should not be crudely regarded as artificial. If these cities and rural areas become represented, we will have assured more balanced representation, and we will have given all factions rights, thereby making them more confident of their existence in the framework of the state, regardless of fluctuating circumstances.

[AL-HAWADITH] Are their similar suggestions regarding state institutions?

[Dib] Yes, there are numerous bodies which must be created, including the following for example:

- The social-economic council: It would function to provide the legislative authority with the expertise of social and economic specialists. It would also pave the

way for the participation of various organizations, such as unions and some associations in public life, and accustom them to bearing the responsibilities of public life.

- The supreme court.
- The constitutional council.
- The organization of the justice administration, and the creation of a spirit of cooperation between the judicial authority and the executive and legislative authorities, even regarding the formulation of [legal] provisions, so as to avoid contradictions and ambiguity in provisions, which we are seeing increasingly.
- Public service: Its organization must be reexamined with a view toward shortening transactions, reducing redundancy, and reinforcing the status and prestige of employees while making job proficiency a stringent requirement.
- There is also the problem of the various armed forces. It is impossible to be satisfied with uniting them by combining corps, merging militia elements, and other such measures. Rather, the armed forces institution must become a national unity institution. We have a strong need to establish unity at present. Also, settling the matter of armed persons now must be carried out with speed and, at the same time, deliberateness, both of which assure performance and fair decisionmaking, no matter what.

I place my detailed program at the disposal of whoever wishes, especially with a view toward explaining and defining the aims of each recommended measure or detail.

Proposal for Privatization of Utilities

90OL0259A London AL-HAWADITH
in Arabic 9 Feb 90 p 46

[Article by S.Z.: "The Private Sector Snatches Public Utilities From the Public Sector"]

[Text] Beirut and the sectors experienced a general power blackout in the new 1990 year, an occurrence unprecedented except in times of heavy bombardment, wide-scale engagements between the eastern and western sectors, and during the Israeli invasion.

In the second week of last month, Beirut and the sectors had no water or electricity for two full days or more (entirely without electricity). This happened more than once and was attributed by officials to the shortage of imported fuel oil whose local inventory has been totally depleted.

Concerned circles wonder why this has happened, especially since a legitimate authority exists that is anxious, and is trying, to prove good intentions and the willingness to discharge its responsibilities. This authority is in a race with the clock and is undergoing a rigorous test of its worthiness.

The circles say that if the question is not "why did the authority fail, despite political and financial legitimacy,

to import the necessary fuel oil before the supply ran out," then it should be "why did it not hasten to import the fuel oil especially since it had the funds and competence and that the issue was not in dispute?"

The fact is, according to those concerned circles, a state of disarray permeates public utilities in Beirut and the sectors—not only electricity but also water that is cut off several days a month in a manner heretofore unprecedented in Beirut. This [situation] is aggravated by continuing problems with domestic and foreign telephone connections, sanitation, transportation, and other services.

Legitimacy means "existence" not only by authority of the constitution and ancillary laws but also in the name of the majority of inhabitants and in response to their interests and basic needs.

The concerned circles may have themselves alluded to a serious matter—a scheme seems to be quietly, deliberately, and slowly implemented. It does not seem currently targeted at damaging, tainting, or undercutting the legitimate authorities in Beirut and the western sectors, but rather on pressing them, and all other Lebanese authorities as a whole, to adopt a plan, formerly proposed to the government, that recommends relegating all public utilities to the private sector, having concluded that the public sector has completely failed in managing those utilities.

The scheme is again coming to the fore, but this time against a background of the dismal reality engulfing the Lebanese. The concerned circles themselves have revealed that a group of competent technicians and businessmen believe in striking the iron while it is hot and that before the state begins to turn the public utilities wheel, it should be scared into adopting the group's new but old scheme to relegate public utilities to the private sector—to it, in other words, as a financially viable and technically competent team.

Information available to the abovementioned group indicates that all public utilities are in utter paralysis not only as a result of the war, but also, and fundamentally so, because of [poor] management and operations. This would be true of electricity, water, telephones, sanitation, and public transport. It is even true of the airport, al-Littani dam, the tobacco board, and the port authority. All have been studied and found to be flawed and lacking in expertise, competence, and efficiency because they are charges of a public sector characterized with negligence, reticence, and stifling rigid red tape. The private sector, on the other hand, seeks an end to flaws, negligence, and red tape in order to serve its own vested interests as well as the interests of the groups concerned with those utilities.

The scheme called upon the private sector to take charge of public utilities and pointed out the following:

- 1) Utilities are in need of a comprehensive fiscal and managerial overhaul and of restructuring from scratch.

The state proved to be a managerial failure and it lacks the estimated \$6 billion needed for comprehensive restructuring. The private sector, on the other hand, has within Lebanon and abroad a fiscal surplus of \$20 billion marked for investment.

2) The private sector is more understanding of utility customers and patrons and has more contact with them. It is better able to transcend the bureaucratic, partisan, and political obstacles that rein in the public sector.

3) The private sector also has the material incentives to success. Providing all citizens with telephone service, making electricity widely available around the clock, creating a transportation network that connects all of Lebanon, providing adequate and clean water—all those are objectives that would return a profit because they appeal to the widest cross-section of patrons and consumers.

4) There is focus in Lebanon on partisanship and sectarianism. Everything is under some sort of influence other than law and the public interest. It is best in the postwar era of a country like this to bet on the private sector without fear of monopolistic practices. Should there be mounting fear lest the private sector monopolize utilities, the House of Deputies could create an oversight committee to deter any monopolistic actions by private sector institutions.

5) Concern over monopolistic practices, should it be a major obstacle, could be allayed by turning public utilities into publicly subscribed stock companies traded on the exchange. This type of stock company assumes public characteristics because ownership is spread over a very wide base of stockholders.

6) Another safeguard against monopolies would be for the privatization act to outlaw monopolistic practices, to define the public objectives of each institution, and to establish procedures for calculating assets and service rates.

7) No one private sector entity should monopolize a service sector. It should, therefore, be possible to have more than one electric company, more than one tobacco company, more than one telephone company, more than one public transport company, etc. Naturally, this would not be possible in the case of water.

The plan promotes itself and points out that by selling the entire public sector to the private sector, the state would realize a return that could be large enough to repay its public debt. It would be taking a positive step towards ushering in a new era that would remove citizens from the war and its social and economic ills and from the effects of anarchy, favoritism, bureaucracy, corruption, and red tape.

There are those who look upon the Tobacco Board as typical of public sector units since it is particularly

replete, according to a study, with favoritism and corruption and is a haven for incompetence and a home for idle employees.

The study, according to the concerned circles themselves, makes sure to point out the fate of the public sector in "public sector countries" such as the Soviet Union (the home of perestroika and eastern Europe). It concludes by calling upon Lebanese officials to adopt a historic resolution to seek better results by "letting the baker do the baking," even if certain restrictions must be imposed. The state should give the private sector a try, as it did the public sector. It could set suitable rates for the services supplied and could maintain oversight to keep the private sector on its course of providing proper, sound, and consistent services at lower cost for a reasonable profit. The private sector could absorb all qualified public sector employees while reserving the right to implement, expand, and develop the necessary technology and expertise. The private sector is capable of rapidly transferring to Lebanon the world's most modern and successful technologies and press them into the service of Lebanese citizens.

It seems, according to the same circles, that public sector people are aware of private sector moves and of the threat they represent to them and have counteracted with a defensive plan of their own. They claimed, in marketing that plan, that their only problem was the lack of funds. They prepared detailed studies and reports showing how prosperous and successful the public sector was in the prewar era and underlining public sector contributions even during the war and in spite of war crises.

But, again according to the same circles, there are those in the public sector whose interests would be served were utilities turned over to the private sector. This group does all it can to serve private sector interests and objectives by undermining public sector efficacy every so often. The general blackout just might be proof of that, according to these circles.

At any rate, the citizens of Lebanon desire an end to all wars against them—not only shooting wars but also economic and social wars. That is the responsibility of the state.

SUDAN

Interviews Claim Lifestyles of New Leaders Austere

90OA0295A Khartoum AL-INQADH AL-WATANI
in Arabic 31 Dec 89 p 5

[Article by Salwa Hasan Sadiq: "Salvation and Accomplishment in Six Months"]

[Text] The people who, on 30 June 1989, risked their lives along with the hopes and aspirations of the Sudanese people to put a stop to the odious party rule

farce were not a bunch of adventurers, lovers of power, or personal glory seekers. For the idea of tackling the responsibility of saving Sudan is enticing only to those who are truly aware of the magnitude of such a task and are exclusively detached from anything that may take them away from the sacred mission to which they have dedicated themselves.

They were from the common people, mostly from poor or middle-class families, whose conscience and sense of the armed people's responsibility would not allow them to see the country burning while they watched. So they came forward to accomplish the dangerous mission, fully aware of its enormous dimensions.

Today, six months into their tenure, what has power done to them and what have they done to it? How have their lives changed and how different are they from Sudan's military and civilian rulers who came before them? How do they carry out their responsibilities?

We looked for answers to these questions among people close to the Revolutionary Council [RC] members: their parents, members of their families, and office directors. We were already aware, prior to this report, that, despite the new burdens facing them, the RC members had turned down all additional benefits and were content with salaries equal to those of their colleagues of similar grades. We were awed, however, by the new facts we learned. For example, the majority of the members work a minimum of 18 hours a day and their families seldom see them.

The leader of the revolution and the rest of the council members more often than not do not have in their homes the basic necessities and the leader endures the same hardships as the rest of the Sudanese households. Fava bean dishes are still the king of the table at home.

RC members pay for the meals they eat at the palace out of their own pockets and they pay a monthly charge for the buffet which is nothing but fava bean dishes and condiments. Some of them bring sandwiches from home to save money and stay within the family budget. [one line illegible] The leaders, including the general, often have to press their clothes themselves.

Unique Tale

What did the new leaders do when they went to the palace for the first time? How did they behave at the beginning? Miss Aminah Mustafa from the office of Staff Colonel Salah-al-Din Karrar, chairman of the economic committee, who has been working at the palace since 1980 and had worked with a number of officials in the al-Numayri eras, in the transitional era, and of late in the revolutionary era, told us: "During the al-Numayri era and that of the parties that came after him, spending at the palace was open. Breakfast used to be brought in from luxury hotels wrapped in cellophane and visitors used to be offered all kinds of juices, coffee, tea, and milk. Milk used to be brought in in kegs from Kafuri and there were all kinds of different foods.

"When the new leaders took over, something uncommon happened on the first day. The leaders asked for the bill to pay for their breakfast and tea, but were appalled to learn that the palace paid for the meals. They ordered the practice of offering cold drinks, tea, coffee, and breakfast stopped. Now they eat at their own expense from the buffet for a monthly charge, earning the title 'the Prophet's Companions.' Breakfast nowadays is limited to fava beans and salad."

Miss Ni'mat Muhammad Bushari, who worked at the palace as a secretary during the parties era, said that she used to go home in a private car, but now she uses public transportation. The economic committee has only two cars.

Only tea and coffee are offered to visitors who go there by appointment. The hospitality tray in the past used to have all kinds of sweets, imported cookies, Mackintosh candies, and various kinds of imported juices. Now it has Sudanese candy, dates, and cooked fava beans.

As for working hours, employees working for RC members say that working hours used to be from 8 AM to 2 PM. Now, work starts at 7 am and sometimes earlier and ends at 5 PM.

Jobs for close friends used to be by personal assignments and an executive secretary's salary was equal to that of a DS [diplomatic service] government employee. Now, secretaries are paid the same as their counterparts in other fields.

RC members do not have any benefits and they receive the same salary as their army counterparts.

A Day in the Life of the Revolution's Leader

Let us begin with the head leader, as the saying goes, General 'Umar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir. About how his life and their lives have changed six months after he assumed power, his youngest sister, Miss Safiyah Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir, said: "My brother, 'Umar, has strong feelings toward his family. We used, and I say used, to lead a quiet life like the rest of the Sudanese people. After the revolution, however, our life changed a great deal. We have been affected by the events surrounding us. I am talking about my brother 'Umar leading the revolution. We have really missed having him around to take care of the family. I remember that in the first month of the revolution, we saw him for a few minutes only. He was working over 18 hours a day. Things have gotten a little better now. He leaves for work about 6 AM or 7 AM and returns home at 9 PM to get ready for the next day. Ever since the revolution broke out, he has had lunch with us only once, when he returned from Qatar and was on his way the same day to Nairobi to attend the preferential trade conference and it happened to be lunchtime. Sometimes, he comes home at 6 but does not come out until 9 because he resumes work in his office at home.

His whole life is devoted to his work.

Fava Bean King of the Table

[AL-INQADH] Does the general, as president of the republic, and do you, as his family, get any benefits?

[Safiyah] Many people do not believe that we do not get any special privileges of any kind. Sometimes we even lack the bare necessities. 'Umar's position as president of the republic has not changed our way of life. Fava bean dishes still take their place in the center of the table and we do not have domestic help. My mother and the other family members still do their normal chores. The only change in our life is our move from the family home in Kawbar to Gen. 'Umar's residence at the General Command. We have the same problems as the rest of the Sudanese people and we, like them, hope that the salvation revolution will work to lower prices and overcome public problems.

As for Gen. 'Umar, he, like the rest of the RC members, has given up all other job benefits to support the treasury and they don't even not get food allowances. Sometimes, he has to take care of his personal needs himself. For example, one of his trips abroad he wanted to change his suit. The other suit needed ironing, so he had to do it himself. Things like that happen quite often in Gen. 'Umar's life. He always says that reform in this country can only be achieved by the good example the leaders set for the people.

The President and Favoritism

[AL-INQADH] What about favors that family and friends ask from Gen. 'Umar?

[Safiyah] Gen. 'Umar, by temperament, does not like crooked ways. Our father, God rest his soul, taught us to be truthful. That is why Gen. 'Umar shuns favoritism or intercession. As I said, he hates this sort of conduct. We receive many letters from family, friends, and other people asking Gen. 'Umar to do things for them. Sometimes, it is a simple request, but Gen. 'Umar refuses to do it and pays no heed to such requests. We have relatives who have been included in the purge and their relation to Gen. 'Umar did not do them any good. Even when it comes to signing severe punishments, such as the death sentence, the mother or other relatives come to Gen. 'Umar to plead with him, but he [one line illegible], thinking only of the great responsibility he bears.

[AL-INQADH] What about Gen. 'Umar's social relations?

[Safiyah] Gen. 'Umar used to have good social relations with most relatives and neighbors. Now, of course, he cannot live up to them. Relatives and friends often drop by to chat with him as they used to do before the revolution, but they do not find him at home and, when they do occasionally, he cannot spare the time. So, he just greets them and leaves for his never ending work. But his preoccupation notwithstanding, he tries [three lines illegible] I remember a few hours before the revolution broke out. We had a date with him to go out

of town for a social function. We left a few hours ahead of him and, on our way back, we heard on the radio military music and Gen. 'Umar's voice. This was a surprise to all of us.

Colonel Karrar

Col. Karrar is an unassuming person, according to the majority of employees who work with him. When I went to interview him about the revolution six months after it broke out, I was surprised to find him in his office at the palace engaged in a friendly conversation with the office staff. When I inquired about this, I was told that, despite his cheerful appearance and simple quiet life, Col. Salah does not waste one minute without doing something. This comment compelled me to talk with his family. So, I took advantage of the opportunity to talk with Mrs. In'am al-Shazli, wife of Col. Salah Karrar, about their life after the revolution. She said:

After the Revolution

The revolution has had a direct effect on our life. Many people may think that we are happy to be in power, but, in all honesty, we are happy that our relatives, families, or husbands are bearing the national burdens to save the country. As for our private situation, no family in Sudan is going through what we are going through. I remember the first month of the revolution. We were like refugees because we saw Col. Salah only for a few minutes. In the last days before the revolution, he used to spend most of his time with his children, but when the revolution broke out, they did not see him at all. My youngest child fell ill because his father was away. The children started kissing his picture on television. Even now we are not fully settled down because Salah comes home only to eat a bit and perform the evening prayer. Sometimes he does not even do that and days pass without him spending time or playing with his children. His absence has affected their studies. I remember two months after the revolution. I was nine months pregnant, but Salah had to hear about my delivery on the phone. Sometimes his children miss him, but the only way to get to him is by phone. Sometimes he spend time with them, but often he apologizes because of a meeting or something. Once he took them with him to the office to show them the kind of work he has to do and they were a little satisfied.

No Benefits

About benefits, Mrs. In'am said: "Some people may not believe that our economic and financial situation has gotten worse after the revolution and our standard of living has dropped. In the past, we used to have everything we wanted. Things have changed now. I have to attend to the family's needs and do my best to give them everything their father gave them, but I cannot do that because I do not know about such things. Once a lady came to me asking for sugar. I told her we did not have any sugar and she protested vigorously, but that was the truth. We are satisfied and content because, otherwise, this government would be like any other government."

"As I said at the beginning, we really miss 'daddy'. We have four children: Muhammad, in 5th grade; Mis'ab, in 2nd grade; Hazim, who is a toddler; and Ala', who was born with the revolution. They miss the good life when we had standing plans for Thursday or Friday outings and for an annual trip to Egypt. We miss all these things. Salah has had to give up his social obligations and visits. Before the revolution, he was not socially active, but he did have many friends we used to visit. All these things are over now. At the beginning, we, as a private family, were afraid for his safety because the colonel used to drive his own car. But now, six months later, we are more at ease and pray for their success and stability. We are convinced that they are paying their national dues and they have to sacrifice especially, especially since all RCC members are in the same boat. So, we hope that the Sudanese people will understand their situation, will come to their aid, and will try to put up with the various crises."

Colonel Khalifah—Ascetic Diplomacy

At the office of Staff Colonel Muhammad al-Amin Khalifah Kassar at Friendship Hall, we talked to one of his friends in order to get to know the person charged with bringing peace to Sudan. He said: "Col. Muhammad al-Amin Khalifah was born in 1949 in the city of al-Nuhud. He is a soldier who loves the military. He has worked himself up through the army ranks and has passed all the basic courses. Col. Khalifah knows the Koran by heart. His father founded a religious house in al-Nuhur and, therefore, the colonel has been greatly influenced by his father. That is why he appears to lead an ascetic life in a modest home. One manifestation of his asceticism is the fact that he always returns part of his travel allowances to the public treasury. On his recent trip to Egypt, he returned most of his travel allowances."

"Col. Khalifah drives his own car without any bodyguards. He reports to work early in the morning and does not leave until the evening."

"Regarding the impression he left during the national dialogue conference, his friends say that he is a good listener and a clear and decisive, albeit diplomatic, negotiator."

"At the personal level, Col. Khalifah does not interfere in the affairs of others. He is often asked to intercede for others, but he refuses to do so. One memorable incident is when a relative came to him for help, he told him that if his academic degree had not helped him, he had to wait until he got another degree because 'our motto is free competition.'"

Brigadier General al-Tajani

In the office of Brig. Gen. al-Tajani Adam al-Tahir, chairman of the legal and administrative affairs committee, we met with Miss Tahiyah Yusuf, an office employee who is a contemporary of many leaders at the presidential palace. She said: "Ever since the revolution broke out, I have noticed that Brig. Gen. al-Tajani comes

to the office early, before the employees, often at 6 AM, and most of the time he leaves in the evening, about 5 PM or later to resume his work someplace else."

"The current government is serious and disciplined. I say that based on Brig. Gen. al-Tajani's personality. I worked in this office as secretary to former presidential council member Dr. 'Ali Hasan Tajj-al-Din. The office used to be packed with visitors, deputies, and relatives. I was unable to take care of most of their requests and they often had to wait."

"Today, despite the fact that Brig. Gen. al-Tajani is a committee chairman and a political supervisor, things are different. He often delegates to the office director and no one interferes with his affairs or his work. Sometimes we have long periods of peace and quiet at the office. Even local government personnel have to go through the governor or a representative and they have a followup office in the province. Problems and conciliations are handled through delegates. As for government members, they used to eat their meals at the palace. The current members refused to eat at the Sudanese people's expense and started paying for their meals, but they found this to be very expensive, so Brig. Gen. al-Tajani began bringing sandwiches from home. I think the only thing they get from the palace is fresh water. I was at the palace during the time of Ja'far al-Numayri, but the then military government was different from this one."

Regarding travel allowances, Miss Tahiyah said that the new leaders have cut travel expenses by more than half. A member used to receive \$200, and an escort received \$100. Today, travel allowances cover expenses only, which may be less than half of the previous allowance, depending on the host country. In Arab countries, expenses are lower because the host country pays for accommodations.

Official Discusses Merits of New Investment Law

90OA0314A Khartoum AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAHAH in Arabic 24 Jan 90 p 4

[Interview with Abu-Harirah 'Abdallah al-Nahhas, director-general of investment, by 'Amr Mukhtar and Hamid al-Mu'tasim; "New Investment Law Initiates New Investment Avenues"; first two paragraphs are AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAHAH introduction; date and place not given]

[Text] The National Conference on Economic Salvation emphasized in its resolutions the necessity for stimulating investments and passing investment laws offering guarantees and facilities to attract national and foreign investors to participating more fully in development projects. A committee was formed to review the 1980 investment law and to draft another in light of the resolutions and recommendations of the National Conference on Economic Salvation.

The draft investment law of 1989 offers several advantages. It opens investment opportunities wider, offers

more guarantees and facilities to investors and their projects, and provides for the creation of a general investment authority with regional branches. The draft law will be discussed and debated at the interactive seminar for local investors.

AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAHAH interviewed Abu-Harirah 'Abdallah al-Nahhas, director-general of investment, in order to shed more light on the new law.

The Laws of 1980 and 1989 Compared

[AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAHAH] Did the draft investment law for 1989 improve on the investment opportunities available under the 1980 law?

[al-Nahhas] The new law deals with new investment activities that were not available under the old law.

In addition to publicized investment incentives in fields that would boost national income, attain self-sufficiency and food security, and help support the development plan, the new law initiates opportunities in rural development, housing, the transfer of suitable technology, and for other projects meant to attract the savings of expatriates abroad, to support regional balance, and to achieve cooperation and integration among Arab, Islamic, and African countries.

Those initiatives are among new investment vehicles offered by the new law in order to stimulate the process of development.

Guarantees and Facilities

[AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAHAH] Does the new law offer further advantages, facilities, and guarantees that would attract investment capital to opportunities in the Sudan?

[al-Nahhas] The new law offers many guarantees and facilities that promote investment in the previously mentioned projects. Incentives include exemption from profit taxes for a minimum period of five years; duty-free importation of equipment, spare parts, and capital goods; exemption from export taxes on project output; reduced production and consumption fees; reduced industrial water and electricity rates; and the availability of production sites at promotional costs.

The new law supplements all the above incentives, which were part of the 1980 law, by lifting credit ceilings on project financing, increasing profit margins for manufactured goods, and calculating consumption rates on the basis of suitable replacement value and work shifts.

The new law also offers additional incentives to projects implemented in less developed regions; to those that utilize domestic raw materials; and to those that target food security, import substitution, and rural development.

His excellency enumerated the main facilities mandated by the new law, such as repatriation of profit on foreign

capital and foreign credits and setting aside a reasonable portion of export revenues for procuring factors of production and fulfilling the project obligations. A new provision not previously available allows foreign workers to repatriate a portion of their savings and guarantees them freedom of movement, relocation, and residency in accordance with the law. The new legislation also facilitates the importation of foreign expertise, if not available locally.

Abolishing Receiverships and Confiscations of Investor Funds

He added that the law's most important guarantee to investors is a provision that protects invested funds against being confiscated or placed in receivership except in the public interest and then only by a ruling of a competent court. Under such circumstances, the investor must be compensated on the basis of a fair property valuation at current prices within a period not to exceed six months from the date of nationalization. The compensation, according to the new provision, is to be paid no later than five years.

In case of liquidated projects, the new law also guarantees the repatriation of invested capital in its currency of importation. Another innovative guarantee exempts project output from regulated pricing and mandated profit margins.

Abu-Harirah 'Abd-Allah al-Nahhas says that in order to protect the output of investment projects, the draft law stipulates that they be taxed at a lower rate than imported competing products, which would be additionally restricted and subjected to higher customs duties.

He added that the new law provides for the creation of a Khartoum-based autonomous general investment authority under an independent chairman and would be competent to open branches in the provinces or abroad.

The law also provides for a ministerial council composed of the prime minister or his representative, competent ministers, the attorney general, the governor of the Bank of Sudan, and the authority chairman. The authority would have a board of directors and a general manager. All would have the competence and authority to implement policies aimed at creating and promoting investment opportunities.

The Investment Experiences of Others

[AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAHAH] What guided the committee as it drafted the 1989 investment law?

[al-Nahhas] The committee was guided by the investment experience of Arab, Islamic, and African countries whose circumstances are similar to those of the Sudan. It was also guided by the studies of the Arab Investment Insurance Organization, an Arab League agency, as well as by Arab laws, the lessons gained from their implementation, and the experiences of the private sector. It also heeded the vision and suggestions of local investors.

[AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAHAH] Do you have any plans or programs to seek Arab and foreign investor reaction to the new law?

[al-Nahhas] The draft law was preparatory to the assembly of local investors at an interactive seminar that would scrutinize and discuss the law. This evaluation of the law's provisions makes it possible to present it in a more comprehensive form to Arab investors when they meet with local investors in Khartoum early in February. We also lean towards supplying our embassies abroad with copies of the draft to be spotlighted and disseminated by commercial attaches to foreign investors and expatriate Sudanese.

Bank Official Comments on Draft Investment Law

90O40313A Khartoum AL-INQADH AL-WATANI
in Arabic 17 Jan 90 p 5

[Article: "Commentary: Suggestions and Observations on the Proposed Investment Law"]

[Text] An interactive seminar was held the day before yesterday for local investors to discuss the proposed investment law whose draft we summarized last week. We print the following commentary by al-Rashid Sa'd, assistant manager of Al-Tadamun Islamic Bank in Khartoum as a contribution to that debate [over the draft law]

The draft investment law has been published. Its objectives are to streamline procedures and to provide incentives to capital investment. Because the reason behind publishing the draft is to elicit debate, I would like to comment on certain provisions already published in the media.

1. One paragraph mandates reduced electricity and water rates and official fees for the transportation of imports and exports.

Even though the three utilities—electric, water, and transportation—are in the public sector, they do have their own separate entities, commitments, and worker responsibilities. Forcing those utilities to offer reduced rates may impact on their services to others.

Instead of legislating a rate reduction without specifying which agency is to bear the resultant cost, I believe the law should clearly stipulate that the central government make up the difference between the incentive and actual rates of the services.

2. Consumable rates should be calculated on the basis of replacement values and operating shifts.

I believe that specifying asset replacement value is difficult to predict and a mandated stipulation would, therefore, serve no purpose. An establishment owner should be permitted to calculate consumables at rates commensurate with his financial position within historical parameters. Otherwise, the value of assets should be handled as expenses and forgiven in their entirety; or the

establishment owner may be granted a customs exemption for the equipment replacements.

The draft law stipulated twice that a portion of export [revenues] be put aside to finance capital or to retool imports. I believe this should be edited and two instances combined into a single item.

The draft law alludes to facilitating the utilization of foreign expertise that is unavailable locally. This, in my opinion, requires additional definition and clarification. The legislation did not specify the methodology of determining the lack of Sudanese expertise. That paragraph must be restated to specify the methodology and to spell out the length of time after which foreign experts must leave and be replaced by local ones.

Reviving Bank Investment, Unfreezing Assets Discussed

90O40313B Khartoum AL-INQADH AL-WATANI
in Arabic 17 Jan 90 p 5

[Article by Shadiyah 'Arabi: "How To Invest the Billions Frozen in Banks"]

[Text] Bank credit plays an important role in economic activity and might even be considered the major driver of various economic sectors. It is a two-edged sword and must, therefore, be managed and controlled. Mismanaged, it can cause economic anarchy. Well-managed, it is an important factor in propelling economic forces and activity away from inflationary and contractive pressures.

Observers of bank economic activity can clearly see that the banks' role is wanting. Huge sums of money and deposits are frozen and idle when they could have been used for various investments. Our country needs to put every penny to work in order to boost production and to escape the bottleneck.

How large are those frozen surpluses and what has this to do with current credit ceiling policies? Is it time for a fundamental review of those policies? How can officials and economists complain of a low national level of savings when funds are accumulating idly in banks?

Why have certain banks stopped opening checking and savings accounts?

AL-INQADH toured a number of private and public banks, interviewed banking experts, and debated Bank of Sudan officials in order to reach a formula for investing all bank deposits in useful and productive projects.

12 Billion Are Frozen

'Abd-al-Qadir Mansur, chairman and general-manager of the Islamic Cooperative Development Bank, estimates that some 12 billion pounds in deposits are frozen in Islamic banks alone. The funds lack investment opportunities that would reward depositors with quick

profits and returns. This is not the fault of the banks or of the allegedly inflexible structure of Islamic banks. Rather, it is the credit ceilings imposed by the central bank that keep those funds from being optimally invested, such as in the West. Another consequence of the ceilings has been the excess liquidity suffered by Islamic banks.

Mr. Mansur points out that the central bank forbids bank lending and borrowing, thus rendering them unable to attract deposits even though they have plenty of liquidity. This is because of bank operational policies.

In order to safeguard depositor funds, the central bank also forbids speculation. It must introduce new formulas and update the legal ceiling for the investment of bank funds.

To Arrest Inflation or To Stimulate Investment

We interviewed Mr. al-Baqir Yusif Madawi, general-manager of Faysal Sudanese Islamic Bank, a typical Islamic bank. He elaborated on the concept of saving for investment, for emergencies, or for both. The return on investment is not the prime motivation when saving for emergencies but is an incentive for those who save in order to develop their resources. The latter would realize a return by lending their funds for development or by depositing them with banks.

Investment opportunities for depositor funds shrink when executive authorities, for reasons of monetary policy, subject invested funds to a ceiling too low for the needs of the economy. Consequently, opportunities for disbursing funds to depositors in order to boost their resources also become fewer.

The head of the Faysal bank continued: We believe that continued monetary expansion forces monetary authorities into action to curb excess liquidity and control inflation. It escapes them that this has a negative impact on investment for development and on production.

We believe that monetary authorities should tolerate a measure of inflation in order to finance productivity. Real investment results in increased productivity and consequently in curtailed inflation.

We are, therefore, of the opinion that the authorities should create investment opportunities by lifting the credit ceilings on development financing. The state must create projects in which to invest these resources. Our bank, for instance, has more than 30 million pounds in frozen funds.

We asked the manager of Faysal bank: Islamic banks are accused of working only in the profit sector and, therefore, finance only buy-and-sell deals but do not contribute to development.

He replied that Islamic banks work in all profit and partnership sectors but are unable to speculate because of Bank of Sudan restraints.

Savings and Lending Rates

The general-manager of a foreign bank branch in the Sudan pointed out that the savings rate is declining in the Sudan because bank depositors are paid minimal returns on their savings. Furthermore, the banks do not benefit by those deposits that remain frozen and idle assets.

The solution is to lift credit ceilings and remove restrictions on bank profit margins in order that they may offer higher returns that would encourage savings.

In a country with high inflation like the Sudan, the return on savings must be higher than the rate of inflation in order to boost savings and to shrink lending rates. Assuring a worthwhile return would be an incentive to save with the banks. Reducing interest rates by 24 percent would boost lending rates and consequently increase money flow into economic activity. That would drive inflation higher. Raising interest rates, on the other hand, would reduce borrowing from banks and confine it to real and necessary need. Therefore, funds would be funneled to viable economic activity.

We have deposits that are three times higher than our assigned development ceiling. This restricts the use of money and idles the funds. The central bank is using the pretext of fighting inflation even though the inflation rate continues to climb day after day. That policy must be abandoned in favor of a different approach that allows development financing by defining national priorities investing in them.

Banks do not wish to accept any more deposits because they are costly to maintain. They are, therefore, attempting to discourage them by offering unattractive rates of return.

Bankers see no need for credit ceilings when savings and investments are weak. Rates of return must be raised. The Bank of Sudan oversees economic activity and defines the sectors to be financed by banks. Oversight, however, should be extended to those sectors in order to ensure that they are pursuing their objectives. (To be continued).

Investment Rollbacks Expected in Wake of East Europe Events

90OA0325A Khartoum AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAH in Arabic 25 Jan 90 p 5

[Article: "We Must Restructure Our Economy in View of the Storm of Political Change Over Eastern Europe"]

[Text] Political change in countries of the Eastern Bloc will have a negative impact on Third World economies, especially on developing nations whose development plans and programs are primarily dependent on trade agreements and protocols and on grants and loans. Most projects in the Sudan, especially in industry, were initiated with the help of socialist countries that are currently undergoing fundamental change.

The world has been scurrying to get ready for the unified Europe of 1992, which will integrate the customs duties and the peoples of 12 countries. Those countries are the Netherlands, West Germany, France, Luxembourg, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Spain, Italy, Greece, Portugal, and Britain.

We should be more apprehensive about 1990 if Romania were the last nail in the coffin of the communist theory and the blaring voice of the Polish solidarity movement were the first of those nails. We must be prepared for the Europe of 1990 that will be economically oriented towards countries that were formerly satellites of the communist theory. Today, all of them will blend into one economic amalgam.

Today, it is an irrefutable fact that the European community is uniting and cooperating. Observe as Germany extends a hand toward its sister and works to help it economically.

Where, then, is a place for other countries?

It would be a grave mistake to think of political developments in the Eastern Bloc as political change from communism to socialism, to democracy, or to whatever other nomenclature those countries choose. It would also be a mistake to believe that it would be easy for countries of the Third World to adapt to such political change that others might even consider to be an internal matter.

The fact is, the winds of change will economically sweep countries of the Third World in the form of a storm of rapid changes that call for every possible precaution.

The economic map will shift in the direction of the Eastern Bloc because of the availability of infrastructure such as roads, telecommunications, and paved overland routes, all of which the West requires.

That will be the first blow to the Third World. We will be losing investments, loans, and grants. As a matter of fact, all donor nations will be reviewing their agreements with Third World countries as they seriously consider investing in the Eastern Bloc and embracing it economically. Countries of the Third World will become nothing more than a vessel for the raw materials they need for their investments.

Now that things are more crystallized, we must go over our economic and investment studies. Reality propels us towards self-dependence in many projects and industries because some donor countries, or maybe all of them, offer aid in return for policies or principles and beliefs. Those bulwarks have tumbled one after another, making it imperative for Eastern countries to rethink their strategies since they will have need for the investment funds they [previously] donated to each other and to

their neighbors. Their objectives have changed and so have their governments, policies, and leaders.

The East and West, to put it more precisely, are now closer to capitalistic unity and integration. We will be witnessing this as soon as Russia launches those variables.

We must carefully study the issue from all angles and must be ready to depend on ourselves. I had previously criticized the former government's four-point program because it was dependent on foreign loans and grants for more than 60 percent of it. I am fearful that this subject will not be given the attention it deserves from Sudanese fiscal and investment authorities, and especially from those in charge of planning and implementation.

Serious deliberation is needed [to cope] with the extensive and comprehensive change ushered in at the conclusion of the 9th decade of this millennium. Are we prepared for it?

General 'Umar Hasan al-Bashir, the leader of the National Salvation revolution, has declared this year "Africa Year." African, and also Arab, politicians must find an economic formula for mutual help. We must unite with African and Arab countries because in unity there is strength and in division there is defeat.

As we prepare for the upcoming decline in economic investment, I do not believe that we would be able to attract investors by maintaining our current course in the face of those variables. I am merely suggesting to officials, and especially the economic commission, that a free zone for investments and investors be created along the Red Sea coast, much in the same manner as Port Said in Egypt. The zone would be subject to international free zone regulations. We can invest in it but we must keep it tightly secured against smuggling and monkey business by allowing access to the zone only to honest and ethical investors [as published]. We must start getting used to the idea that we will be using hard currency to buy a lot of our needs, or even all of them. We must, in order to attract foreign currency, develop modern vessels to replace the old methods that change in name only. A market like that would solve many of our problems and the port of Sawakin may be the ideal site for it. We must also rely on producing and exporting after purging exporters who smuggled export revenues abroad. We must take all necessary measures to deliver export revenues to the central bank.

The challenge we face is not a serious problem but we need to approach it with modern and innovative ideas in order to reorganize our ranks and to punish that minority that ruined this country's economy. We must focus on our output and on the requirements of the future.

I have sounded a warning and God is my witness.

IRAN

Second Phase of Distribution of Potatoes Begins

96J10202F Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI
in Persian 26 Feb 90 p 2

[Text] Following intensified activity on the black market for potatoes in some parts of the country, the second stage of the project to distribute and market this product justly was carried out, with the elimination of the sources of hoarded potatoes in identified warehouses and dealing decisively with hoarders and illegal speculators.

The black market for potatoes is appearing at a time when several thousand tons of the crop, which is under observation by those who apply the government penalties, have been marketed in various parts of Tehran Province, but this produce has not been marketed at the official price for months.

Now potatoes are only sold at the official price (135 rials per kilogram) in the markets affiliated with the Tehran mayor's office. However, due to the long lines and the excessive crowding, a number of citizens, despite standing around and wasting their time, were unable to buy this product.

Mr. Baba'i, chief of the Tehran market produce sellers, said concerning this: Unfortunately, a real and proper plan has not been implemented for the cultivation of potatoes. For this reason, one year they plant so many potatoes that they are not economical to harvest, and then the next year the farmers do not plant potatoes for fear of taking more losses. As a result, we are faced with shortages, high prices, and a black market for this crop.

He added: In the years 1365 [21 March 1986-20 March 1987] and 1366 [21 March 1987-20 March 1988], due to the willingness of farmers to plant potatoes, we were faced with a surplus of this crop, to the point that they could not even be sold at one toman per kilogram. Consequently, the amount of potato cultivation declined significantly and we were faced with such a shortage that the cost of this crop reached 20 tomans per kilogram.

The chief of the Tehran market produce sellers discussed the reason for the shortage and high cost of potatoes this year. He said: Last year potato farmers bought seeds at 30 to 35 tomans per kilogram and planted them, and since the price of potatoes was high, a great many farmers did not buy this crop, and therefore this year we will be faced again with a shortage and a black market. He said: Once again we remind the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Agriculture, the governor-general's office, the Government Penalties Staff, and other appropriate officials that if they do not make a real and operable plan for the potato crop, shortages and high prices can be expected for this crop next year as well.

He proposed: In view of the fact that there is a month and a half left before the harvest season for new potatoes, potatoes must be imported as quickly as possible to break the black market.

He added: In this way, the existing potatoes hoarded by profiteers will come onto the market and moreover, potato farmers will be able to buy potato seeds for planting at low prices, and then next year we will not see shortages and a black market for this market.

Mir'ali Negarandeh, an assistant on the Central Government Penalties Staff, gave an interview to the trade guild correspondent from the Islamic Republic News Agency. He said that the intensification of the black market for potatoes is due to the invasion of middlemen into the production centers for this crop and its unauthorized transfer to other parts of the country. He said: During the last two months, despite the prohibition on the transfer of potatoes from the area's production centers, some officials paid no attention to this matter and opened the outlets for the unauthorized export of potatoes from the production centers to the other parts of the country.

He added: For this reason, profiteering middlemen took advantage of the opportunity to buy potatoes at high prices in the production centers and transfer them to other areas to create a new black market for this crop.

Negarandeh added: Following discussions with the Ministry of the Interior, this ministry issued guidelines to the gendarmerie highway patrol asking them to prevent the unauthorized transfer of potatoes from the production centers. He said: Since early last week, with the implementation of the guidelines, supervision and control has begun for this important matter. For the same reason, the price for potatoes has dropped somewhat in the production centers.

Likewise, teams from the Central Government Penalties Staff have been sent to various parts of the country to carry out the second stage of the project, and have begun extensive operations to identify hoarders and potato hoards in warehouses (in accordance with Article Four of the Government Penalties Law).

According to this report, yesterday morning a public relations official in the Central Government Penalties Staff announced on a radio program: In view of the shortage of potatoes in some producing regions, plans have been made to import potatoes. Therefore there is no reason for any sort of worry, and God willing, in the near future, the black market for this crop will be broken.

Gilan Facing Fuel Shortage

90010180E London KEYHAN in Persian 22 Feb 90 p 4

[Text] Discontinuation of the export of Baku oil to the Islamic Republic during recent weeks has caused a severe fuel shortage in the province of Gilan.

In many cities of Gilan province, the people have to form long lines in front of the stores and other stations which sell white kerosene.

Reports from Gilan indicate that, despite the arrival of cold weather in this province, the National Oil Company of Iran has not been able to secure and distribute fuel products in the province and, at present, the people have to pay three times the official price for the purchase of one liter of white kerosene. Gholamreza Aqazadeh, the Islamic Republic's minister of petroleum, who had traveled to this region in order to inaugurate the Fuman gas distribution facility, told correspondents that the cause for the fuel shortage in the province of Gilan is the discontinuation of the import of oil products from the USSR.

He further added: On a daily basis, about 10 million liters of kerosene used to arrive in Iran, but unfortunately as a result of the recent incidents in this region this problem has come to surface. Through certain measures which have been undertaken, we hope to remedy this problem soon.

The managing director of the National Gas Company, who was also accompanying the minister of petroleum during his travel in Gilan, told correspondents: As of 1 April 1990, the Islamic Republic will be able to export eight million cubic meters of gas to the USSR on a daily basis.

IGAT-2 Pipeline To Be Extended to Soviet, Turkish Border

90010180G London KEYHAN in Persian 22 Feb 90 p 4

[Text] In order to make it possible to export more gas, the National Iranian Gas Company intends to extend the IGAT-2 gas pipeline along the Tehran-Qazvin route and terminate it at a point close to the Soviet Union or Turkish border. The construction operation of the IGAT-2 gas pipeline, which from the beginning was intended to export natural gas from the southern region of Iran to the Soviet Union, in 1979 as a result of unforeseen incidents pertaining to the Islamic revolution, came to a halt.

Mohammad Isma'il Kordchian, managing director of the National Iranian Gas Company, some time ago announced that the aforementioned pipeline will soon be extended as far as the border of the USSR or that of Turkey. The news regarding the possibility of the start of construction of the IGAT-2 gas pipeline, together with the announcement of the export of Iranian natural gas to the Soviet Union was put at the disposal of the mass media.

In the beginning of last week, officials from the National Iranian Gas Company announced that the export of Iranian natural gas to the Soviet Union will be carried out through the use of the IGAT-1 gas pipeline and this operation will get underway as of 1 April of the current year.

Some time ago, IRNA [Islamic Republic News Agency] mentioned the annual amount of natural gas exported to the Soviet Union as eight billion cubic meters. This figure is about three times more than the amount which was discussed in the negotiations of last year with regard to gas export to the Soviet Union.

The gas intended for export to the Soviet Union will come from the Nar-Kangan gas reserves. This gas will go through the purification process in a refinery which is planned to start operation in the current month of February. At present, the capacity of the said gas refinery is limited to about 34 billion cubic meters annually. In the future, it is planned to increase that capacity to 80 billion cubic meters annually.

The responsible oil authorities of the Islamic Republic are planning after the completion of construction of the IGAT-2 gas pipeline—which has been extended to Qom—to take certain measures in order to increase the capacity of the gas refinery of Nar-Kangan as well.

Engineer Kordchian, the managing director of the National Iranian Oil Company, told correspondents and other representatives of the mass media that in order to secure the necessary gas for the capital in emergency situations, plans are underway to construct an extensive gas storage facility near Tehran. He cited the capacity of this facility to be about two billion cubic meters.

Lead Free Gas To Go on Sale Next Year

90010180H Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 23 Jan 90 p 3

[Text] On a daily basis, one-and-a-half million automobiles throughout the city of Tehran, through the use of leaded gasoline as the primary source of fuel, spew 1,500 tons of lead, 4,000 tons of carbon monoxide, and a lot of other harmful gases into the city's atmosphere.

According to the Central News Unit, in a report which was published in this regard by the Petroleum Ministry's Center for Research and Scientific Services, it was announced that 70 percent of Tehran's air pollution is attributed to the fumes exhausted by automobiles.

The director of the Combustion and Fuel Unit at the Petroleum Ministry's Center for Research, in an interview with the Voice and Vision of the Islamic Republic, while making the above statement further added: Scientific research for the purpose of creating the possibility for the use of unleaded gasoline and liquid gas as automobile fuels, with regard to our climatic conditions, began four years ago and it is expected that as of next year, on a limited basis, certain measures will be put into action for the practical use of unleaded gasoline. Thereafter, through a long-term program, the use of unleaded gasoline and liquid gas in lieu of leaded gasoline will be increased accordingly.

He went on to add: The use of unleaded fuels mainly involves minor changes in the construction of the fuel

system of the automobiles, and this matter is currently observed aboard in the manufacture of new vehicles. Therefore it is necessary that we follow the same route in our country while manufacturing new automobiles as well.

The lead thus spewed into the air will eventually poison our atmosphere and create various other forms of lung and heart ailments, will possibly cause cancer, and destroy the vegetation life. Right now 80 percent of gasoline in the United States and 99 percent in Japan are lead free, and in many European countries the use of leaded gasoline is prohibited.

PAKISTAN

Commentary: Center, Punjab Need To Mend Political Ways

90010125A Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT
in Urdu 30 Dec 89 p 10

[Editorial]

[Text] Mian Nawaz Sharif, the chief minister of Punjab, speaking at a public meeting at Swat once again said, "We shall rid the country of the PPP's [Pakistan People's Party] leadership because this party has helped India to brow-beat Pakistan and because I have doubts about Benazir's patriotism." On the other hand, Ghulam Mustafa Khar, the present MNA [Member of National Assembly] and former governor of Punjab, in a press conference has said, "If the chief minister does a good job, we shall let him stay, but if he does not, I shall become the chief minister in his place." A little scrutiny of these statements brings us to the conclusion that each of these individuals is trying to do something which is not, properly speaking, his business. Mr. Nawaz Sharif, the chief minister of a province, is trying to play the role of the opposition leader, and Mr. Khar, a member of the National Assembly, is dreaming about becoming the chief minister of a province. Had these two gentlemen minded their own duties nobody could find fault with them. If Mr. Nawaz Sharif wanted to become prime minister and keep the PPP out of power, why didn't he think of it in 1988? He had been elected for two seats, one in the National Assembly and the other in the Provincial Assembly. He should have stuck to his National Assembly seat and tried to fulfil his own ambition and that of his advisors by trying to become the prime minister. If he had failed to become the prime minister, he could serve the country in the capacity of the opposition leader and could continue to criticize the PPP. The same can be said about Mr. Khar, who is the third nominee of the prime minister in Punjab. He won two seats in the National Assembly. He gave one to his friend Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, who was elected and is now the leader of the opposition. Now Mr. Khar seems to have no interest in his role as an MNA, nor has he any interest in his friend's leadership of the opposition. He has left Islamabad and the National Assembly and taken permanent abode at Lahore. The prime minister came to

Punjab and supposedly made him all powerful in the province. All the PPP members of the Provincial Assembly, as well as the party leadership, have rallied around him. Sitting in the midst of these people, Mr. Khar is challenging Nawaz Sharif that unless he mends his ways, he [Mr. Khar] would take his place as chief minister of the province. It appears that the PPP, having failed twice to topple the government of Punjab, has now appointed Mr. Khar to try it again a third time. Mr. Khar is trying to fulfil this mission at every cost. A better method to fulfil his ambition to become the chief minister of Punjab would be for Mr. Khar to leave his seat at the National Assembly, try to get elected for the Punjab Provincial Assembly for the continuency of his own choice. After that he can either become the chief minister, or serve the people of the province as the leader of the opposition. But we are afraid he will not be able to rise to the challenge. Nor will his opponent, Mr. Nawaz Sharif, be able to pinpoint his own role in politics. They will go on wasting their time in attacks and counter attacks, while the people of the province, whose welfare they both claim to have at heart, will remain a prey to ever mounting nervous tension. Ironically, our venerable president, despite the gravity of the situation, is trying to make the nation believe that all is well. Both of these opposing groups keep meeting the president. Recently, he met Nawaz Sharif twice, while Benazir meets him almost everyday. If the two opponents are not willing to listen to the president's words of advice, it is time that he took the nation in his confidence and exposed the duplicity of both groups. President Ghulam Ishaq is neither nor does he intend to be Fazal Ilahi or Giani Zail Singh. He should use his powers as the rightful president of the country and a veteran politician to cause these opposite groups to respect the rules and regulations of a parliamentary democracy. No problems will be solved if things are allowed to drift at will. Our politicians should know that these days political changes can come about without the help of politicians. The oppressed nations of Eastern Europe have started fighting for liberty. The people of our neighbor Afghanistan have made history by fighting for their own freedom. These winds of change can come our way too.

Government Said Not Sincere About Kalabagh Dam

90010125B Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT
in Urdu 30 Dec 89 p 10

[Editorial]

[Text] Sardar Farooq Lighari, the federal minister for water and power, has not consented to any project that could hurt national unity. He stated that the Kalabagh Dam project could be dropped unless all the four provinces consented to it. This is an old story. Sardar Farooq Lighari said nothing new when he talked about the condition of having a nation-wide consensus on the issue. As minister of power, he must be aware of the fact that Pakistan is presently in the midst of an energy crisis. He must also be aware of the fact that Kalabagh Dam is

meant to ease the situation by increasing the generation of electricity in the country. If his government, despite knowing these facts, insists on a country-wide consensus on the construction of the dam, it can only mean that they are not sincere in their desire to build the dam. No project in our country has been leased on total consent from all the provinces. Many politicians from Sind have declared that the Kalabagh Dam would be built on their dead bodies. In the same way politicians from the Frontier have threatened to blow it up with bombs if it is ever built. Hence the condition of nation-wide consensus cannot be fulfilled. Surely the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] government knows that projects that are meant for the benefit of the nation do not require a unanimous vote. Look at the People's Work Program, which the government is carrying out with such tenacity. Has it got consensus from all four provinces? Or take any other project that is being worked on. Has it been tied to the condition being accepted by all the provinces? The only reason why the Kalabagh Project is being fettered with this condition is because the federal government wants to kill it. Mr. Farooq Lighari is an educated man and an intelligent politician. He should advise the federal government to work on this project in all sincerity, instead of trying to kill it with the help of lame excuses.

Commentary Views Prospects for Midterm Elections

90010157A Karachi JANG in Urdu 23 Jan 90 pp 3, 10

[Article by Abdul Sattar Afghani entitled: "A Hint About Midterm Elections"]

[Text] Prime minister Benazir Bhutto has declared that although personally she is against midterm elections, she is quite prepared to hold them if forced to do so by the opposition. In a detailed interview she gave a BBC reporter, she said she is not afraid of the midterm elections. She said she was of the people and was not afraid of going to them. She said that the opposition wants the assembly to be dissolved. That is why they are spreading anarchy in the country. But, she said, her government would not allow the dissolution of the assembly. She further declared that the opposition is trying to spread terror in the land by printing frightening headlines in the newspapers. But, she said, the people should not take any notice of this because only about 10 or 20 people are engaged in this activity of spreading panic through newspaper headlines and inflammatory speeches. She said that now the opposition has left the parliament in order to play its game of insidious politics in the streets. One day after the publication of the prime minister's interview, Professor Ghafoor Ahmad, IJI's [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] general secretary, criticized the prime minister of wrongfully accusing the opposition leaders and newspapers of following antinational policies. He asked the prime minister to name one opposition leader who has demanded the dissolution of the assembly. He further said that it was Tikka Khan, the governor of Punjab, who had said that he wanted to dissolve the Punjab assembly. The Baluchistan assembly

has already been dissolved. If despite all these facts she accuses the opposition of wanting to dissolve the present assemblies, she is being very unfair indeed. From this interview it is clear that the prime minister herself wants to have midterm elections. She has the right to do so according to the Constitution. There is no need for blaming it on the opposition. Ghafoor Ahmad further said that if she thinks the public unrest is caused by the speeches of some leaders and the headlines of some newspapers, then we want to remind her that all the disturbing headlines come from the newspapers of her party, and all the antinational speeches are made by her ministers and advisors. Mr. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, the leader of the United Opposition, showed great surprise on hearing the prime minister's accusation and said that the opposition never demanded the dissolution of the assembly. In the same way Qazi Hussain Ahmad, leader of the Jamaat-i-Islami, advised the government to change its attitude towards the opposition. He said the prime minister herself wants to have midterm elections. He advised her to keep the political climate in the land peaceful, and try to fulfil the purpose for which the nation has elected her. He further said in the case of a midterm election the government will be completely routed. Maulana Fazlur Rahman, JUI's [Jamaat-i-Ulema-i-Islam] general secretary, and its working president, Shah Faridul Haq, Sherbaz Mazari, the leader of the NDP [National Democratic Party], Wali Khan, leader of the NAP [National Awami Party] have all rejected the idea of midterm elections.

On the one hand, the prime minister's resolve to have midterm election has given the PPP members a chance to define their objectives, and on the other hand, the members of the opposition are preparing to present another no-confidence resolution against the prime minister. The opposition is planning to lure away all PPP members who do not expect to be reelected in the midterm election. In this way a large number of PPP members will sign the no-confidence motion against the prime minister.

Knowledgeable people in the political circles are wondering why the prime minister, who has always rejected the idea of midterm election, has made such an offer herself. Some people think that she has decided to swallow the "bitter" pill of midterm elections because she is afraid of a dangerous step that the opposition is about to take against her.

In this connection, reference is being made to the meeting between the president and the good humored chief of the army staff, which took place on the occasion of the inauguration ceremony of the chief justice, Afzul Zilla, in the president's office, after the departure of the prime minister. The two were closeted for nearly two hours. Political observers think that the two had been discussing ways and means by which they could make the members of the assembly (who are unreliable and unpredictable) see reason and mend their ways. Now let us see whether the opposition presents the no-confidence motion first or the prime minister is the first to ask the

president to dissolve the assembly for the midterm elections. It is a rumor that the opposition has prepared the no-confidence resolution, complete with all the necessary number of signatures on it. They will soon present it to the speaker of the National Assembly. The last no-confidence motion was presented so suddenly that the federal government was taken aback. The opposition will soon give the prime minister another such surprise. This and other similar rumors, being spread by the opposition and other political groups, do not bode good to the country nor are they in the interest of the tender plant of democracy in our land.

For one thing, in this country (where all political parties are financially weak) the holding of elections every two years is unwise. Secondly, it does not give the voters a chance to judge the work their elected representatives have done. How will they decide to vote next time? It is best to let the present government complete its term. Give it a chance to fulfil the promises it made the nation at the time of the last election. This will help the voters to make the right decisions at the next election.

It is up to the prime minister to bring about a political atmosphere that would give the present government a successful tenure. The chief responsibility of the prime minister is to end the conflict between the federal and provincial governments. That is the only way by which democracy and its values can be served. In order to achieve this purpose, here are a few steps that must be taken:

(1) In accordance with the Constitution, a meeting of the Joint Interests Council must be called.

2) In view of the provincial objections to the people's program, changes should be made in that program, in the light of suggestions made by the provinces.

3) The amendment made in the law of Zakat and Ushr (made during the budget session of the current year) should be removed, and the law should be reinstated in the original form. It should not be connected with the financial bill.

4) The Punjab government is pleased because the federal government has allowed it to appoint officers of its own choice, instead of being forced to accept those appointed by the federal government. This pleasant attitude should continue, and the provinces should be given the freedom to appoint officials of their own choice. This will lead to cooperation between the federation and the provinces.

5) Recently the opposition presented a memorandum at Islamabad's television station, in which they stated all the complaints they have against television and the media in general. Steps should be taken to address the complaints.

If practical steps are taken to fulfil all the conditions mentioned above, we are sure the political climate of the country will change for the better, and the conflict

between the center and the provinces will come to an end. The federal as well as the provincial governments will be able to work peacefully through their elected members. That is what the country needs. That is how we can protect the Constitution as well as democracy and serve the poor and toiling masses of the country. Only in this way can peace and prosperity be ours. Now it is for the prime minister to decide which way she wants to lead the country. She is at a cross roads and the whole country is watching her next step. Will she be able to save the country, or will she take a wrong step and hurl the nation into an abyss where there is nothing but chaos, civil war, and destruction of democracy? May God guide her to make the right decision.

Concern Over Violent Crimes in Punjab

90010153A Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT
in Urdu 20 Jan 90 pp 9, 12

[Report by Anwar Qidwai from Lahore entitled, "An Individual's Political and Social Status Should Not Be Allowed To Obstruct Justice"]

[Text] Terrorism by hoodlums in Lahore's Moghulpura locality has aroused anxiety not only in Lahore, but among all peace loving citizens and patriotic political workers in the country. The reaction of this area's inhabitants against hooliganism should make the situation clear to those politicians whose eyes are open and whose hearing has not been impaired by the hubbub of power. If speedy and effective measures are not taken to rid the society of political and social hoodlums like Jugo, the inhabitants of Punjab, the largest province in the country, where law and order prevailed until now and conditions were much better than in Sindh, will fall prey as well to uncertainty and insecurity. The government should pay immediate attention to this serious problem and, with public cooperation, start a campaign to end the crime. The government and the police cannot accomplish the task by themselves. Murder has become a common occurrence. The people shoot and kill each other over small differences of opinion. According to the newspaper reports, 13 year-old Adeel was killed in Moghulpura over a quarrel among children. The accused criminal's brother was told not to bother the girls. On being told to stop their evil actions, the merchants of evil broke into a law-abiding citizen's home and opened fire with Kalashnikovs and Mauzers, wounding 13 year-old Adeel, his Uncle Taher, grandmother Nur Begum, and mother Talat. Little Adeel had come from London to celebrate his birthday with his grandmother. He fell victim to hooliganism, and a mother lost her dear son. The people of the area were already fed up with the hoodlums. They protested and set up a people's court. Jugo, who with his kalashnikov had become the symbol of terrorism in the area, fled at night with his family. The next day, on 11 January, which was to have been Adeel's birthday, the residents of Moghulpura set fire to three houses belonging to the criminal and his relatives, and burned the houses to the ground. They also attacked the police station and the subinspector of police. The reports

of the incident published in the press are both tragic and a cause for concern. It was reported that the criminal, Jugo, enjoyed the protection of the police and influential individuals, that he dealt openly in heroin and bribed the police, and that when public complaints increased and efforts were made to have the SHO [Station House Officer] transferred, the member of the national assembly from that precinct stopped the transfer.

Mian Nawaz Sharif, the chief minister of Punjab, took a serious view of the incident and ordered that the criminals be apprehended within 24 hours. The Punjab police inspector general even offered a reward of 100,000 rupees for the capture. The speedy attention given to this incident is commendable, but the authorities should pay attention not to just one incident, but to the situation as a whole. Our society and our country have become the targets of social and political criminals like Jugo. Sindh and in particular Karachi have been burning for a long time in the fire of prejudice and hatred. When a traveler from Karachi was asked about the conditions there, he said that the people had become accustomed to the situation. They heard the sounds of gunfire every day. Political conditions on the frontier are not much better. Heroin has created, in the country, a drug mafia who live high on the hog. The exercise of power does not consist of riding in luxury cars, sitting in the heated and cooled rooms of mansions, and summoning meetings. It does require the fulfilling of responsibilities entrusted to the authorities by God. It is the duty of those who rule to fully protect the lives, property, and honor of the people and to guarantee the people food, clothing, and shelter. Islam has even made marriage easy, so that an individual may start a family and live an exemplary Islamic life. The injunction of Omar Faruq, the second caliph, should guide all those who rule: "Even when a dog dies on the bank of Dejala river, I hold myself accountable for it."

Today's rulers should reflect on what their struggle for power has done to the country and the nation. No man's life, property, or honor are safe. Social and political hoodlums do as they please and the law cannot touch them. No one obtains just treatment from the police. On the contrary, because of the manner in which the police have been used for political power, the people are beginning to distrust them. The poor people get no justice, when it should be the first duty of the government to provide speedy and cheap judicial redress. A government that does not fulfill this responsibility has no right to govern. The people do not elect delegates by majority vote so that these delegates may start political battles among themselves. They vote for delegates so that they may solve the problems of the people and provide them with facilities.

The people of Pakistan deserve all these good things because they made sacrifices and put up an unparalleled struggle, over a long time, against martial law for the attainment of democracy. Are the individuals elected by the people carrying out their duties? Are the people facing any fewer problems, and are they receiving just treatment? The answers to these questions are not in the

affirmative. The confrontation between the center and the provinces has reached such a stage that Pakistani television, instead of helping to reduce crime in the country, tries instead to prove that the law and order situation is deteriorating in Punjab and, to that end, telecasts news and shows pictures of petty crimes. The fact is ignored that indulging in such actions in order to prepare a case against a provincial government harms law and order. The authorities are not undertaking any further constructive actions nor are they serving the people. It is the duty of the government to pay attention to those elected individuals who are guilty of protecting the undesirable elements. Such problems can be solved only with an iron hand. A statement by the prophet Mohammad clarifies the matter. He said that among the Israelites, when a man of substance committed a crime, he escaped legal punishment, but when a poor and weak man committed a crime, he was punished. This was the reason for the downfall of the Israelites.

Islam practices no such discrimination. Any man who commits a crime is punished. Murder is a serious crime and, in Islam, the murder of one individual is regarded tantamount to the murder of all humanity. Life is a blessing from God, and the taking of a man's life by another is one of the greatest crimes against humanity. Islam regards human life as a great blessing, but there are cruel individuals who, for the sake of personal interest, power, and illegal gain, play with human lives. These individuals are blinded by avarice and they cannot see whether the life they extinguished belonged to their own home. All will have to face the day of judgment and answer for their actions. Those who are not afraid of worldly justice should remember that they will not escape the final accounting, but will suffer the torment that awaits them.

Commentary Condemns Hyderabad Violence

90010166A Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 1 Feb 90 p 3

[Editorial]

[Text] The events that took place in Hyderabad have once again shocked the people. The expectations of peace have once again been shattered. The people were thinking that the public meeting of 26 January would however do away with the prejudice, and that the slogans of peace and brotherhood raised unanimously by all the leaders would have a positive effect. However, the violence that erupted first in Model Colony and then in Malir and now the carnage and massacre in Hyderabad has renewed the bloody scenes all over again. The killing of innocent people will not help anyone. This is like inviting the divine wrath. There is no use blaming any one group or community for the violence. But the question is why can't the subversionists be brought to justice. These masked men open fire from cars and, after creating unrest, disappear immediately. These unknown car travellers were not caught during the martial law

regime and they are not being caught during this democratic regime. The intelligence machinery of the government failed to catch them before and have not succeeded in catching them now when everything is within the reach of the government. After all, one is tempted to ask why it is not possible to identify these subversionists. The only possible answer is that a group of the Party in power, that was supporting the subversionists then, is supporting them today too. This is why these people are not being caught, and as long as they are not caught this bloody drama will continue. Not only the future of Sindh, but the democratic future of the whole country is threatened by these bloody incidents. Democracy thrives and flourishes in an atmosphere of peace and understanding. Democracy cannot prosper in an atmosphere of violence and unrest, but is destroyed and reduced to ashes. If the unrest continues in Sindh, then it can mar our political future.

We had previously suggested that the situation in Sindh did not deteriorate in one day and neither can it be rectified in one day, and that one party can not control it. Everyone should participate in controlling the trouble that has been started. The PPP [Pakistan People's Party] leaders make offensive statements against MQM [Muhajir Qaumi Movement], which in turn holds the PPP responsible for the worsening situation. The charges and counter charges are of no use. Whether it be the PPP, MQM, or other parties, or the people, the majority want to live in peace and are grieved. These people should set aside their political differences and work together for peace in Hyderabad, where a curfew was imposed five times during the past two months. Every time a curfew is imposed, the poor people suffer. They cannot attend their jobs, and all business goes topsyturvy, besides terrifying the citizens. In Hyderabad the mutual conflict of the politicians will serve no purpose. All of them should unite and work together for peace and tranquility. This is the need of the hour in Sindh and the country. The chief minister, Qaim 'Ali Shah, has ordered the immediate arrest of all the murderers. We pray that they are arrested. There is no doubt that these murderers were wearing masks. They should be unmasked lest Sindh gets into the grip of a civil war. If there is bloodshed in Sindh no one will benefit from it, neither the Sindhis, nor Mohajir, nor Pathan. Everyone needs peace, especially the needy people who cannot earn their livelihood without peace.

Sindh: Situation Sparks Serious Concern

Proposal for All Parties' Conference

90010179A Karachi AMN in Urdu 20 Feb 90 p 3

[Editorial: "Law and Order Should Be Enforced"]

[Text] President Ghulam Ishaq Khan expressed some opinions and gave some advice to the nation and the politicians, while addressing the municipal committees' convention at the historical Sabi fair. His advice is very timely and to the point. In addition to discussing several

other issues, he pointed out very sympathetically and sadly that the Sindh problem was becoming chronic. He said that every Pakistani was shedding tears of blood over this problem, while the terrorists and mercenary killers were roaming the street freely. Spreading prejudice, distrust, and lawlessness are old and tested weapons of the enemy and there is no doubt that these will hurt us again. We do not disagree with his comment that gambling with the rights of the people for political interest is the same as treason. He added that we should not waste time in accusations and counter-accusations and should face the realities of life bravely and realistically regardless of how bitter they are.

There is no doubt that the president had echoed the inner voice of every patriotic Pakistani. All this bloodshed, terrorism, murders, and violence are against not only the nation, but Islam and humanity. We will be doomed if all this does not stop. It will doom those who are secretly supporting the terrorists and those who aggravate the situation by issuing instigating statements. Those who are directly involved in terrorism and destruction will also suffer. Everyone will benefit if all this is stopped totally, and those who are involved in terrorism and other activities are given exemplary punishments. The factors that encourage these enemies of the nation and humanity to play with blood should also be removed.

The president did not only express his genuine sorrow over the bloodshed in Karachi and Sindh, but also talked about plans that the federal government was following to end this. An important aspect of this plan is the establishment of a high level court commission to investigate these incidents. This commission, however, can collect information only when those who know facts come forward and share these with the commission. Also, all efforts to influence the commission directly or indirectly should be stopped. However, we have noticed that several important politicians have started making accusatory statements since the announcement to establish this commission was made. They have even used television for this propaganda. Some people are rightly feeling that these politicians are trying to influence the commission members. These efforts should be banned immediately.

The second important aspect of this effort is the proposed conference of all parties. Leaders of various political parties have been contacted in this context. However, this effort is very slow compared to the seriousness of the problem and the effort is limited to Sindh only. This effort, however, is still very helpful. It is important to mention here that some people rightly or wrongly blame the chief minister and Punjab's IG [Inspector General] for all the problems in Karachi and Sindh. They believe that the root of these problems is outside of Sindh. If these allegations are correct, then the logic behind the efforts to keep the All Parties' Conference limited to Sindh alone is beyond our comprehension. The All Parties' Conference should involve the whole nation.

Anyhow, it is important to call this conference as early as possible. All political leaders who care for the unity, prosperity, peace, and economic development of the country should attend it ignoring all kind of political affiliations. They should call a spade a spade here. If this conference is used as just another platform for political debate and all political leaders, ignoring the facts, support their party members regardless of the propriety, then not only will the conference fail to achieve its goal, but the chasm of difference between these parties will widen. Patriotism demands that the real causes of unrest in Karachi and other areas in Sindh be identified and efforts be made to rectify them. The most important of these efforts should be providing appropriate employment to all residents of Sindh, following all government policies and procedures strictly, and enforcing the law fairly and firmly.

PPP Government Said Not at Fault

90010179B Karachi AMN in Urdu 20 Feb 90 p 3

[Column: "From Jumma Khan's Pen"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] It is no secret that after the failure of the no-confidence campaign, several opposition members in the National Assembly have either joined the ranks of the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] or have announced that they will cooperate with it. Thus, the curtain on the new no-confidence motion has fallen, and now even the idea of starting a new campaign would be very embarrassing to the united opposition parties.

This situation clearly illustrates the fact that it is not possible to change the government using the constitutional approach. Since the opposition is not interested in midterm elections, it should abandon the politics of confrontation and focus on efforts at cooperation. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto has been repeatedly asking that all of them should keep the national interests in mind, ignore political confrontation, and work together for the country's welfare. The opposition, however, never let on its propaganda campaign. We can never grieve enough over the increased incidence of violence.

The people are being influenced by the poisonous propaganda carried out by the opposition. They are worried and wonder what will happen the next day. There are worse problems in other democratic countries, but those countries are taking care of these in a democratic way. For example, if we call Sindh a trouble-making state, then what would East Punjab in India be called? We all know what is happening in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh.

However, the prevalence of regional problems in India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka does not mean that we must have violence in one of our regions. We cannot deny the fact that the PPP can not be blamed for the situation in the Sindh. This is the result of the seeds sown during the 11 years of dictatorship. It is not possible to solve all the political and economic problems left by the former government overnight. There is plenty of hatred, prejudice, and complaints while the government has but

limited resources. An atmosphere of mutual trust would help solve these problems faster. The suspicions and lack of trust, however, could not be removed and minor problems were blown out of proportion.

The government is not ignorant of these problems; it knows them well. Limited resources restrict it. Meanwhile, the suffering masses want their problems solved before the next sun rises. They had hoped that all their problems would be solved as soon as democracy was established! We should remember that General Zia also led a government and his prime minister, Junejo, also ran the government for three years. Why didn't they solve the problems? How can the present government solve these problems in one or two years, if they failed to solve them in three and 11 years of their leadership. It takes time to solve problems that are many years old.

How can they provide employment to one-half million applicants when there are only 50,000 government jobs available? New jobs can be created only by expanding the existing department. New industry can also increase employment opportunities. When trade expands, business organizations will need more employees. However, new jobs cannot be created if there is no peace. The government can focus on developmental projects only if there is peace and harmony. The opposition created crisis after crisis, from the first day the government was established.

The government has to clean up the mess of the last 11 years and meet the people's expectations. This cannot be done in two or three years. The opposition did not realize the sensitivity of the situation, demonstrated impatience, and did not cooperate, ignoring all the facts. Thus, the government faces a new crisis daily.

Sindh: Ideological Rifts Discussed

90010166B Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 1 Feb 90 p 3

[Article by A. H. Khanzada: "Who Wants Sindh Divided?"]

[Text] Sindh, the land of golden farms, lush green farms, enchanting fables, melodious and sweet tongue, culture filled with music and melody, the land of hospitality, the land of the poets Sachal Sarmast and Shah Latif, which was once the abode of love, is today burning in the flames of hatred and animosity. Some places are rife with regional and linguistic prejudice, others with prejudice of caste and creed. In some places there is prejudice between the poor and the landlords, in others prejudice exists between the haves and the have-nots. In some places, no in all places, prejudice between farm workers and landlords, all kinds of prejudices not among the people of other places, but the inhabitants and children of this very land. Their individual and collective interests too are dependent on Sindh. They earn their livelihood here and spend their earnings here too. They were born here and will die here. What then is the reason for the flames of hatred that are marring the peace and tranquility in this land.

Today, the cities and villages of Sindh are the targets of intense cruelty because there is looting and plundering going on everywhere. But now even the government officials and some of the elected members of the assembly, who have taken the oath of serving the people, are also engaged in the looting and plundering going on in Sindh, for the sake of their own personal gains. They are looting the Sindh which they call "Jeejal Sindh". The situation prevailing in Sindh today is a source of concern for the people living in the cities, but the people living in the villages also are not happy with their lot. They are the victims of so many problems that they have no confidence in the present government. The son of a poor farmer living in Sindh, first of all, gets an education with great difficulty and, even when he manages to pass his exams, working day and night the most he can become is a primary teacher. But now, even in order to become a primary teacher, he has to get a recommendation which costs money. These problems exist not only with any particular class of people, but generally speaking with all classes of people. The injustice has reached such heights that a [Sindhi] provincial minister, in order to get his brother who has passed MBBS [a medical degree] appointed assistant commissioner on his own quota, has to run around days on end. If an attempt is made to inform the people of the prevalent situation, then they are told that they cannot see the democratic system of government in the country. According to the present rulers, democracy consists of bribery, commission, and brokerage. Despite all of this, the present rulers view everything as a conspiracy against themselves and their supporters. But the present democratic government has not taken any democratic steps against dictatorial cunningness.

The prevailing situation in Sindh can be summed up best by the statement of a nationalist political leader who said that Sindh will not be allowed to become a Beirut. A leader cloaked in the appeal of the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] advised the Sindhi people to sell their luxury goods and buy arms and ammunition. There are some such individuals who, taking advantage of the present conditions, are seeking to hunt two victims with one shot. They are the people who are responsible for the outbreak of violence in the interior of Sindh without participating in it. They want the situation in Sindh to deteriorate so that the most honorable person in the PPP, Sayid Qaim 'Ali Shah, may be removed from office. If they cannot succeed in doing this, that is bringing about his removal, then they start riots in Sindh locally as well as outside Sindh so that all the non-Sindhis from the interior of Sindh may be forced to leave for Karachi, Hyderabad, or some other place, and its reaction would be felt in places wherever the non-Sindhis may go. What else can the non-Sindhis do except go away from the interior of Sindh. The person who has forced the non-Sindhis to leave for other places has power and authority, controls the police, the administration, and the government.

It is a historical fact that when the Sukkur barrage was built in Sindh people from other villages were invited.

Under these conditions, those settlers too are victims of various problems. On the one hand non-Sindhi settlers in Sindh are subjected to inhuman treatment. The standing crops and gardens on their fields are destroyed, their children are not admitted to educational institutions, and if by chance some individuals do succeed in getting admission in some schools they are thrown down from the second and third stories. The situation in the cities and the villages is such that the shops are closed in the evening and the police heed more to what the dacoits say than to the citizens. Recently the non-Sindhis who demonstrated against the desecration of Barbari Mosque in the localities at Obaron and Ghoongi created unrest themselves and non-Sindhis were disgraced. In other words, they are being forced out of the interior of Sindh by every means possible. Under these circumstances, if this process is not stopped and if one class of people are continuously subjected to persecution, then at last some day the movement of people from the interior of Sindh will come to a stop. The people moving out from such places will have come to secure places and that day will be the first day of the division of Sindh.

The leaders who do not want the partition of Sindh and are determined not to give lives should think coolly to see if they are not playing an important role in the division of Sindh. Mr. Altaf Hussain, the leader of MQM [Muhajir Qaumi Movement], addressing the general meeting of the Combined Opposition Parties, held on 26 January, said in clear and un-ambiguous terms that they would like to live and die in Sindh and Pakistan with dignity and honor, and that they should be allowed to live with honor. After this announcement, the situation should be evaluated to see who wants the division of Sindh and what the reason behind these objectives can be.

In one way the imaginary division of Sindh has already been accomplished. In the past elections the people who won the elections from the cities and those who won the elections from the villages belonged to two different factions. This is a clear indication of this fact. Now it is necessary to somehow remove this imaginary partition from the minds of the people instead of creating conditions that would make the partition possible. In the interior of Sindh, one class of people are being discriminated against. Their crops are being burned, their gardens are uprooted, and their children are prevented from obtaining an education. People are being dragged out of cars and buses and are being disgraced. Above all, when someone wishes to sell his property worth hundreds of thousands of rupees, they are offered an outrageous amount of only a few rupees. Who is doing all this and why. The question is whether the people swearing by Sindhri can tell us if the partition of Sindh can be stopped by such acts.

Pakistan-loving people, irrespective of what language they speak or to which class they belong, want the division of Pakistan. But the people claiming and boasting of love for Sindh want the partition of Sindh so that their lust for power may be fulfilled. But patriotic

Pakistanis—whether they be Sindhis, Baluchis, Pakhtoons, Punjabis, or Muhajirs—will not allow this conspiracy to succeed. The people dreaming of this lust for power and wishing for evil for Pakistan and Sindh will be left in despair forever. Pakistan is the only biggest guarantor of survival, independence, and freedom for Muslims all over the world. Pakistan can be independent, prosperous, free, and powerful only if all of us live and die as Pakistanis. Pakistan is an ideology, and the people who die for this ideology do not die but live forever.

India Seen Winning Battle for the Minds of Sindhi Youth

90010151A Lahore NAWAW-I-WAQT
in Urdu 20 Jan 90 pp 9, 12

[Analysis by Tariq Warsi from Rawalpindi entitled, "The Enemy's Ideological Inroads in the Beautiful Sindh Area of Pakistan: Hatred, Territorial and Provincial Prejudices Have Inflamed Everyone."]

[Text] Tranquillity reigns in Islamabad. The business of life and government proceed slowly and unhurriedly without noise and agitation. The national assembly and senate have adjourned for an indefinite period. The members of Parliament have returned to their comfortable homes. Even when they gather in the capital city to make fateful decisions, their faces radiate tranquillity and comfort. Slowness is part of their nature. In fact, seriousness has disappeared from national affairs. But peace and tranquillity sometimes are the forerunners of those silences which make it appear as though there is muteness everywhere. Here, one does not hear the tumult raging in some parts of the country, the effects of which pose a terrible danger to our national life and existence. Those who guide the ship of state pay no heed to the consequences of the situation and seem to be laboring under some unknown illusion. They are insensitive to the pain of the national tragedies which the country has suffered in the brief 42 years of its life. They do not know that as the silence of night deepens and the inhabitants of the localities, mansions, and sectors of the capital flock like ardent lovers to watch the news, at that same time the inhabitants of Sindh lock their doors and cower inside their houses hoping that the hail of bullets from kalashnikovs does not change direction and reach their abode. Robbers, masked men, and kalashnikovs are the present currency of Sindh. The need to express these views arose because on the day celebrating the end of suppression and violence against the press, Professor N. D. Khan, a high official in the ruling PPP [Pakistan People's Party] central leadership, sketched the situation in his province and referred to the conditions there. He lightly contrasted the serious situation in Sindh with the pleasing atmosphere of Islamabad.

During his term in office, Mr. Junejo was afraid of venturing into certain areas. Now, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto stays in large cities such as Hyderabad and Karachi and summons officials and notables to

meetings. The reason may be that while the hearts of Sindh's inhabitants beat with devotion to Bhitai, they tremble at the thought of the "mystic bandit". Whether big or small, today no big man can go to Sindh and make any claims. If anyone talks big, hordes of masked bandits appear some evening and bathe him in his own warm blood. No one can be certain that he will sleep safely at night and wake up the next morning to go about his daily chores. Hatred, territorial prejudice, and provincial discrimination have set every individual aflame in Sindh. There was a time when this land of Shahbaz Qalandar and Sachal Sarmast was far removed from anger and sang sweet songs of love, friendship, and peace. In this province, holy men were welcomed, not only from Sindh but from Punjab and Baluchistan as well. The Islamic traditions and national values expressed in the love, sincerity, and hospitality of the brotherly inhabitants of Sindh used to revive memories of the humility and self sacrifice of the noble families of Arabia and Hejaz and their sweet and loving manners. Even today when some areas of Sindh are in the mood to change the direction of their gaze, the sweet sounds of their language awaken the desire of brotherhood. But Sindh today is at the crossroads of decision. The desire to find new ways can soon assume the shape of Mukti Bahini. The crop now being reaped in Sindh will be reaped by those who tilled the soil, made it ready for cultivation by the power of thought, and sowed the seed according to their own needs and interests. They labored for 40 years to raise this crop. They waited and now the fields are ready to be harvested by the "cultivators" who are preparing themselves for the task. Those who nurtured this crop by talking, planning, working, who dedicated and even gave their lives to carry out the conspiracy are now happy. They see the obvious signs of the success of their work and are satisfied that there is no longer any need for anxiety; that whatever happens now will be in accordance with their wishes; that no Muslim leader or guide will be able to change the mind of the Sindhis. God Forbid! We see that most of those leaders who express their views or their anxiety over the situation in Sindh say what they feel after leaving Sindh. Inside Sindh, they are cautious about openly expressing their concern.

When India and Russia were together coloring the map of Bangladesh, the patriotic leaders there adopted the same cautious behavior. They would think a thousand times before uttering an emphatic word against Mujibur Rahman and his pro-India faction. That was not an ordinary victory, but one of the overwhelming triumphs of separatism. It is not easy to inspire such terror in the hearts of patriotic politicians with influence and reach, but once this objective is achieved, other traitorous stages are gradually reached and passed. The same process is speedily taking place in Sindh. Just as the enemies living in Bangladesh sheltered the military "squatters" in their homes, in the same way a stage will be reached in Sindh when the enemies of the country will recognize their companions by their white dresses and open the doors of their houses to them. This stage is still some distance in the future, but someone has to be

ultimately responsible for keeping an eye on the events. Regrettable incidents of insult to the national flag are occurring in Sindh, and certain circles are expressing joy over the acceptance of non-Islamic values in place of Islamic traditions. In 1970, similar incidents of disrespect to the crescent and star national flag were occurring in various areas of East Pakistan. Enemy businessmen, teachers, and lecturers brought matters to that juncture in Muslim Bengal. Now in Sindh, the same elements are working to create Sindhudesh. They are the people who have prepared the crop.

Acting on a predetermined plan, these individuals established contact with the children of Sindh 40 years ago. These Muslim Sindhi children either helped their parents in the fields or spent the day roaming aimlessly in the streets. The large landowners cursed and kicked them, extracted forced labor from them, summoned them to their mansions to cut the crop. On the other hand, throughout Sindh, the enemies gave these children cigarettes to smoke and tea to drink and enjoy. They showed the children kindness and even put a few pennies in their pockets.

The enemies thus built a wall around the new Muslim generation of Sindh and made them believe that once the Muhajirs from Karachi, businessmen and cultivators from Punjab, and Pathans from the frontier were expelled from Sindh, the poverty of the Sindhis would be ended; that the hundreds of thousands of families from "outside" who had settled in Sindh had robbed the original Sindhis of their share. The enemy has been inculcating these ideas in the minds of Sindhi children starting from the time they enter primary school. To prepare Sindhi children mentally for the acceptance of these ideas, the enemies of the country devoted their time, wealth, intelligence, and leisure. To carry out their plot of destroying Pakistan, the enemies put on a show of affection, used sweet talk and patience. They have completed the psychological stage of their mission. A large number of Sindhi youth regard Muhajirs, Punjabis, and inhabitants of the frontier province as their enemies and the reason is that for the past 20 or so years, that is what they have heard. The voice that told them this has made a place for itself throughout Sindh. It has introduced and promoted a new concept in the minds of the new generation of Sindhis. Whether it be a plot or an affirmative plan, it is the concept which is formed first. Efforts are made and movements are started to promote it. The enemies introduced a concept in the minds of the Muslim youth of Sindh and promoted the concept by demonstrating self-sacrifice. The crop they sowed is now ready, and the final decision will soon be made. You can judge for yourself whether this decision will be in favor of those who worked hard or of those who did nothing; who established no contact with Sindhi Muslims, but continued to oppress him. Has it ever happened anywhere that those who sat idly by succeeded, while those who worked hard did not? This would be both unreasonable and unnatural. These elements will not rest until Sindhudesh is achieved.

Ibn-'Alqami, the prime minister of the last caliph of Baghdad, similarly worked for many years and sacrificed his peace and comfort. He proceeded from one stage to another while Baghdad and its inhabitants, the caliph's supporters, ministers and advisors, wise men and spiritual leaders, quarreled among themselves until the Tartars entered Baghdad, reduced it to rubble, and changed the course of history. A similar drama was played out in Bangladesh and is in progress now in Sri Lanka. The same roles have been played in Sindh during the last 40 years. Pakistan never discriminated against any of its citizens, but it is also a fact that certain elements never accepted Pakistan wholeheartedly as their country nor lifted a finger to work for its interests. When it comes to handing over territories and governments to the enemy, no one can match the Muslims. They returned the whole of Andalusia to the Christians, tore up the noble history of Granada and Cordoba, and left the grief of the loss of Andalusia in the heart of Islamic history.

Muslims experienced the tragedy of the fall of Baghdad, but learned nothing from it. We saw the fall of Mysore, Murshidabad, Delhi, and later, of East Pakistan, and now, God Forbid, the dangerous signs of the loss of Sindh are evident and thus pose questions and demand answers from Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, and Qazi Hussain Ahmad. Indictments are under preparation.

Is there a limit to the government's ignorance of events, denial of facts, and deviation from the real situation? Pakistanis have seen in the press the published report of the warning issued by a member of the American Congress to the effect that Pakistan is in danger from all four sides. We hear about ourselves from others.

Why is the sacrilege of lying being committed in a sacred institution like the Parliament? What is the reason for hiding the true state of affairs? The same questions that were posed to the leaders of Muslim Bengal in 1970 are now being asked of Pakistan's leaders, but the questions were not answered then nor will they be answered now because only those who have worked can answer the question. After all, anyone can recite poetry. Those Pakistanis who visited the holy city of Ajmer after the 1965 war must still be alive. They were told loftily that it did not matter; that it was 1965, but in the future they would snatch away Bengal or Sindh. That was not just a statement, but a summary of the enemy's plans. But we did not learn from experience. Our leadership is doubtful, our objectives shaky, our ranks agitated by doubt and poverty, and our hearts are broken. We get no message of light, unity, and strength from any direction. We hold meetings only to level as many charges and accusations as possible. We get together to devise ways of entering the avenues of power without work or self-sacrifice. We are not ready to approach the people, but if we did, what could we give them? The people would demand a Constitution, they would ask awkward questions and want accountability.

We are fulfilling the promise that we made to present, in these columns, a picture of the destruction caused by the psychological tunnels dug by the enemy in Pakistan's beautiful area of Sindh. The enemy has completed the ideological stage in its effort to defeat the ideology behind the creation of Pakistan. The slogans being raised in Sindh, the "political literature" written over the doors and the walls can be termed the Sindhi edition of Bangladesh. It poses a great challenge to those sitting in the ranks of Pakistan's patriotic leadership. They should reflect on whether resistance efforts should be based on a show of enthusiasm or on wisdom and thought. The enemy has opposed one ideology with another. It has promoted its own ideology, made it successful, strong, and powerful. Switching the tracks of a railroad incorrectly can cause great havoc and, in no time, derail and destroy a train. Should the conspiracy to switch the ideological tracks under the speeding "national express" train succeed, nations would be destroyed.

The defeat of an ideology and the destruction of centuries of effort can bring about wide and unforgettable destruction, not likely to be remedied for several centuries. Such an event can crush societies and push

humanity to the limits of its endurance. The people of Pakistan cannot endure such cruel blows any more. Their leaders should realize the pain felt by the nation and prove their own courage and honor. The leaders should remember that with a degree of organization, it is possible at any time to destroy the bandits who rob gold and jewels from houses and mansions, but it is not easy to combat those who rob the ideological treasure of nations. Before the challenge posed by ideological bandits who rob the ideological wealth of nations can be met, it is necessary that leaders possess wisdom and farsightedness and be united. Such a confrontation demands revolutionary and universal planning. Do the leaders of the party in power and the opposition have the ability and patience to accept the challenge of those who are lying in ambush in Sindh, with the intention of destroying the ideological and geographical integrity and unity of Pakistan? These leaders are doing all that they can for themselves and their friends; but do they have the courage and the capacity to make sacrifices for Pakistan? This is a question being asked by the people of all four provinces. Will anyone answer the question? "...All we have is to inform [arabic phrase]...."

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

09 April 1990